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The history of Ireland is complex, and has been plagued with religious, 
political and military influences that have created divisions within its population. 
Ireland’s experience throughout the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars 
highlighted and intensified such divisions that have influenced Irish society into the 
twenty-first century. This body of work is an analysis of the British army in Ireland 
during the period 1793 to 1815, which proved to be a critical era in British and Irish 
history. The consequences of the events and government policies of that time helped 
to determine the social and political divisions within Ireland for the following two 
centuries.  
The intension of this thesis is to provide an analytical synthesis of the military 
history of Ireland during this time, focusing on the influences, experiences and 
reputations of the various elements that comprised the Irish military forces. This 
revisionist study provides an holistic approach by assessing the militia, yeomanry, 
fencible and regular regiments in relation to their intended purpose within Britain’s 
strategy. By focussing on deployment, organization, performance, leadership and 
reputations, as well as political and military background, a number of perpetual 
misconceptions have been exposed, especially in relation to the negative 
historiography surrounding the Irish militia and yeomanry due to sectarian bias. 
This work shows that Ireland became an important facet of the tactical and 
strategic thinking of both the French and British governments at this time, with 
Britain needing to defend the kingdom against any possible invasion to secure its own 
defence. This resulted in the British military occupation of a kingdom whose 
population had been polarised by civil rebellion, invasion and renewed religious 
bigotry. A close examination of the military history of the kingdom during these 
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crucial years provides a better understanding of how the Irish became, and remained, 
a socially and politically divided people, while being subjected to the political and 


































In 2003 I enrolled at the University of Canterbury as a mature student to study 
for a degree in history. After eighteen years in the New Zealand Police, and with a 
young family, I considered it time that I re-evaluated my career options. I had always 
been a prolific reader of history and my thirst for historical knowledge remained 
unquenched, so undertaking a programme of formal study was the obvious option for 
me to take. During my undergraduate study I was fortunate enough to enrol in 
Eighteenth-Century Rebellions in Britain, a course taught by Professor John Cookson, 
which sadly, due to his later retirement, is no longer available to students. This course 
introduced me to the 1798 Irish Rebellion, a revolt which I had previously known 
very little about but which now intrigued me, especially due to my Irish ancestry. 
Thus, the decision to conduct a study of the military history of Ireland during the 
period of 1793-1815 for my Masters thesis proved a natural choice in that it combined 
my longstanding interests in military and Irish history. 
In this thesis I have attempted to provide a balanced synthesis of the military 
history of Ireland during these turbulent times, by examining the various elements of 
the Irish military establishment, the roles they played and the events with which they 
were involved. What became very obvious early in my reading was that the Irish 
played a significant part in the defence of Britain, as well as their own country. Until 
recently, the traditional British bias towards the Irish has been responsible for the 
limited recognition of this, especially in regard to the Irish militia. Generally lacking 
the training, discipline and professional supervision of regular regiments, the militia 
provided the majority of troops who effectively contained and extinguished the 
rebellion prior to the bulk of the reinforcing British regiments arriving from Britain. 
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Admittedly, I found myself having some empathy with the plight of the militiamen in 
dealing with their fellow Irishmen, when reflecting on my own service as a policeman 
in my home-town of Westport, where on occasions I was required to act as an agent 
of the government in containing aggressive protests against unpopular government 
policies affecting the local economy. 
My sincere thanks must go to John Cookson, whom I am heavily indebted to 
in regard to this work. It was he who initially suggested the topic to me and agreed to 
supervise me in this endeavour after he had already supervised my Honours 
dissertation. Not only has he provided me expert advice and guidance in ensuring that 
the thesis has developed from the raw draft initially presented to him, but he also 
provided me with his collection of primary source notes and microfilm that have 
proved invaluable. Although well-deserved, his retirement is a loss to the University 
of Canterbury and to future history students. I am also indebted to Graeme Dunstall, 
who as my senior supervisor provided sound guidance and critique that ensured the 
improved structure of the thesis. Thanks must also go to Judy Robertson, office 
administrator of the School of History, for her welcoming smile and helpful manner 
that has ensured my time studying history has remained hassle free. I would also like 
to acknowledge the dedication and professionalism of the other academic staff of the 
School of History who have provided me with enthusiasm and support throughout my 
time at Canterbury. 
Undoubtedly, my greatest thanks must go to my wife, Susanne, whose love, 
support and sacrifice has ensured that I have been able to take my passion for history 
to another level. She encouraged me to follow my dream when others questioned my 
sanity in relinquishing ‘a perfectly good salary’ to lead the impoverished life of a 
student with a family. However, the student lifestyle has ensured that I have been able 
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to combine study with quality family time, with my children, Seamus and Niamh, 
unable to avoid being indoctrinated with my views of historical issues. Thus, it is to 
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An Introduction: the British military in Ireland in the eighteenth century- 
towards crisis. 
 
The history of Ireland is colourful and complex, and has been plagued with 
religious, political and military influences that have created divisions within its 
population for nearly one thousand years. Ireland’s experience throughout the French 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars highlighted and intensified such divisions that 
have influenced Irish society into the twenty-first century. The intention of this thesis 
is to provide an analytical synthesis of the military history of Ireland during this time, 
focusing on the influences, experiences and reputations of the various elements that 
comprised the forces in Ireland. To date only a small number of comprehensive 
academic studies have been made of the Irish establishment at this time, with only 
three comprehensive studies fully focussing on either the Irish militia or the Irish 
yeomanry. Although these studies have provided greater knowledge of these 
individual corps, they do not provide an overview of the Irish military experience 
during the period. Most work relating to this era in Ireland has focussed specifically 
on the rebellion and French invasion of 1798, but has failed to include the post-
rebellion years that saw a massive increase in the numerical strength of the Irish 
military establishment which led effectively to the military occupation of the country. 
This revisionist study provides an holistic approach to promote a greater 
understanding and a more accurate account of the components that made up the armed 
forces in Ireland, their involvements in critical events, and of the influences and 
experiences that have shaped the historiography surrounding these corps. This has 
been done by identifying the critical factors that influenced the military experience in 
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Ireland and critically analysing the traditional views, some of which have been 
prejudiced by religious, racial and political bias. 
The historiography surrounding the military history of Ireland during these 
years of conflict has been moulded by political motivation of nineteenth-century 
Ascendancy and British historians, such as Sir Richard Musgrave and Sir John 
Fortescue, and more recently in the twentieth-century by Irish academics, such as 
Allan Blackstock and Thomas Bartlett, encouraged by the strength of Irish national 
identity. Ascendancy-minded historians have focussed on the loyalty to the crown of 
the Protestant yeomanry, while vilifying the Catholic population and militia for being 
untrustworthy and infected by revolutionary fervour. Most nationalist historians have 
tended to portray the 1798 rebellion as a Catholic national uprising against an 
oppressive government, backed by a yeomanry corps intent on murdering Catholics, 
while marginalising the militia as nothing more than an oppressive element of the 
British army.1 This thesis aims to provides a less partisan approach to the topic, 
fostering a more balanced view by exposing inconsistencies and evidence that have 
either purposely been ignored or have yet to be analysed. Essential records relating to 
the Irish yeomanry and militia were destroyed in the Four Courts fire during the Irish 
Civil War of 1921-1922, although sufficient data has been obtained from other 
primary sources that provides crucial evidence of individual corps, such as official 
returns submitted by the lords lieutenant of Ireland, located in the Home Office papers 
of the National Archives at Kew. Some reliance has been placed on the 
comprehensive studies of the Irish militia by Sir Henry McAnally and Ivan F. Nelson, 
as well as the studies on the Irish yeomanry by Allan Blackstock,  as apart from these 
                                                 
1 S.J. Connelly (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Irish History, New edition (Oxford, 2004), p. 504 
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works, the only serious examinations of these organisations has been limited to a few 
academic journal articles. 
An examination of the military history of Ireland during this period is 
fundamental in gaining an understanding of the complex nature of Irish society and 
the creation of two separate Irish nations. This body of work is a critical analysis of 
the British army in Ireland at the time which assesses the militia, yeomanry, fencible 
and regular regiments in relation to their intended purpose within Britain’s strategy. 
By focussing on deployment, organization, performance, leadership and reputations, 
as well as political and military background, not only has a greater understanding of 
the military history of Ireland during this period been achieved, but also a number of 
perpetual misconceptions have been exposed, especially in relation to the negative 
historiography surrounding the Irish militia and yeomanry due to sectarian bias. This 
necessitated separate chapters for both organisations. A number of significant 
questions have remained unanswered by historians, which this thesis attempts to 
resolve by placing them into context with each other. Such questions include: How 
true was it that Ireland was considered too important to Britain for its defence to be 
left to the Irish?; How much conflict was there between the ‘Hibernianization’ of the 
armed forces of the British crown and continued rule in Ireland?; How well did the 
Irish militia and Irish yeomanry serve the purposes of the British government?;  What 
conclusions can be deducted from the deployment patterns of the Irish units?; Was the 
Protestant Ascendancy correct in questioning the loyalty of the mainly Catholic 
militia?; What legacy did the British army leave Ireland as a result of military 
operations during the period? By addressing these questions it has become clear that 
Ireland and the Irish played a important role in the defence of Britain, which has been 
generally overlooked by British historians. What remains the most significant result of 
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the events of 1798 was the military occupation of the kingdom by Britain which was 
to last for more than a century. 
The period of 1793 to 1815 was a critical era in British and Irish history. The 
consequences of the events and government policies of that time helped to determine 
the social and political divisions within Ireland for the following two centuries. A 
close examination of the military history of the kingdom during these crucial years 
provides a better understanding of how the Irish became, and remained, a socially and 
politically divided people, while being subjected to the political dominance of Britain. 
These years saw the rise in militant republicanism that was influenced by the ideology 
of the French Revolution and was popular amongst some factions of the middling 
classes. In response there was resurgence of militant Protestant loyalism that had 
initially evolved in the early 1780s. Revolutionary politics of the mainly Protestant 
middle-class, coupled with traditional agrarian grievances of the rural Catholic 
peasantry, led to the rise in internal violence and destruction of property.2 Renewed 
war with its traditional foe, France, along with the need to counter increasing 
insurgent activities, forced Britain to augment its military forces in Ireland on an 
unprecedented scale. Ireland became an important facet of the tactical and strategic 
thinking of both the French and British governments at this time, with Britain needing 
to defend the kingdom against any possible invasion to secure its own defence, while 
France intended to capitalise on Irish unrest in an effort to distract British military 
resources from campaigns in the Caribbean and on the Continent.3 This resulted in the 
British military occupation of a kingdom whose population had been polarised by 
civil rebellion, invasion and renewed religious bigotry. 
                                                 
2 Mike Cronin, A History of Ireland (Basingstoke, Hampshire, 2001), p. 105 
3 Donald R. Come, ‘French Threat to British Shores, 1793-1798,’ Military Affairs, vol. 16, no. 4 
(Winter, 1952), pp. 174-188 
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Ireland became a military and political enigma for Britain during the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. The essential defence of the kingdom created a 
number of dilemmas that compounded the manpower issues facing the British 
government in time of war. Compared to France, Britain’s relatively small population 
ensured it had limited manpower resources for either defence or offensive operations. 
Heavily committed on the Continent and the West Indies, operational requirements 
forced the British army to transfer regular infantry regiments from the Irish 
establishment. In response, British Prime Minister, William Pitt, instigated the 
formation of the Irish militia to make use of the largely untapped Catholic male 
population that his government had recently permitted to bear arms in defence of their 
country. However, this caused conflict with the majority of the ruling Protestant 
Ascendancy in Ireland who feared the rise of the Catholic majority, claiming that they 
could not be trusted due to their traditional Jacobite sympathies and allegiances to the 
Pope and Catholic monarchy of France.4 The army also had to deal with the 
conflicting demands of counter-insurgency operations while having to deploy a 
sufficient force to meet any invasion. The events of 1798 illuminated the problems 
faced by the authorities in Dublin Castle who had to quell rebellion and defend 
against invasion, while attempting to temper factions of zealous Protestants whose 
continued violence towards the Catholic population promoted further internal unrest. 
This did not prove easy as the contradictory ideologies and tactics of the military high 
command promoted confusion and ill-discipline within the army, fostering further 
violence; Ascendancy-minded generals Carhampton and Lake encouraged counter-
                                                 
4 J.E. Cookson, ‘Arming Catholics: The Irish Militia, 1793-1815,’ Unpublished paper presented at 
A.M.B.H.A. Conference, February 1995, p. 5 
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terror tactics, while generals Abercromby and Cornwallis favoured a more liberal and 
humane approach.5 
The Protestant Ascendancy caused the greatest predicament for Britain in 
Ireland in the 1790s. The nationalistic fervour of the armed volunteers of the 1770s 
and 80s during a time of war with the American colonies and France had seen Britain 
relinquish legislative power to the Irish parliament in 1783. However, by the early 
1790s the rise of the republican movement and its potential for Catholic emancipation 
led to the Ascendancy to seek the military support of Britain to maintain their control 
of the kingdom. This led to a change of direction for the Protestant minority who now 
saw closer ties to Britain as the only means to protect their interests. The Protestants 
focused on religion as a tie to Britain, openly displayed through the rise of the Orange 
orders that were incorporated into the yeomanry. It was such fervour that led Britain 
to reclaim political control of Ireland through the Act of Union in 1801. The chaos 
caused by constant civil unrest and the excessive violence against Catholics, 
encouraged by the Ascendancy, convinced liberals such as Pitt and Cornwallis that 
the only alternative was for Ireland to be incorporated into the United Kingdom.6 The 
military reverses of 1798 were unfairly blamed on the militia to hide the inadequacies 
of the high command and its policies, further promoting the mistrust of Catholics. 
This was endorsed by the Ascendancy who called for the augmentation of the 
predominantly Protestant yeomanry, which it claimed was the only national force that 
could effectively defend its and Britain’s interests in Ireland.7  This resulted in the 
militia being marginalised to being seen as a source for regular recruits, with the Irish 
garrison being further reinforced by British fencibles and English militia.       
                                                 
5 Charles Ross (ed.), Correspondence of Charles, First Marquis Cornwallis, vol. 2 (London, 1859), p. 
355 
6 Cronin, pp. 114-116 
7 Allan Blackstock, An Ascendancy Army: The Irish Yeomanry, 1796-1834 (Dublin, 1998), pp. 289-290 
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The French revolutionary principles of ‘Liberty, equality and fraternity’ were 
popular within certain sectors of the Irish population in the 1790s and such 
philosophies helped to determine the crucial events of 1798. These principles were 
embraced by the Presbyterians of Ulster, whose religious beliefs were in line with the 
democratic doctrine and who hoped to gain the political power that was denied them 
as religious dissenters. Factions within the Irish peasantry also incorporated some of 
these principles with their separate agrarian issues, especially in County Armagh and 
the Ulster borderlands where violence became prevalent by 1796. Such principles also 
gained support to varying degrees from the four million disenfranchised Roman 
Catholics who, until 1793, could not buy or sell land, practice law, teach, enter 
university, vote or enter parliament, bear arms, or purchase commissions in the armed 
forces.8 Political agitation was fuelled by publications such as Tom Paine’s The 
Rights of Man and Wolfe Tone’s An Argument on behalf of the Catholics in Ireland, 
leading to the formation of new political societies.9 The ‘Society of United Irishmen’ 
campaigned for radical reform and the limitation of English influence in Ireland, 
while supporting the re-instatement of Catholics into Irish politics. Their ultimate aim 
was for total independence from Britain and the formation of a republic, although 
initially such policies were not publicised.10 Political tension grew within the 
kingdom, with the British prime minister, William Pitt, arguing that concessions 
needed to be made to Irish Catholics to counter revolutionary ideas, regardless of the 
position of the Irish parliament in Dublin.11 This led to the removal of some of the 
Penal Laws in 1793 that had legally deprived Catholics of their civil rights for most of 
                                                 
8 Thomas Bartlett, ‘Defence, counter-insurgency and rebellion: Ireland, 1793-1803,’ in A Military 
History of Ireland, eds. Thomas Bartlett & Keith Jeffrey (Cambridge, 1996), p. 247 
9 David Dickinson, Daire Keogh & Kevin Whelan (eds.), The United Irishmen: Republicanism, 
Radicalism and Rebellion (Dublin, 1993), pp. 256-258 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ivan F. Nelson, The Irish Militia, 1797-1802: Ireland’s Forgotten Army (Dublin, 2007), pp. 30-33 
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the eighteenth century. Other moves which proved unpopular with the Protestant Irish 
oligarchy included the disbandment of the old Volunteer movement and its 
replacement with a militia controlled by the government. Catholics were entitled to 
enlist in the militia, ensuring they were now armed, which led to protests from 
Protestant sectors and increased sectarian tension. Starting in County Armagh, clashes 
between Catholic ‘Defenders’ and Protestant ‘Peep o’ Day Boys’ led to the formation 
of Loyal Orange societies that quickly became powerful elements within Irish society 
and were initially looked upon with some concern by the British authorities at Dublin 
Castle. However, by 1796 the government was more preoccupied with the 
suppression of the clandestine activities of the United Irish and the Defenders that 
were actively promoting rebellion. 
The army in Ireland had dual tasks of maintaining the peace and defending the 
kingdom from invasion. Up until the 1790s this was successfully achieved by the 
small number of British regular regiments stationed there. However, war with France 
from 1793 created added pressure on the Irish military forces. The shortage of troops 
required to fight in overseas campaigns led to a rapid reduction in the number of 
regular infantrymen on the Irish establishment. The creation of the 38 militia 
regiments that year ensured the augmentation of the infantry component of the 
garrison at a time when internal security was seriously threatened, although the 
loyalty and competency of the predominantly Catholic and poorly trained militia was 
questioned by many.12 When the United Irishman, Wolfe Tone fled from Ireland in 
1795 he succeeded in persuading some of the French Directory that Ireland was a 
weak spot in Britain’s defence system and that a French invasion would spark a mass 
popular uprising that would end British rule. By 1796 the Irish army was fully 
                                                 
12 Ibid., pp. 15-16  
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stretched with few regular troops to provide a sufficient force to repel an invasion, 
while most of the militia regiments were dispersed into small detachments throughout 
the kingdom to counter insurgency.13 The fact that a large fleet carrying a sizable 
French army led by General Hoche had managed to evade the Royal Navy blockade 
and anchored in Bantry Bay in December 1796 proved that the security of Ireland was 
seriously under threat and emphasized the inadequacies of the government’s defence 
strategy. 
The threat of invasion accelerated the polarization of Irish society. The 
outlawed United Irishmen established an underground military organization and allied 
themselves with the Defenders in an effort to gain mass support from the Catholic 
peasantry. In response to demands from Protestant gentry for the means to defend 
themselves from insurgent activities, and as a safeguard against invasion and 
insurrection, a force of yeomanry was established that actively enlisted the 
vehemently Protestant Orangemen. Tension mounted with the introduction of the 
Insurrection Act of 1796 which enabled the lord lieutenant to proclaim certain areas to 
be ‘in a state of disturbance.’14 This act allowed for searches, curfews, press-ganging 
of suspected insurgents, calling-out of the yeomanry and the quartering of soldiers in 
the homes of citizens without compensation. Such moves proved highly unpopular 
and led to excesses and acts of cruelty by government troops that went unpunished 
and fuelled resentment. As more areas were proclaimed to be in a state of disturbance 
and searches led to arrests and the seizure of weapons, pressure grew on the United 
Irish to act before their organization was too weak to be effective.15 Thus, in May 
                                                 
13 Earl of Camden to the duke of Portland, 19 March 1796 (National Archives, Home Office Papers, 
HO 100/60) 
14 Bartlett, ‘Defence, counter-insurgency and rebellion: Ireland, 1793-1803,’ pp. 262-265 
15 Nancy J. Curtain, The United Irishmen: Popular Politics in Ulster and Dublin, 1791-1798 (Oxford, 
1994), pp. 65-66 
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1798 the long-awaited rebellion erupted without the support of a French invasion that 
was essential to give it any chance of success. 
The 1798 uprising was a tragic episode in Irish history that had political and 
social ramifications for future generations of Irishmen. Massacre and atrocities were 
perpetrated by both government and rebel forces, each feeding on long-held hatred 
that was sponsored by religious bigotry. A bloodbath ensued in the few counties 
where the rebels succeeded in gaining active popular support, especially in Meath, 
Kildare, Wicklow and Wexford, with the hated yeomanry and hundreds of innocent 
Protestant civilians being targeted by Protestant and Catholic insurgents.16 The rebels 
fought bravely, and though poorly armed and ill-organised, initially inflicted some 
reverses on detachments of government troops that mainly consisted of militia and 
yeomanry. However, once the government forces were concentrated into sizable 
bodies the rebel armies were contained and quickly defeated. Due to the lack of 
experienced leadership and significant active popular support within the United Irish 
movement in Dublin and its surrounding counties, the rebel forces in Meath and 
Kildare lacked direction and soon after the outbreak of the uprising lost the initiative 
and were either captured, surrendered or were mercilessly killed by government 
forces. It was only in County Wexford, where the combination of a number of factors 
ensured the rebellion gained significant popular support. Recent counter-insurgent 
operations, combined with the limited number of troops stationed in the county and 
economic hardship had inspired a number of Protestant gentry, as well as the Catholic 
peasantry, to rise against the government.17 The county was quickly captured by the 
                                                 
16 Thomas Pakenham, The Year of Liberty: The bloody story of the great Irish Rebellion of 1798 
(London , 1972), pp. 132-140 
17 Daniel Gahan, ‘The Rebellion of 1798 in South Leinster,’ in 1798: A Bicentenary Perspective, ed. 
Thomas Bartlett, et.al. (Dublin, 2003), pp. 109-111  
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rebels and a short-lived republic was established that seriously threatened the internal 
security of the kingdom. 
However, all attempts to expand the republic into neighbouring counties were 
defeated. The United Irish suffered heavy reverses at Arklow and New Ross, losing 
the military initiative. Lacking essential military experience within the senior 
leadership, the rebel forces remained disorganised and eventually concentrated at 
Vinegar Hill, near Enniscorthy, where they were easily defeated by a number of 
converging government columns. The rebel army was dispersed, with hundreds being 
slaughtered in the rout, including women and children.18 And although a small 
number escaped into the Wicklow Mountains to continue guerrilla-style operations up 
until 1803, the uprising had been effectively dealt with. The failed rebellions in Ulster 
in June 1798 proved even less successful for the United Irish movement and were 
decisively extinguished within two weeks. Government counter-insurgent operations 
in the province had successfully weakened the revolutionary organisation that ensured 
that the risings in counties Antrim and Down were uncoordinated and lacked 
experienced leadership.19 As with the uprising in Dublin, government spies had 
successfully penetrated the rebel movement ensuring that military forces could be 
mobilized to counter insurgent activity. 
The subsequent French invasion in August the same year came too late to aid 
the rebel cause. After landing on the coast of county Mayo, the small force of 1,100 
men led by General Humbert, captured the town of Castlebar and established a 
republic.20 The defeat and ignominious rout of the government troops, known as the 
‘Castlebar Races,’ became a stain on the reputation of the British army for which the 
blame was placed unfairly on the Irish militia. However, the outnumbered and 
                                                 
18 James Hewitt (ed.), Eye-witnesses to Ireland in Revolt (Reading, Berkshire, 1974), p. 92 
19 Bartlett, ‘Defence, counter-insurgency and rebellion: Ireland, 1793-1803,’ p. 281 
20 Richard Hayes, The Last Invasion of Ireland (Dublin, 1979), pp. 140-146 
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isolated French column was eventually surrounded and forced to surrender at 
Ballinamuck, County Longford, on 8 September after Humbert had attempted to 
march on Dublin to release imprisoned rebel leaders. The invasion failed to inspire the 
mass popular support that the exiled United Irishmen, such as Wolfe Tone and Napper 
Tandy, had promised. And although there were minor risings in counties Longford 
and Westmeath, where rebels had hoped to link up with the French force, the 
insurgents were easily defeated by government troops. At Granard, County 
Westmeath, an ill-conceived and disorganised attack on the garrison was dispersed, 
while at Wilson’s Hospital in County Longford, an estimated 200 rebels were 
slaughtered in the hospital grounds after they had negotiated to surrender.21 Some 
United Irishmen from these defeated groups did manage to join the French only to be 
killed at Ballinamuck. The massacre of five hundred of rebels who were forced to flee 
after the French had surrendered was followed by the summary execution of the 
majority of the 90 insurgents who were captured.22 Further atrocities were committed 
by government troops in mopping-up operations in the recapture of Killala in County 
Mayo.23 And although the rebellion was over, reprisals continued that ensured further 
unnecessary deaths that fostered permanent division between the Protestant 
Ascendancy and the Catholic majority. 
Despite the repression of the rebellion, military resources in Ireland had been 
severely tested. The continued demand for regular troops to be taken from the Irish 
establishment ensured that Dublin Castle accepted the offer of English militia 
regiments to serve in Ireland, alongside the numerous English and Scottish fencibles 
units that remained in the kingdom until their disbandment in 1802. Exaggerated and 
                                                 
21 Pakenham, pp. 370-372 
22 Ibid. 
23 Harmen Murtagh, ‘General Humbert’s Futile Campaign,’ in 1798: A Bicentenary Perspective, eds. 
Thomas Bartlett, et.al (Dublin, 2003), p. 186  
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politically motivated reports concerning the undisciplined behaviour of the ‘Catholic’ 
Irish militia regiments during the events of 1798 promoted a reputation of 
untrustworthiness that was to affect the components of the Irish garrison in the post-
rebellion years.24 The uprisings were portrayed by the Ascendancy as a Catholic 
rebellion set on the removal of the Protestant oligarchy.25 Therefore, the 
predominantly Catholic militia could no longer be fully trusted in the defence of the 
kingdom, ensuring that greater reliance was now placed on the yeomanry to provide 
internal security. Loyalism was now rampant within the Protestant population, 
including the Presbyterians of Ulster, leading to a massive augmentation of the 
yeomanry that eventually saw membership exceeding 80,000.26 This was more than 
four times that of the militia which had been restricted by law not to exceed more than 
25,000 men.27 The militia became an embarrassment to the government and, apart 
from a few ‘Protestant’ regiments together with the ad-hoc elite light company 
battalions who were considered worthy enough to be incorporated into the army 
reserve, the majority of the militia regiments were relegated to secondary roles of 
garrison duty in Ireland and England. In effect, the Irish establishment became a 
Protestant army of occupation with the marginalisation of the militia, the expansion of 
the yeomanry and the increased number of British auxiliary troops in Ireland. 
Nevertheless, Ireland continued to provide a flood of recruits to the militia and 
regular regiments, despite the events of 1798. At a time when enlistment in the army 
was entirely voluntary, there was a steady flow of Irish Catholics recruited into the 
British army throughout the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. However, by 
comparing the rapid expansion of the yeomanry to the estimated Protestant male 
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population at the time, it is clear that Protestant Irishmen generally preferred to defend 
their interests in Ireland rather than serve overseas.28 It appears that such trends may 
have been encouraged by the government to ensure internal security by legally 
removing thousands of potentially volatile military-age Catholics from the kingdom 
while increasing the number of armed loyal Protestants. An examination of Home 
Office archives indicates that regiments sent to recruit in Ireland post-1798 were 
stationed in counties with high Catholic populations, with few being posted in Ulster 
where the concentration of the Protestant population and yeomanry corps was 
greatest.29 However, it could also be argued that these regiments were simply posted 
to locations that provided the greatest number of recruits in the shortest time, and no 
doubt this must have been a consideration of Horse Guards with the constant demand 
for troops during the period. Ultimately, Irishmen, whether Protestant or Catholic, 
enlisted for self-interest. Protestants joined the yeomanry to protect family and 
property, while the Catholic peasantry generally enlisted to provide an income for 
their families in a time of economic hardship. Whatever the motivation, the Irish 
proved to be reliable soldiers and an essential element of the British army both in 
home defence and overseas operations. 
The historiography surrounding the Irish establishment during the period has 
been influenced by political intrigue and religious intolerance. This is most evident in 
the lasting reputations of the militia and yeomanry where the ‘Catholic’ militia 
became synonymous with ill-discipline, disaffection and disloyalty, while the 
‘Protestant’ yeomanry established a reputation for loyalty and reliability. Such 
attitudes were promoted by contemporary Ascendant politicians and historians, such 
as Sir Richard Musgrave, who played on the fears of Catholic domination in Ireland 
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to secure their own interests through British military support. Exaggeration of 
massacres became the orthodoxy of a reinvigorated conservative Protestantism in 
Britain and Ireland with the publication of Musgrave’s memoirs in 1801 which further 
fuelled the underlying fear of slaughter by Catholics that had remained in Protestant 
psyche from the stories of the massacre of Protestants in 1641 during the English 
Civil War and the Williamite War of the early1690s.30 By focusing on atrocities 
committed by the Catholic rebels against Protestants during the uprisings and 
emphasizing the perceived poor performance of the militia, these zealous loyalists 
intended to prove that the Irish Catholic population could not be trusted and were not 
deserving of emancipation. Thus by depriving the Catholic majority of any political 
power, the Protestant minority could maintain control of the kingdom. Irish Catholics 
had traditionally supported the Jacobite cause and their supply of recruits to the Irish 
Brigade of the French army throughout the eighteenth century was seen as proof of 
disloyalty to the Hanoverian regime. Such strategies proved fruitful in preventing 
emancipation for a time and secured the military dominance of Britain over Ireland 
through to the early twentieth century. However, it was not until the late twentieth 
century that in-depth study has revealed a less partial account of the era.  
The lack of regimental returns that has survived regarding the Irish militia and 
yeomanry has limited the accuracy that can be established regarding these 
organisations. However, there is a wealth of other primary source material that 
ensures a sound appreciation of the military establishment, issues, strategies and 
operations in Ireland in the 1790s and early 1800s. Home Office Papers (100 series 
relating to correspondence between the lords lieutenant of Ireland and the Home 
Secretary) at the National Archives in Kew provide evidence of the official decisions 
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and opinions of the governing authorities at the time. The official returns submitted by 
the lord lieutenants of Ireland contained in these papers are invaluable in confirming 
the official strengths of the Irish establishment throughout the period, as well as 
providing crucial information regarding the stationing of each corps. They prove to be 
essential in providing data as to when and what British units were transferred to 
Ireland. Examination of these records clearly prove that Ireland was an essential 
recruiting ground for Britain and that contrary to Ascendancy propaganda, Irish 
Catholics were considered sufficiently loyal enough to fight for a Protestant king. The 
official correspondence of Charles, the Marquis Cornwallis, provides evidence of the 
difficulties facing the British government in dealing with the complexities of Ireland 
at this time, as well as the thoughts of those who pushed for union with Britain The 
Kilmainham Papers, relating to the administration of the Irish military establishment, 
and the Rebellion Papers, a collection of personal correspondence relating to the 1798 
uprising, held in the National Library of Ireland, Dublin, also provide an insight into 
the views, attitudes and experiences of individuals within organisations that 
influenced the period. 
The rise of interest in Irish history in the late twentieth century has ensured 
that there is a wealth of secondary sources to aid this study. Although published in 
1949, Sir Henry McAnally’s book, The Irish Militia, 1793-1816, provides the most 
comprehensive study of the Irish militia. This has been complemented by Ivan F. 
Nelson who provides a more analytical approach to the early years of the militia in 
The Irish Militia, 1793-1802: Ireland’s Forgotten Army, published in 2007. Both 
authors challenge the traditional poor reputation of the militia and provide sufficient 
evidence to substantiate their arguments which are supported in this thesis. An 
Ascendancy Army: The Irish Yeomanry, 1796-1834, by Allan Blackstock remains the 
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most comprehensive study of the yeomanry to date and has proved invaluable in 
providing sources and data relating to the controversial corps. Thomas Pakenham’s 
The Year of Liberty: The bloody story of the great Irish Rebellion of 1798, remains the 
most comprehensive narrative history of the rebellion, with the bibliography 
providing a rich source of primary material. Thomas Bartlett’s A Military History of 
Ireland provided an initial overview of the complexities of the Irish military forces 
during the period, while J.E. Cookson’s The British Armed Nation, 1793-1815 proved 
essential in gaining a thorough understanding of the significant part Ireland played in 
the defence of Britain. The periodical of the Military History Society of Ireland, The 
Irish Sword, proved a lucrative source of academic articles surrounding Irish military 
issues of the era, while K.P. Ferguson’s PhD. thesis from Trinity College, Dublin, 
‘The army in Ireland from the restoration to the act of Union,’ also provided essential 
data. 
The thesis has been divided into chapters that emphasize that during this era, 
the military forces in Ireland largely served British interests in the kingdom. Few 
historians have reached this conclusion, with the exception of John Cookson in The 
British Armed Nation, because they have only examined individual elements within 
the Irish establishment without considering a broader context.  The minor exception to 
this conclusion was the yeomanry which, although officially under the control of the 
government at Dublin Castle, seemed to have had some autonomy in that it was 
localised and its use was dictated by the interests of the local gentry. Chapter Two 
relates to the formation and distribution of the militia prior to the rebellion, and 
emphasises that though predominantly Catholic in composition, the militia was a truly 
national force through its inclusion of Protestants. The militia proved essential in the 
defeat of the uprising and a study of experiences leading up to the rebellion provides a 
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greater understanding of why the regiments performed as they did. The following 
chapter focuses on the yeomanry and how and why it came into being. The yeomanry 
proved essential in the British defence strategy in that it provided localised protection 
and intelligence which the regular army was unable to offer, while allowing the 
concentration of troop for counter-invasion operations. Chapter four explains the 
composition and management of the Irish establishment leading up to 1798 and is 
essential in understanding the changes that took place in the post-rebellion era which 
are examined in Chapter six. The events and experiences of the rebellion and French 
invasion are covered in Chapter Five. These events and the aftermath need to be 
closely examined and understood in an effort to achieve a less biased and non-partisan 
view of the whole period which seems to have been lacking amongst British and Irish 
historians of the two centuries since. 
Arguably, 1798 proved a watershed in Irish history and has differing 
significance within factions of Irish society. The events of this period have been 
coloured not only by nineteenth century Ascendant historians who have emphasized 
the negative aspects of Catholic participation and largely downplayed or simply 
ignored the unfavourable features of Protestant involvement, but also by Catholic 
memorialization of 1798 fostered by the rise in Irish nationalism in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. By closely examining the relevant available primary source 
material a more enlightened view and a better understanding of the military 
organisations and of those who influenced them in Ireland during the period can be 
obtained. In doing so it has become clear how the religious bigotry and division in 
Irish society plagued the country for so long. A closer study reveals serious flaws in 
the traditional historiography surrounding the military history of Ireland in this era, 
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especially in regard to the militia, that needs to be exposed to ensure a more balanced 






























The conventional view of the Irish militia is of an ill-disciplined and poorly 
trained Catholic corps that had been infiltrated by the United Irishmen, was subject to 
subversion, and thus could not be trusted in the defence of Ireland.31 This view was 
reinforced by exaggerated, and sometimes false, reports concerning negative 
behaviour of individual militia regiments during the rebellion and French invasion of 
1798. This chapter exposes some of the myths and inaccuracies that have stained the 
reputation of the corps, but also provides an understanding as to how and why some 
of these have developed. Political expediency, religious bias, mistrust and fear of the 
Catholic peasant majority by the Protestant minority can account for the unfavourable 
attitudes towards the militia. This has been perpetuated by Sir Henry McAnally, who 
provided the first comprehensive study of the Irish militia but failed to provide a 
complete analysis of the corps performance during the uprising. However, there is 
clear evidence that contrary to such adverse views, in general, the militia played a 
significant role in the defence of the kingdom, either in dealing with rebels during the 
rebellion or by providing thousands of semi-training recruits to regular British 
regiments. This study goes beyond that of Ivan Nelson, whose work on the militia 
only covers the years 1793 to 1802, by examining its role and influence to the end of 
the Napoleonic Wars in 1815. This is crucial in exposing the importance of the corps 
in the broader defence of Britain.      
The arming of the Irish population through the formation of the militia and 
yeomanry was a necessary consequence of war with Revolutionary France. The 
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demand for service of regular army regiments outside the British Isles led to a 
massive reduction of the Irish establishment and posed a serious threat to Britain’s 
defence system. When war was first declared in 1793 the Irish establishment, then 
consisting of 11,094 regular troops, was well under strength from the 15,000 men set 
by the British government in1769.32 However, this number was further reduced to 
less than 4,000, with battalions being required for campaigns in Flanders and the W
Indies.
est 
                                                
33 Securing Ireland from external invasion and internal rebellion was necessary 
for maintaining Britain’s defence system and a substantial military force was needed 
to ensure this. An immediate solution was found in the posting of English and 
Scottish fencibles to Ireland from 1794, as only a few regiments of the newly 
established Irish militia were operational at the beginning of that year and the Irish-
recruited regular regiments were being immediately shipped out of the kingdom once 
they had reached full strength.34 At this time it was considered that the raising of the 
militia, and the later yeomanry, from within the local population would provide the 
necessary manpower for a substantial garrison that was not available from Britain. 
However, the creation of these forces, the way they were employed and the 
reputations that they acquired during this turbulent period were to have a dramatic 
effect on the future political and social development of Ireland. 
The Militia Act of 1793 provided Ireland with a citizen army for its defence. A 
similar act had been introduced to Ireland in 1778 during the American War of 
Independence but had never been enforced. What had subverted the formation of an 
Irish militia during this time was the creation of patriotic volunteers into independent 
armed associations from 1776 until 1793. These formations were independent of any 
formal government control, with the politically ambitious and democratically elected 
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leadership of landed gentry and middle-class professionals, supported by the rank and 
file, eventually gaining substantial political influence that assisted Ireland in gaining 
full legislative independence in 1782.35 This ensured that the volunteer movement 
became a subject of suspicion that posed a threat to British influence in Ireland. The 
earl of Rutland claimed that it was ‘impossible to bring them under subordination’ 
and that there was a need to restore ‘the sword to the executive.’36  The creation of the 
militia was seen by the administration at Dublin Castle as an opportunity to remove 
this threat, as well as the threat of increased rural disturbances created through the rise 
of Catholic Defenderism, by providing a government-controlled armed force for 
internal security. In December 1792 the earl of Westmorland, then the lord lieutenant 
of Ireland, wrote to the British Prime Minister, William Pitt, stating that the Irish 
cabinet had decided that it was now essential to form a militia in an effort to put down 
the volunteering spirit.37 Once the Militia Act was introduced and the militia 
regiments embodied, the numerous volunteer corps were forced to disband through a 
proclamation by the lord lieutenant. 
The Irish militia was a subject of controversy from its inauguration. The 
Militia Act authorised the formation of 38 single battalion regiments to be established 
from each county as well as from a small number of cities, such as Dublin, Limerick 
and Cork.38 In 1793 many members of the Irish Ascendancy, including the lord 
lieutenant of Ireland at that time, the earl of Westmorland, insisted that only 
Protestants be recruited into the militia. They argued that Catholic loyalty could not 
be trusted and that only a Protestant militia could restore the confidence of the Irish 
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and British governments.39 However, Pitt and Dundas disagreed. They argued that the 
creation of the militia provided an opportunity to establish a regulated instrument of 
government that would defend against anarchy and misrule in Ireland. They stated 
that by promoting the formation of a militia that included Catholics, they were 
advancing the interests of Protestant Ireland and the Empire as a whole, in that by 
‘conciliating the Catholics as much as possible’ it would make them an effectual body 
of support.40 Others supported their stance, with Lord Darnley stating in the Irish 
House of Lords in January 1793, that the militia must not be exclusive to Protestants 
as this would only promote ‘bad blood.’41 Thus, when the Militia Act was passed into 
law by the Irish parliament in early 1793, enlistment into the regiments was open to 
both Protestants and Catholics. Only Lord Kingsborough, the commanding officer of 
the North Cork Militia, openly encouraged Protestant enlistment into his regiment by 
promising land allotments to non-Catholic recruits at the end of their service.42  
The command structure of the Irish militia was predominantly Protestant. 
Initially, in February 1793 a militia force of 16,000 was proposed, with a qualification 
of income of £2,000 per annum for commanding officers ensuring only landed 
magnates became colonels.43 This ensured that the majority of regiments would be led 
by Protestants, with very few Catholic nobles having sufficient funds to qualify. This 
in turn led to the majority of junior officers also being of the Protestant faith, gaining 
their commissions through patronage. This system of acquiring positions by taking 
advantage of family and local connections was the accepted practice within British 
and Irish military and political spheres during this period, providing structures of 
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loyalty that fostered stability.44 However, although this restricted the number of 
Catholic officers in the Irish militia, the same system also led to some Catholic gentry, 
who where tenants of the landed magnates, being offered commissions either by the 
very few Catholic colonels or by liberal-minded Protestant commanding officers. An 
example of this was Lord Fingal, who as head of the Catholic branch of the influential 
Plunkett family, rose to the rank of lieutenant colonel of the Meath Militia in 1797 
after he had been offered a captaincy in the same regiment in 1793.45 
In contrast to the officer corps, the rank and file of the militia was 
predominantly Roman Catholic. In the 1790s Catholics accounted for approximately 
75 per cent of the population of Ireland and clearly without their enlistment into the 
regiments, only the units raised in Protestant Ulster would have been able to achieve 
their effective strength. The enlistment of Catholics was actively encouraged by the 
government, being made possible by the Catholic Relief Acts of 1792-93. These 
removed restrictions on Catholics holding firearms and from entering the army and 
holding commissions. This was a total reversal of previous government policy, 
although Irish Catholics had been unofficially recruited into the British army since the 
Seven Years War in the 1750s.46 The heavy demand on manpower on the small 
British army during the American War of Independence from 1775 to 1783 had led to 
constant recruiting in Ireland, where the legislation preventing the enlistment of 
Catholics was pragmatically ignored. During the 18th century it was customary for 
recruits to enlist for life service, only being released from the army due to medical 
disengagement through illness, age or wounds.47 This meant that by the time the 
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Relief Acts were introduced in the early 1790s, thousands of Irish Catholics had 
already proved their loyalty through service in the British army. 
The demographics of the Irish population influenced the identity of each 
militia regiment. The majority of records pertaining to the individual regiments were 
destroyed during the Irish Civil War of 1921-1922. However, by examining other 
relevant contemporary documentation such as official government correspondence, 
journals, newspapers and personal memoirs, it is possible to get a clear picture of how 
the regiments were formed and of the reaction to the raising of the militia. In 1793 
Ireland was divided into 32 administrative counties, varying in population size and 
religious persuasion. Catholics made up the majority of people in most counties, with 
only the bulk of the population of the counties in Ulster being Protestant.48 But there 
was further division amongst the Protestant population, with the majority of the 
population of several counties in Ulster being Presbyterian. This was reflected in the 
composition of the rank and file of the militia regiments. 
Ivan Nelson, in his recent book The Irish Militia, 1793-1802, argues that due 
to there being no record of the religion of individual militiamen in enrolment books, 
pay records or muster rolls, without further evidence it remains conjecture that the 
county regiments reflected the religious make-up of their county of origin.49 
However, he has used the contemporary evidence collated by Edward Wakefield, in 
his book An Account of Ireland, Statistical and Political published in 1812, in an
attempt to estimate the proportion of Catholics to Protestants in the Irish militia. 
Wakefield’s data was compiled from interviews with various regimental commande
and from records concerning the composition of the 30 militia light companies t
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camp at Athlone.50 Although Nelson argues that this evidence must be treated with 
care due to some of it being based on hearsay, it is the only contemporary evidence 
available. He concludes that contrary to the previously accepted historiography 
surrounding the religious composition of the militia rank and file, proportionally m




e eighteenth century.  
                                                
51 He has come to this conclusion by comparing 
the estimated proportion of the Catholic and Protestant population of 17 counties to 
the proportion of Catholics and Protestants in the rank and file of the respective 
county militias. In almost every case the ratio of enlisted Protestants far exceeds the
proportion of the Protestant population for the counties (Table 2.1).52 However, the 
accuracy of such statistics will always remain in question as the only available official
evidence of the Protestant: Catholic county population ratio was provided from the 
Hearth Tax survey of the 1730s which does not take into consideration the rapid 
population increase of Catholic peasantry during the lat
Regiment Militia Proportion County Proportion  
 
Carlow      5:2      9:1 
Cork County      7:2    11:1 
Fermanagh      2:13      2:1 
Galway      5:1    39:1 
Kerry      5:1    79:1 
Kilkenny      7:1    22:1 
King’s County      6:1      7:1 
Leitrim      2:1    29:1 
Limerick County    14:1    79:1 
Louth      5:4    14:1 
Monaghan      3:4      4:1 
Roscommon      7:1    79:1 
Tipperary    19:1    11:1 
Sligo      2:1    30:1 
Westmeath      2:1    29:1 
Wexford      2:1      9:1 
 
Table 2.1 - Proportion of Catholics to Protestant in the Irish militia  
(Source: Nelson, The Irish Militia, 1793-1802, p. 124) 
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The most extreme example is County Fermanagh which had a civilian 
population ratio of two Catholics for every one Protestant. However, this was not 
reflected in the county militia which had a ratio of 2 Catholics to 13 Protestants.53 It 
could be argued that the small proportion of Catholics could be explained by 
Fermanagh being a border county where traditional agrarian disturbances and strong 
links to Defenderism dissuaded the Catholic peasantry from joining what may have 
been seen as the military arm of the Protestant oligarchy. However, an examination of 
predominantly Catholic counties throughout Ireland, and excluding those in Ulster, 
supports Nelson’s claim. County Kerry had a population ratio of 79 Catholics to 1 
Protestant, but the county militia ratio was only 5:1. County Louth had a Catholic 
population majority of 14:1, but a militia ratio of only five Catholics for every four 
Protestants. Only County Tipperary went against this trend having a militia ratio of 
19:1 compared to a civilian population ratio of 11:1.54 
It is impossible to get an exact proportion of Catholic militiamen compared to 
Protestants or their distribution amongst the regiments. The light company returns 
submitted from the battalions formed for summer camp training, and used by 
Wakefield, are the only known official records to provide the relevant information 
(Table 2.2). However, J.E. Cookson concludes that this evidence suggests that only 
two thirds of the total militia rank and file were Catholic.55 He argues that possibly 15 
out of the 38 regiments included one third or more enlisted Protestants, but that 
official information concerning the religious make-up of the battalions was not 
published due to the government concern for the deepening sectarian bitterness.56 The 
Irish administration at Dublin Castle was hopeful that the militia would be seen as a 
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national defence force, free from religious labelling. However, from the time of its 
establishment, the Irish militia was dismissed by the Protestant Ascendancy as being 
hostile to the Protestant population, mainly due to the perceived proportion of 
Catholic militiamen.57 Historians generally agree with the estimation that Catholics 
provided two-thirds to three-quarters of the total militia rank and file during its 
existence.58 This then indicates that Protestants made up a substantial percentage of 
enlisted militiamen, negating the historical perception that the Irish militia was 
exclusively a Catholic institution. However, the militia remained predominantly 
Catholic in the rank and file, which was unprecedented in eighteenth century Ireland. 
Regiment Catholic Protestant Percentage Catholic  
Cork City      95     1  
Galway      97     2  
Carlow      78     4  
Longford      90     6  
Waterford      89     6  
Clare      91     7  
Limerick County      89     7  
Limerick City      84     7  
Meath      90     9  
Kildare      91     9  
Westmeath      85   10  
Kerry      83   13  
Tipperary      85   15  
Dublin City      84   16  
Roscommon      82   16  
North Cork      81   18  
Louth      72   25  
Queen’s County      73   26  
South Cork      73   26  
Tyrone      58   29  
Londonderry      55   45  
Sligo      48   42  
Leitrim      50   50  
North Down      44   51  
Wicklow      44   54  
Armagh      26   69  
Fermanagh      24   76  
Monaghan      18   82  
South Down      13   87  










Table 2.2 - Irish Militia, 1802: Catholic and Protestant rank and file, Light Infantry Brigade 
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(Source: Wakefield, An Account of Ireland, Statistical and Political, vol. 2, pp. 630-631) 
 
The balloting system used to raise the militia proved contentious and 
unpopular as it saw the introduction of compulsory conscription in an era when 
service in the army had been traditionally voluntary. To meet the emergency response 
of raising an establishment of 16,000 men for the new militia, each parish within the 
counties was to provide a list of names of all eligible males between 18 and 45, with 
professions or occupations to be included.59 Names were then drawn from a ballot by 
a local magistrate to ensure each parish provided the required number of recruits 
allocated to serve in the county regiment. However, in some areas this system was 
extremely unpopular and resulted in rioting. Throughout March, April, May and June 
of 1793, more than 230 people were killed in protests against the embodiment of the 
militia that occurred across the county.60 This was five times the number of casualties 
sustained than in the previous 30 years of agrarian disturbances, but considerably less 
than the fatalities recorded concerning protests against raising militia in England.61 
Rioting was particularly prevalent in counties that had a strong United Irish presence, 
such as those of eastern Ulster and border counties such as Armagh and Monaghan. 
Riots in other counties, such as Roscommon, were not only aimed at the ballot system 
but were also stimulated by traditional agrarian complaints regarding church tithes 
and rents.62  Although initially successful in quickly raising the required numbers for 
some county militia regiments, the ballot system was eventually abandoned due to a 
combination of its unpopularity, that it was considered slow, expensive and 
inefficient, and that it had been made redundant by the number of volunteers.63 
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Some historical claims surrounding difficulties in raising the militia regiments 
have been exaggerated. The population of some counties peacefully accepted the 
ballot system, with 17 out of the 32 counties having no reported riots or incidents.64 
Numerous counties were able to dispense with balloting altogether due to the number 
of men who voluntarily enlisted. Examples include the County Kerry and City of 
Limerick militias that were able to raise their full complements in one day, solely 
from volunteers.65  Others such as the Queen’s County regiment took only ten days. It 
could be argued that the large number of volunteers was due to a number of benefits 
and the comparatively good wages paid to the rank and file once it had been 
determined that militia would remain on permanent duty, effectively making the 
militiamen full-time soldiers. One incentive for recruits was the limited enlistment 
period of four years, with the right of re-enlistment once the period had expired.66 
Ivan Nelson argues that the majority of the militiamen were either labourers or 
tradesmen. He concludes that this shows that those skilled recruits from cities and 
provincial towns tended to be Protestant, while those unskilled labourers from rural 
areas tended to be Catholic, and that many saw the militia as providing a regular 
income in times of economic depression.67 This view has some substance when 
considering the high proportion of unskilled and semi-skilled married recruits who 
would have been attracted by regular full-time pay, extra allowances for wives and 
children under ten years old, promotion, and in the early 1790s, no risk on service 
outside Ireland.68 One notable benefit was provision for children of militiamen to 
attend school at a time of high illiteracy and no formal state-funded education system. 
Nelson bases this claim on evidence obtained from the Carlow Militia enrolment 
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book, the only known complete surviving contemporary record of militia enlistment 
in the 1790s. However, although this data provides an insight into the composition of 
one individual regiment, any general conclusions must be treated with caution due to 
a lack of similar records to compare it to when considering there were 38 battalions of 
Irish militia. 
Regimental establishments varied in size when they were first raised in 1793. 
Lord Hillsborough, the chief designer of the bill put to the Irish House of Commons, 
suggested an initial total strength of 16,000 militiamen, based on 500 men per 
county.69 The total number of troops initially raised, excluding officers and non-
commissioned officers, was 14,948.70  The ability to raise troops was determined by 
regional economic, political and religious influences, as well as the reaction of the 
local population to the ballot system and proposed conditions of service. Lord 
Hillsborough’s ‘Royal Downshire Regiment’ had the largest complement with a 
strength of 770 rank and file divided into 12 companies.71 Tipperary, Wexford, 
Galway, Donegal, Londonderry and Tyrone all had strengths of 560 men distributed 
into ten companies, while most other county militia varied  between 300 to 500 men 
in 5 to 8 companies.72 The smallest unit was that of the Drogheda Militia which had 
only 183 militiamen formed into three companies.73 The total number of troops within 
the Irish militia fluctuated from year to year due to medical discharges, desertions, 
deaths and availability of recruits. In February 1795, Earl Fitzwilliam, the lord 
lieutenant of Ireland at the time, reported that the militia amounted to 13,366 rank and 
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file.74 The same year authorisation was given for militia companies to be augmented 
from fifty to seventy men, as it was considered easier to find recruits for the militia 
than regular regiments.75 From that time there was a steady increase fostered by a 
wealth of volunteers and substitutes, ensuring that by January 1798 the militia 
consisted of 22,728 men.76 The size of the militia was significant in that when the 
rebellion broke out in May of the same year, the militia constituted 64 percent of the 
total military forces available in Ireland.77    
 Initially, the Militia Act empowered the governors of each county to call out 
the militia once a year for 28 days of training in times of peace.78 However, the 
increase in violence throughout the kingdom, accompanied by the constant threat of 
invasion through war with republican France and the upsurge in the volunteer 
movement, posed a serious risk to the internal and external security of the nation. This 
resulted in heated debate within the Irish parliament as to the proposed length of 
embodiment after the cabinet had already authorised expenditure for 12 months wages 
for each regiment.79 This then led to the lord lieutenant in the summer of 1793 
directing that the Irish militia be placed on permanent service for the duration of the 
war with France. Although this contradicted the terms in which the recruits were 
enlisted, resulting in some desertions, there appears to have been no serious protest 
from the rank and file. What concerns the men did have were mainly in regard to the 
initial lack of provisions made for their families. However, such anxiety soon 
dissipated once allowances, pensions, and schools were provided by government 
funding for dependents of all militiamen on permanent service and serving outside 
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their home county.80 In effect, permanent service was welcomed by many of the rank 
and file as it provided clothing, food, accommodation and regular pay in a time of 
economic uncertainty.   
The reputation and performance of the militia officer corps proved 
controversial. Most criticism came from experienced senior regular army officers 
such as Lieutenant General Sir Ralph Abercromby and Lieutenant General Charles, 
Marquis Cornwallis, who were highly critical of the lack of leadership within the 
militia during 1797 and 1798. As commander-in-chief of the army in Ireland from late 
1797 until April 1798, Abercromby used his criticism of the militia to highlight the 
flaws of the strategic policy that had been implemented. He argued that its dispersal 
into small detachments throughout the countryside to guard against insurgency 
hindered training and supervision by officers, thus reducing discipline and morale.81 
Subsequent to a general inspection of the army conducted throughout Ireland in 
December 1797, he described the militia as ‘licentious’ and was critical of the lack of 
professionalism and responsibility displayed within the officer corps.82 He found that 
many militia officers were absent from their commands, preferring to maintain their 
social lives by residing in cities and provincial centres. In a private letter to the duke 
of Portland in June 1798 when the government forces had successfully contained the 
uprising, Cornwallis expressed his disgust at the cruelty shown by officers of the Irish 
militia and yeomanry: ‘It shall be one of my first objects to soften the ferocity of our 
troops, which I am afraid, in the Irish corps at least, is not confined to the private 
soldiers’.83 A month later, when post-rebellion clean-up was in full swing, he 
reinforced his feelings in a letter to Major General Ross when he stated, ‘The Irish 
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Militia with few officers, and those chiefly of the worst kind, follow closely on the 
heels of the yeomanry in murder and every kind of atrocity’.84  
Regular officers constantly criticized their colleagues in the militia. An 
example is Colonel Robert Craufurd, who was later to gain fame leading the Light 
Brigade of infantry in the Peninsula war, claiming that the Irish militia officers were 
nothing more than brutes and uneducated farmers’ sons.85 Some criticism came from 
within the militia itself with Colonel Charles Vallancey, commander of the Tyrone 
Militia, complaining that his junior officers were self-indulgent and had no sense of 
duty to the regiment or their men.86 Even after their involvement in extinguishing the 
rebellion and defeating the French, Lord Castlereagh, secretary to Cornwallis and a 
previous militia officer himself, wrote in September 1798 that the militia was 
commanded by ‘bad officers’ who perpetually solicited leave of absence and that they 
had ‘a total ignorance and inexperience of every military duty beyond that of a 
common parade’.87 It was statements such as these, made by respected military 
authorities, which reinforced the perpetual stigma that was attached to the militia and 
its officer corps. 
However, the alleged general reputation of the leadership within the militia 
must been seen in its context. There is more than sufficient evidence to prove that as a 
whole the officer corps of the militia was not of the professional standard of the 
regular army. In reality it could not be expected to achieve that level. The militia by 
definition was a military force of trained civilians to be used in times of emergency. 
The only officers required to have previous military service were the regimental 
adjutants, ensuring that many unsuitable officers were offered commissions purely on 
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their financial qualifications.88 Most of the peers and the middle-class gentry, who 
made up the majority of the officer corps, also had civil duties as county governors, 
magistrates and land magnates. Examples were Lord Abercorn of the Tyrone Militia, 
Lord Portarlington of the Queen’s County Militia, and the duke of Leinster in the 
Kildare Militia, who gained their appointments as colonels due to their local influence 
and loyalty to the government.89 Having dual responsibilities led to many being 
absent from their units for long periods of time, especially when required to attend 
county assizes.90 Admittedly, many officers would have used such occasions as 
excuses to escape the boredom of military life in unfavourable rural and provincial 
locations. This is evident in the correspondence received by the lord lieutenant from 
disgruntled regimental commanders seeking permission to replace officers who had 
continually refused to return to their units.91 
The absence of officers from regiments had a detrimental effect on training for 
both officers and the rank and file. Nelson argues that there is an obvious link 
between the criticism of the quality of the officers and the ill-discipline of the men.92 
In the 18th century officers in the British army learned their profession through 
studying the numerous manuals written for junior officers, guidance from experienced 
colleagues, by being provided drill lessons from senior non-commissioned officers 
and through experience in times of war.93 The ability of many officers to gain leave to 
foster their civilian interests ensured that they and their men did not achieve the level 
of professionalism expected by the Irish administration. However, much of the blame 
for this state of affairs lay with the colonels of the regiments. All leave was given at 
                                                 
88 McAnally, p. 21 
89 Ibid., pp. 88-91 
90 Ibid. 
91 Lord Carhampton to the earl of Camden,  19 October 1797 (National Archives, HO 100/68) 
92 Nelson, p. 25 
93 J.A. Houlding, Fit For Service: the training of the British army, 1717-1795 (Oxford, 1981), pp. 45-
57 
 50
the discretion of the colonel, with each battalion officially required to have one field 
officer (major, lieutenant colonel or colonel) and two thirds of all other officers 
present with the regiment at all times.94 In reality, leave tended to be given 
indiscriminately. The absence of many officers then led to much of the individual, 
platoon and battalion drill and tactical training being conducted by the non-
commissioned officers, such as sergeant-majors and sergeants.95 This was especially 
so when the battalions were broken up into small sections and platoons to be stationed 
in small hamlets. 
Detached service also proved damaging to the effectiveness of the militia and 
it is surprising that the semi-trained regiments performed as well as they did during 
the uprising and French invasion. It not only hindered essential large formation 
training which was required to be effective in linear-style actions against regular 
troops, but also proved difficult in establishing and maintaining regimental discipline 
and morale.96 This came about through lack of officer supervision when battalions 
were broken up into company, platoon and squad size detachments that were 
commanded by either inexperienced junior officers or NCOs.97 Small squads were 
posted in villages and hamlets to protect individuals and property, negating any form 
of battalion or platoon training that was essential to effectively perform the linear 
tactics of the British army during the period.98 An example was the Downshire Militia 
which in 1796 had its headquarters at Drogheda, while one of its companies was 
stationed at Navan and another at Bilgriggan. However, smaller detachments of the 
regiment were stationed at Swords, Rateath, Lusk, Malahide, Dunshaglin, 
Westpanstown, Collon, Torkphecklan, Slane and Parsonstown; six being commanded 
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by a subaltern, while the rest by a sergeant.99 Morale and discipline suffered due to 
exposure to corruption, drunkenness and constant use in unpopular policing duties in 
assisting magistrates against the local population among whom the militiamen had to 
reside.100  Regiments were restricted from being stationed within the same localities 
from which they recruited because it was felt that possible family connections and 
local sympathies would affect unit discipline. It was such postings, together with the 
shock of military life that initially led to a significant number of desertions within 
regiments. Within the first six months of service the County Wexford regiment lost 27 
out of a complement of 207, the Downshire regiment lost 14 from 649, County Meath 
lost 45 from 298, and the City of Dublin regiment lost 33 out of 291.101 Such 
desertions became less frequent once conditions for the troops improved, such as 
provisions for wives and children to the live within barracks and the establishment of 
battalion schools.  
Much of the indiscipline shown by the militia was officially encouraged. In 
March 1793, General Richard Whyte urged his troops to rampage through Belfast, 
attacking homes and businesses of known radicals.102 The 1795 pacification of 
Connacht by Lord Carhampton, the commander-in-chief of the army in Ireland at the 
time, also aided the breakdown in discipline with those militia units involved. This 
came about through rising unrest and the inadequacy of the magistrates to deal with 
the disaffected population. On 17 May a proclamation was issued authorising the 
military to act in dispersing unlawful assemblies without the need to wait for the 
direction of a magistrate, although they could not act on their own accord if a 
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magistrate was present.103 The proclamation order was signed by seven privy 
councillors who were all colonels of militia regiments.104Continuous searches of 
civilian property, floggings, numerous house burnings and the illegal sending of 
suspected Defenders and United Irishmen to serve in the Royal Navy without trial 
were characteristics of this campaign as well as similar operations in Ulster later that 
year.105 Thomas Pelham, the lord lieutenant’s chief secretary at the time defended 
such practice and praised the conduct of the militia: ‘It cannot be denied that some 
things were done that are to be regretted, but at the same time I believe no army ever 
behaved better under similar circumstances and I venture to say no army was ever 
placed in exactly the same situation.’106 Thomas Bartlett argues that the illegal 
operations carried out under veiled approval from the government were linked to the 
indiscipline of the militia regiments involved.107 He claims that the dispersal of 
battalions and the blurring of vital distinctions between civil and military authority 
could only add confusion and lack of restraint to troops who were not properly trained 
in such use. Even the severest critic of the Irish army, General Sir Ralph Abercromby, 
admitted that some of its indiscipline stemmed from the situation in Ireland: ‘the 
dispersed state of the troops is really ruinous to the service. The best regiments in 
Europe could not stand such usage.’108    
To remedy the effects of detached service, summer training camps were 
established in 1795 where a number of battalions could come together.  These camps, 
situated at Ardfinnan, near Clonmel in County Tipperary, Blaris, near Belfast and 
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Loughlinstown, near Dublin, provided opportunities for company, battalion and 
brigade level training in firing and marching that were essential in forging the militia 
into an effective military force. Although initially established as temporary 
encampments for the summer months, they eventually became permanent camps with 
huts being erected for the troops. In the first year of their operation the Kildare, Clare, 
Donegal, Limerick City and Wexford militias were ordered to remain at 
Loughlinstown over the winter, while the Carlow, Wicklow and Kerry regiments 
remained at Blaris.109 The traditional dispersal of the regiments had led to a decline in 
regulation dress, parade drill and arms exercise, due in part to the boredom and 
negligence of many officers.110 It was proposed that a rotational system of postings to 
the above camps would increase the standards within the militia regiments. However, 
it appears that these camps were not used to their full potential. The lack of 
contemporary documentation relating to training at the camps makes it difficult to 
ascertain an accurate record of what regiments attended these camps as well as what 
training they received. By examining the very few relevant sources available, such as 
official returns and reports from newspapers such as the Dublin Journal, Nelson has 
calculated that only 27 out of the 38 militia regiments trained together between 1795 
and 1797.111 He claims that no regiment attended the camps in all three years, as was 
initially intended, and that only the Clare, Donegal, Wexford, Armagh, Westmeath, 
Limerick City and Cavan militias had attended twice. He further states that there were 
a decreasing number of units available to attend summer training, with 21 in 1795, ten 
in 1796 and only three in 1797.112 These figures clearly demonstrate how the 
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reserves at Blaris, near Belfast, and Dublin, the government would have been able to 
react quickly with superior forces should the regiment mutiny. Sir Henry McAnally 
                                                
al of the regiments throughout the country was ruinous to the proficiency of
the corps.  
In general, the initial stationing of the militia regiments between 1794 and 
1798 appeared to be free from any official system of religious bias. Once the 
regiments had been fully embodied they were marched from their counties of or
only to return when being disbanded in 1802 and again in 1816. A system of annual 
rotation was introduced which saw most battalions serving at various locations 
throughout the kingdom. This was proposed to counteract any unwanted sympathies 
and relationships that the militiamen may have developed for and with the local 
population that were deemed detrimental to the policing duties required of the 
militias.113 In practice the regiments were posted to places far from their county
origin as it was thought that discipline would improve and training would be more 
efficient with the officers and men away from their home influences.114 This is 
evident when examining the militia return for March 1796 which showed the Kerr
Militia stationed at Newry in County Down, the Derry Militia at Limerick, th
Fermanagh Militia at Waterford and the North Cork Militia at Sligo.115 The only 
exception to this was the Royal Downshire Militia, recruited from the large 
Presbyterian population of County Down in Ulster, which appeared to have been
permanently stationed at Drogheda. One explanation for this could be the str
the United Irish in this part of Ulster whose large Presbyterian population were 
considered dissenters from the Anglican Church and mistrusted by the Irish 
Ascendancy. By stationing this unit at Drogheda, situated half way between the army
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argues that the quartering of the regiments changed so frequently to prevent 
attachments occurring that the militia developed into a nomadic force.116     
An exact account relating to the annual stationing of the militias is impossible 
to collate due to most records having been destroyed. However, the few surviving 
regimental annual returns provide some indication of how the units were distributed. 
In March 1796, Camden wrote to the duke of Portland with his proposed changes to 
the Irish garrison for the summer of that year. He sought authority from the Home 
Secretary to establish permanent camps to help formulate a defensive strategy against 
foreign invasion.117 By 1796 British intervention in Europe against France had failed 
ensuring that the British Isles were now a likely target of French attack. Camden’s 
letter shows that the majority of the Irish militia was to be dispersed as individual 
battalions throughout the 32 counties, with ten regiments to be concentrated at 
training camps at Ardfinnan (County Tipperary), Laughlinstown (County Dublin) and 
Blaris (County Antrim).118 These camps were established not only to provide 
opportunities for battalion and brigade formation training, but also provided 
concentrations of ready reserves against rebellion or any invasion attempts.119 An 
examination of the regiments selected for the various camps indicates a balance 
between battalions with Catholic and Protestant rank and file majorities. The force to 
be stationed at Blaris in Ulster consisted of two ‘Catholic’ units, the City of Limerick 
and Queen’s County militias, which were accompanied by three ‘Protestant’ 
regiments, the Cavan Militia together with the Fife and York Fencibles. At 
Laughlinstown the ‘Catholic’ Clare Militia was to serve with the Kildare and Donegal 
militias, which both had a sizable minority of Protestant militiamen. Whilst the force 
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at Ardfinnan consisting mainly of ‘Protestant’ units, the Antrim and Armagh militias, 
was balanced by the presence of the ‘Catholic’ Wexford Militia and the Louth Militia 
that had a large minority of Catholic troops.120 However, the lack of available regular 
army units and the desperate need to police the rural heartland of Ireland, as well as 
the strategic ports of Dublin, Cork and Belfast, ensured that the government was 
initially forced to rely upon the loyalty of the ‘Catholic’ militia regiments in assisting 
in the national security. 
The militia lacked the required effective training to raise it to the level of the 
regular army. In contrast to the regular regiments, when first raised the militia 
battalions generally lacked a cadre of experienced officers and non-commissioned 
officers to provide drills and experience. Heavy reliance was placed on the few who 
had previous military experience to forge the officers and rank and file into a 
disciplined and effective unit.121 Some regiments resorted to recruiting retired English 
NCOs to provide the necessary experience.122 The few diligent officers who remained 
with their regiments were required to study the new drill manual written by Colonel 
David Dundas in 1793 to become proficient with the current military standards. It 
took time for the rank and file to adjust to the rigours of military life, with discipline 
instilled only after months of constant marching and musket drill. Failure of the 
government to initially supply accoutrements and weapons led to some units, such as 
the Kerry Militia, parading and training without muskets for a number of months.123 
However, by early 1794 all but the Cavan and Kildare Militias had reached their 
required strengths and were deemed proficient enough for service at a minimum level 
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required for internal security.124 In a dispatch to London in January 1794, the lord 
lieutenant, the earl of Westmorland reported that ‘the militia are about 10,000 strong 
and are becoming fit for garrison duty and purposes of police but could not well be 
relied on against  a disciplined enemy without the intermixture and aid of a body of 
regulars.’125 It was clear that as a force the militia was not capable of defending 
Ireland against an invasion by regular troops. 
Yet, in contrast to its poor reputation, the Irish Militia was effective in 
providing internal security. The large number of battalions ensured that the rural and 
isolated regions of the kingdom could now be policed against the rising incidents of 
violence. This had not previously been possible due to the few remaining available 
regular troops being required to guard strategic points such as Dublin and Cork. 
General Dalrymple, commanding in Belfast, reported in September 1795 that in 
service against Defenders ‘In all the circumstances that have yet occurred the 
behaviour of the regiments of militia has been excellent…the conduct…has been firm 
and obedient and that of good soldiers.’126 Camden had previously made his 
favourable opinion of the militia known when he reported in May of the same year 
that ‘on all occasions that militia have behaved with the greatest spirit and showed the 
most loyal attachment to his majesty’s government.’127  
The most notable incident where the militia proved effective prior to the 1798 
rebellion was in the quelling of the mutinies of regular battalions in Cork and Dublin 
in 1795. At Cork the Louth, King’s County, Meath and Roscommon Militias 
displayed discipline and loyalty when they assisted the 32nd Foot and the 7th Dragoon 
Guards in subduing the mutineers of the 105th and 113th Foot who were protesting 
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against being posted to the Caribbean. In Dublin the Westmeath, Londonderry and 
Longford Militias combined with the Essex and Breadalbane Fencibles in suppressing 
the 104th and 111th Foot who had mutinied for the same reason. 128 In reporting on 
these incidents and other operations against rural insurgents, Camden stated that ‘The 
militia are the finest troops it is possible to see and have universally behaved well.’129 
While this comment may be an exaggeration stimulated by exuberance and relief in 
eliminating potential threats to Camden’s administration, the militia had proven itself 
to have developed into a reliable and effective auxiliary force. This in part could be 
attributed to the increased supervision and leadership provided by the augmentation of 
the militia in 1795, which led to an increase in the NCO to men ratio to 1 to 5.130 This 
was much higher than the NCO: private ratio of the regular regiments. Clearly, 
contrary to the post-rebellion reputation of the Irish militia, a number of regiments 
had proven themselves to be loyal and disciplined, qualities that would be reinforced 
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The Irish yeomanry remains a contentious subject within Ireland. Historical 
memories of oppression and atrocities by the corps against the United Irish rebels and 
the Catholic peasantry which were fostered by Irish nationalists in the nineteenth 
century have been continued through to the twenty-first century.131 However, in 
Ulster, where the yeomanry were most prevalent, the organisation is seen positively as 
an expression of loyalism to the British crown, although its initial purpose was to 
serve the interests of both Protestant and Catholic gentry and the middle-classes.132 
The perception that the yeomanry provided the armed strength of the Protestant 
Ascendancy that was determined to maintain power through the domination of the 
Catholic majority has, until recently, ensured the unpopularity of the organisation 
amongst Irish nationalist historians. Allan Blackstock’s book An Ascendancy Army: 
The Irish Yeomanry 1796-1834, remains the only comprehensive study of the corps 
and this chapter relies heavily on data provided from this source to evaluate the Irish 
yeomanry in the broader context of military history of Ireland during this period. 
What is evident is that the yeomanry was not only the physical embodiment of the 
Ascendancy, but that it proved to be an essential political tool in achieving increased 
military support from Britain, ensuring the maintenance of Ascendancy power in 
Ireland until the early twentieth century. Contrary to the views of some nationalist 
historians, the yeomanry corps were not a tool of British oppression, but became one 
of Protestant Irish oppression over the Catholic peasantry. The British government 
never fully trusted the Ascendancy and ultimately, it was the armed strength of the 
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yeomanry and the potential threat it posed to stability in the kingdom that ensured 
Britain increased its military presence in Ireland.     
The formation of the Irish yeomanry in 1796 marked the second phase in the 
official arming of the Irish population. This force came about through the increasing 
political and sectarian disturbances that had occurred in Ulster and the bordering 
counties of Ulster, Leinster and Connacht during that year.  Escalating violence in 
rural areas led to the demand for effective protection for individuals and property 
from the propertied classes that included the gentry, farmers, landowners and 
merchants.133 Heightened support for the formation of localised armed forces 
eventually led to official recognition of the many defence associations that had 
already mushroomed in the troubled areas. The establishment of the yeomanry was 
also perceived at this time as being of significant strategic value in that it would free 
the militia from many civil duties so that it could be more effectively used in counter-
invasion operations.134 Although the yeomanry was predominantly Protestant, and in 
later years became the military arm of the Protestant Irish Ascendancy, many 
Catholics enlisted in the corps, with some gaining commissions.135 However, the 
events of 1798 led to a greater polarization of the Irish population, with the increased 
distrust of Catholics leading to most being purged from the yeomanry. It was the 
hardening of attitudes and ill-discipline of many troops within the para-military 
organization that tarnished the reputation of the corps. 
The yeomanry was founded on a tradition of duty in self defence. The majority 
of yeomanry corps were established in Ulster where the Protestant population had 
relied on voluntary military service since the founding of the Elizabethan plantations 
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in the 16th century to provide the necessary protection from Catholic aggression.136 
The collusion of the militant United Irishmen and the Catholic Defenders in the mid 
1790s led to increased fears throughout Protestant society and a call for greater 
measures to ensure the safety of lives and property. Anxiety was increased through 
comments recorded from Protestant leaders such as Lord Clare who feared of the 
repeat of the massacres committed by Catholics in 1641.137  Localised armed 
associations began to be formed based around already established Protestant groups 
known as Boyne societies, such as the ‘Apprentice Boys’ and various other ‘Orange’ 
factions.138 These initially functioned as social organisations. However, by 1795 the 
ability of Protestants to lawfully carry arms saw many of these factions coming 
together to provide armed security to their communities which the army was unable to 
provide.   
The need to provide public safety inspired the establishment of the corps. As 
tension increased rural gentry and merchants increasingly became targets of the 
disaffected. Defenders and United Irishmen carried out raids on the houses of the 
landed classes in an effort to seize firearms necessary for rebellion. Such raids led to 
numerous deaths and destruction of property. Due to the isolated locations of many of 
the houses, the response from the military stationed in provincial towns was 
inadequate, resulting in calls for the creation of official localised bodies of volunteers 
to counter such activities.139 The gentry began to lobby for government support in 
such measures, which were initially rejected.  Although such calls received 
considerable positive response in the Irish Houses of Commons and Lords, the British 
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and Irish administrations quashed such initiatives, fearing the power any such 
organization may hold over the government. 
The experience of dealing with the Irish Volunteers initially hindered the 
introduction of the yeomanry. The Irish Volunteers were established in 1778 and 
existed until the organisation was outlawed by the Irish government in 1793. 
Although the movement was established during the American War of Independence 
primarily to provide an auxiliary force for the defence of Ireland from potential 
French and Spanish invasion, it eventually became a strong political force. At its peak 
in 1782, it could boast 89,000 members and was influential in promoting the re-
establishment of the Irish parliament that year, as well as gaining more favourable 
trade concessions from Britain.140. The Volunteers became the strongest expression of 
Protestant defence tradition and could not be controlled by the government. As the 
movement was based purely on volunteers, received no pay from the government and 
had not been formed through any legislative power, the authorities had no control 
over delegating commissions for officers or the distribution of arms. Ironically, it was 
the legislation that allowed Protestants to bear arms that allowed the Volunteers to 
develop into a strong armed movement and powerful political force that was 
considered a destabilizing faction by the British government. Many feared that the 
creation of the yeomanry would lead to a similar situation. 
Although the establishment of the yeomanry eventually proved to be a 
decisive move in aiding political stability in Ireland, the authorities in Dublin Castle 
initially viewed any sort of volunteering as a destabilizing influence. They saw the 
rise of the independent armed associations as a potential threat and feared armed 
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power in the localities in case it formed into radical political opposition.141 To 
counteract this, it was argued that such groups could be controlled by drafting them 
into a government-established yeomanry. Through this process, the Irish government 
could offer commissions to those it considered loyal to the regime and control them 
through pay and patronage. Lord Fitzwilliam, the liberal lord-lieutenant in Ireland in 
1795, argued for the formation of a yeomanry that would include Catholics: ‘We must 
endeavour to form a strength upon the principle of the English Yeomanry which will 
have the double effect of a defence against an invasion and an additional power in 
support of the magistracy.’142 He proposed that the yeomanry would include the better 
sorts of people whose social status fell between the landlords and the peasantry, which 
would include Catholic gentry, except in Ulster.143 However, this proposal proved 
contentious in that it was seen by the Ascendancy as being revolutionary by placing 
power in the hands of Catholics and was one of the concerns that eventually led to 
Fitzwilliam’s recall.144  
The Irish Yeomanry came into being in 1796, based on a plan proposed by 
Thomas Knox of Dungannon, an MP for Tyrone. In February of that year a number of 
armed Protestant and district defence associations were formed amongst the tenants of 
County Tyrone, pledging assistance to local magistrates in enforcing the law. The idea 
spread with numerous associations being formed in the other border counties of 
Ulster. By June 1796, the Dungannon Association had formulated a plan that was 
submitted to Dublin Castle by Knox. The plan called for a gentry-sponsored law and 
order association which would include reliable inhabitants signing loyal resolutions 
                                                 
141 Ibid.  
142 Fitzwilliam to the duke of Portland, 10 January 1795 (National Archives, HO 100/56)  
143 Ibid. 
144 E.A. Smith, Whig Principles and party politics: Earl Fitzwilliam and the Whig party, 1748-1833 
(Manchester, 1975), p. 177 
 64
and submitting offers of service under government control.145 Although initially 
sceptical, the new lord-lieutenant, the earl of Camden, soon warmed to the idea. In a 
letter to the duke of Portland he pointed out the positive aspects of the proposal, 
arguing that the yeomanry might be the foundation of a useful plan to strengthen the 
government in Ireland.146 However, he believed that any forthcoming legislation 
should exclude the clause from the Dungannon plan that proposed the force could be 
used ‘to oppose the French should they attempt to invade.’147 Camden feared that 
United Irishmen could easily infiltrate the yeomanry and prove a disruptive element in 
the case of any invasion.  
Political pressure played a major part in the creation of the yeomanry. 
Increasing internal violence, civil unrest and the impending threat of invasion forced 
Camden to act. He was under pressure from advisors, such as Lords Clare and 
Carhampton, prominent leaders within the Protestant Ascendancy, to form yeomanry 
corps along the lines of the English model, based solely on cavalry. However, this 
would prove impractical, especially in Ulster where many poorer Protestants would be 
unable to provide their own horse. There was a need for infantry corps to be 
incorporated into the plan as there were not enough gentry in some areas, such as 
Donegal, to raise cavalry. This would then lead to lower-class membership within the 
infantry and raised the thorny question as to religious composition. As commander-in-
chief, Carhampton had voiced his frustration at being unable to concentrate a 
sufficient force to challenge an invasion due to the army being distributed throughout 
the provinces to provide security for the gentry. He argued that such a dilemma could 
be solved by allowing the formation of gentry-led yeomanry corps to provide 
localised security against insurgents, thus allowing the release of most of his troops to 
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concentrate on external threats.148 Portland had authorised Camden to raise 
‘provincial levies’ but hesitated in using the term ‘yeomanry’ due to the unfavourable 
reception given to Fitzwilliam’s rejected plan.149 He advised that any move to make 
the force exclusively Protestant risked alienating Catholics and fostered further unrest. 
Camden was fully aware of the political implications and sensitivity required over the 
matter and took measures to appease all parties. By allowing only reliable Catholics 
and Dissenters of property to enlist he addressed a major concern of Protestants by 
preventing the inclusion of lower-class Catholics from the infantry without alienating 
the Catholic gentry. This ensured sufficient support for the measure to be introduced 
through parliament. 
The Irish yeomanry was established in September 1796 after much 
deliberation and prior to any authorising enactment being passed. On 17 September of 
that year the official plan for raising yeomanry corps was announced and published 
throughout national newspapers. It included a critical amendment that set the 
organisation apart from the English model: ‘Troops of cavalry will be preferred…but 
as it has been represented in certain parts of the kingdom where it might be difficult to 
raise cavalry alone that many respectable persons would readily serve on foot, the 
proportion of mounted and dismounted men in each troop must depend on local 
circumstances.’150 This led to an immediate flood of offers from local associations 
and individuals, especially from Ulster and the northern counties of Leinster and 
Connacht, to raise local corps even before the Yeomanry Bill was introduced in 
October.151  Over-subscription proved an issue, with the government unsuccessfully 
attempting to cap the membership of each corps at 50 when recruits of up to 70 had 
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volunteered.152 County governors and land magnates called meetings of local 
magistrates and gentry who were tasked to administer the raising of units and the 
selection of suitable recruits. What resulted was a diversity of opinion as to the 
admissibility of Catholics due to local circumstances and lack of direction from the 
government. 
Insufficient government directives saw a varied approach to the formation of 
individual corps. The yeomanry gained official recognition with the passing of the 
Yeomanry Bill in the Irish parliament on 25 October 1796, becoming an act of 
parliament after it gained royal assent two days later.153 This allowed the organization 
to emerge as a uniform national structure which simultaneously contained territorially 
discrete, regionally diverse and complex elements. The lack of official directives 
regarding membership contributed to religious and political exclusiveness in some 
counties, which represented the local balance of power within parishes.154 Existing 
social hierarchies that traditionally dominated parishes and towns tended to gain 
control of local units, sometimes at the expense and exclusion of political and 
religious rivals.155 Protestant leaders within the Irish parliament quietly encouraged 
this as it was felt that this represented the natural order within Irish society and would 
provide stability, especially in the volatile rural areas, such as the border counties of 
Ulster.156 This lassez-faire approach to recruiting by the government ensured that the 
yeomanry was to eventually become a solely Protestant institution that was to provide 
the security required to maintain the Ascendancy. 
A large number of members of the dissolved volunteer associations enlisted in 
the yeomanry. This was somewhat ironic as it was the political power that the 
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movement had previously acquired that Camden and his associates feared, resulting in 
his initial hesitance in accepting the raising of the yeomanry.157 An examination of 
surviving documentation reveals that many names of officers from the volunteers also 
appear in the returns of yeomanry corps. In the 1970s Padraig O’Snowdaigh 
conducted a study of surviving Volunteer lists, yeomanry documentation and journals 
and found considerable correlation between Volunteer and yeomanry membership. In 
Monaghan, Donegal and Roscommon he found around 50 per cent of surnames 
recurring in yeomanry lists.158  In Meath, from 88 yeomanry surnames, he found 20 in 
Volunteer lists, while in Limerick and Roscommon, the location continuity rate was 
around 50 per cent, with 43 per cent in Monaghan.159 Although this evidence is 
limited in that there are very few Volunteer lists available for comparison due to the 
secret nature of the organisation and the few surviving yeomanry returns only record 
the names of officers, it does give an indication of strong linkages between the 
membership of the two organisations. However, this should not be surprising as it was 
the minor gentry, merchants and farmers from the middling classes that had gained 
influence in the provinces and feared the loss of their prosperity through peasant 
rebellion or invasion by French republican forces. By 1792-93 the volunteers were 
increasingly dominated by more radical elements within the middle-classes of Irish 
society compared to the more inclusive organisation of the period 1778-83, and 
included a large number of United Irishmen, especially in Ulster.  The quashing of the 
Volunteers in 1793 may have ensured the disarming of an increasingly radical armed 
group but it had also left a void in the ability of this class to maintain any localised 
self-defence force and the raising of the yeomanry provided an opportunity to resume 
the tradition.    
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The radical Protestant ‘Orange’ movement also provided a significant 
membership within the yeomanry. Extreme ‘Orange’ loyalism had grown from the 
ranks of lower class Anglicans in County Armagh in response to the increasing level 
of violence sponsored by Catholic Defenders during the mid 1790s. The movement 
proved popular and quickly spread to neighbouring counties. However, the inclusion 
of Orangemen within the yeomanry was treated with much suspicion by the 
authorities in Dublin Castle, who viewed the democratic and anti-Catholic stance of 
the loyalists as a potential threat to internal stability. Camden voiced his concerns in a 
letter to the duke of Portland: ‘How impolitic and unwise…to refuse the offers of 
Protestants to enter the yeomanry …yet how dangerous is even any encouragement to 
the Orange spirit, whilst our army is composed of Catholics, as the militia generally 
is.’160 His concern had some foundation, with a detachment of the Kerry Militia, a 
predominantly Catholic regiment, being ambushed near Stewartstown, County 
Tyrone, Ulster in September 1797 by a combined force of local yeomanry, the Tay 
Fencibles and the regular cavalry of the 24th Light Dragoons.161 This resulted in a 
number of casualties and strained relationships within the Irish garrison. Nevertheless, 
the Orangemen were openly encouraged into the yeomanry at local levels and played 
a significant role in the policing of their communities. 
The Orange elements of the yeomanry were mainly limited to the counties 
within, or those that bordered, Ulster. In 1796 Orangeism was geographically limited 
to mid-Ulster, with official membership being estimated at only several thousand 
men. However, the movement quickly spread and by early 1797 approximately 
30,000 Orangemen had enlisted in yeomanry corps.162 This was significant in that by 
December 1797 there were only 35,000 men enlisted in the yeomanry, 14,290 of 
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which came from corps within Ulster (Table 3.1).163 And although exact figures can 
not be obtained, John Cookson estimates that eventually one-in-three serviceable 
Protestant males aged between 18 and 45 were to join the yeomanry, where in Ulster 
almost every Protestant of military age was to become a yeoman.164 This also 
indicates how quickly the movement had spread, with another 15,000 Orangemen 
registered as members of other corps throughout the country.165 However, the 
reliability of these figures must be treated with caution as reliance has been placed 
mainly on official returns forwarded to the Home Office. Allan Blackstock argues that 
there are discrepancies between establishment totals and the actual inspection returns, 
which he claims were due to absenteeism and the fraudulent practice of including 
‘paper’ soldiers to extract extra funds from the government.166  Although he further 
states that taking this into consideration, the margin of error would be insufficient to 
change the overall impression. 
 1797 1798 1799 1803 1810 1817 
 
 
Ulster 39 % 36 % 40 % 42 % 45 % 64 %  
Leinster 33 % 33 % 32 % 31 % 29 % 21 %  
Munster 18 % 22 % 19 % 19 % 17 %   7 %  




Table 3.1 - Yeomanry: Provincial Comparison 
 
 (Source: Blackstock, An Ascendancy Army, p. 122) 
 
‘Orangeism’ spread rapidly throughout the yeomanry corps in the north of 
Ireland. Anti-autocracy and anti-Catholic traditions played a part in this, combined 
with the perceived physical and political threats Protestants felt with the recent 
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concessions given to Catholics. The failed French invasion attempt at Bantry Bay in 
late December 1796 further increased the anxiety of the civilian population, leading to 
an upsurge in patriotic fervour and a willingness to assist in the defence of the 
kingdom through joining armed loyalist associations.167 General John Knox, the 
commander-in-chief of the military forces in County Tyrone and a Protestant land 
magnate in that county, actively supported the arming of Orange associations by 
proposing the formation of Orange fencibles. When this move was rejected by the 
government, he then promoted the inclusion of these organizations into the yeomanry 
as a defence measure against the perceived threat posed to Protestants by the posting 
of Catholic militia in Ulster.168 In a letter to Edward Cooke, Camden’s under-
secretary, in August 1796 he argued for the inclusion of Orangemen within the 
yeomanry: ‘As to the Orange Men we have rather a difficult card to play, they must 
not be entirely discountenanced, on the contrary, we must, in a certain degree, uphold 
them, for, with all their licentiousness, on them must we rely for the preservation of 
our lives and properties, should critical times occur.’169 Knox was a greater advocate 
for the inclusion of Orangemen in the yeomanry than his letter to Cooke suggests. In 
early 1797 many parts of Ulster were proclaimed under the Insurrection Act that gave 
magistrates unprecedented power to search and seize arms. At this time, not only did 
he indicate to the yeomanry in Armagh not to seize weapons of Orangemen, but he 
also fostered their inclusion into yeomanry corps by seeking specific permission from 
Thomas Pelham, Camden’s chief secretary, to add these radical loyalists as 
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supplementary men to the corps led by James Verner.170 He further sought to create a 
new corps entirely of Orangemen, who would display their loyalty by wearing orange 
ribbons.171 The inevitability of such measures became apparent to others such as Lord 
Auckland who spoke of a pragmatic approach to the worsening situation in Ireland: 
‘These Orange Boys…are growing numerous and are most inveterate against the 
United Irishmen. They are a dangerous ally; however, to a certain extent, it is 
necessary to use them.’172  
The creation of the yeomanry was an essential strategic measure. By 1796 the 
threat of invasion together with increased civil unrest throughout Ireland had placed 
immense pressure on the army and the government. The demands of Britain’s foreign 
military operations had led to a massive reduction in the number of regular troops on 
the Irish Establishment, ensuring that the inexperienced and dispersed militia became 
the largest element within the army. It became apparent that this force was inadequate 
to provide both the necessary internal security against insurrection as well as 
providing an effective counter-invasion force. Camden was reluctant to establish a 
para-military force of armed civilian volunteers, mainly due to the political power 
previously achieved by the Volunteer movement in the early 1780s.173 However, the 
worsening domestic and foreign situation in 1796 forced his hand: ‘I do not like to 
resort to yeomanry cavalry or infantry or armed associations if I can help it, but I can 
see no other recourse at the present time – the army must be withdrawn from many of 
its present quarters and must be drawn together to act in larger units than it has lately 
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done.’174 His repeated requests for reinforcements of regular regiments from Britain 
had largely proved fruitless, ensuring that rural Ireland could not effectively be 
policed. The formation of a government-controlled yeomanry was thus seen as the 
only alternative to provide the security being demanded by the propertied population. 
The landed magnates provided the political leadership in the yeomanry. It was 
powerful and wealthy Protestant Irish peers, such as the duke of Leinster, the marquis 
of Abercorn and Lord Downshire, that the lesser classes looked to for patronage in 
forming the corps.175 Such men not only had political influence in ensuring 
government support for the formation of the yeomanry at a national level, but they 
also provided leadership at local level, where many held positions as county 
governors. Although the yeomanry was centrally controlled from Dublin Castle, the 
county governors and landed magnates maintained a greater influence over the corps 
within their localities.176 It was these men who mostly determined who received 
officer commissions within individual units and it was through their patronage that 
these were confirmed by the lord lieutenant.177 The system of patronage was well 
established and accepted within 18th century British and Irish society due to its 
perceived ability to maintain stability within the social hierarchy.178 Thus, it was in 
the interests of the aristocrats to support any self-defence measures proposed by the 
middle classes that would defend against the serious threat posed to them by militant 
republicans and the rebellious Catholic peasantry. However, although many Irish 
peers (some of whom were already colonels of militia regiments, such as Lord 
Downshire) also  provided financial backing and accepted colonelcies for numerous 
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yeomanry corps, especially those from their estates, most only provided nominal 
leadership roles, preferring to leave active command to county squires.179 
The gentry provided the practical leadership within the yeomanry. It was this 
social class that potentially had the most to lose through rebellion of the peasantry and 
it was the drive for self-interest and self-preservation that saw thousands offer their 
service and allegiance to the crown. It had been these people, together with farmers, 
merchants and other middling classes, who had been seeking greater protection from 
the state after being the main victims of insurgent activities.180 The gentry had 
successfully argued their traditional local leadership should be reflected in the 
yeomanry where they could maintain the law and prevent the rise of vigilante groups. 
The government looked to establish individual corps based on the traditional parish 
system where each county was divided into a number of smaller administrative 
districts. This was seen as providing stability within communities by transferring the 
accepted civilian hierarchy into leadership roles within the yeomanry. Thus, the 
influence that these landholders held within their districts made them natural leaders 
and ensured the required support within the parish to rapidly establish local troops or 
companies.181 Patronage ensured that mostly substantial farmers or minor gentry were 
offered commissions. Although the right of election of officers remained within each 
corps, ballots were discouraged by the hierarchy for being too democratic, with 
elections sometimes provoking social tension.182 
Each corps was initially established within specifications directed by the 
government. Infantry units were to be around 100 men strong, with cavalry corps 
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being around 50, but no less than 40.183 Each cavalry volunteer was required to 
provide his own horse, with many gentry providing mounts for those tenants, 
servants, retainers and volunteers who lacked sufficient funds to do so themselves. 
The yeomanry was to comprise mainly of cavalry and infantry, although there were 
also some small components of artillery. Examples of this include the Dublin Lawyers 
Corps, which although an infantry unit, had a small artillery section, as well as the 
Loyal Loughlinstown Yeomanry, whose gunners manned the defences at 
Loughlinstown army camp, 12 miles south-east of Dublin.184 However, the size of 
corps could fluctuate depending on the current political situation. This occurred in 
April 1798 when a number of supplementary yeomanry units were created and 
attached to corps as unpaid and un-uniformed auxiliaries to serve in emergencies or to 
fill vacancies.185 The majority of these volunteers came from within ‘Orange’ 
organisations. 
 Each corps was commanded by a captain, who was to be assisted by several 
junior officers, lieutenants and cornets. Often in rural areas the captain’s residence 
became the administrative headquarters of the unit. This proved a practical measure in 
that the strongly built substantial homes of the gentry provided rallying points in 
troubled times that could be used as defensive strongholds. Such tactics were also 
implemented in urban centres where stone-built government buildings provided the 
focus for yeomanry defence system. The defence measures for Dublin provide the 
prime examples of this where the Lawyers Corp headquarters were at the Four Courts 
and the Revenue Corps headquarters were at the Custom House.186 Metropolitan 
centres such as Dublin and Cork had sufficient population to raise a number of 
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yeomanry corps based on, and named after, their professions. These included the 
aforementioned Lawyers and Revenue corps, along with units formed from students 
from Trinity College. In rural areas the units were usually named after the parish from 
which the volunteers came. 
The establishment of each corps was determined through a combination of 
government directives and local influence. The lord lieutenant issued officers 
commissions in the name of the king to those who were nominated by the local 
county governor or aristocrats who were raising corps from within their own estates. 
Dublin Castle stipulated that each corps was to have a minimum of two officers, a 
captain and a lieutenant, with other commissions being offered as required.187 The 
state provided wages for a permanent sergeant to be attached to each unit. These men 
were usually retired regular soldiers who were employed to instil formal drill and 
discipline into the untrained volunteers. The government also provided for the full-
time employment of a drummer or trumpeter for each corps. However, once the cadre 
of the corps were established, a more democratic approach was allowed within each 
unit. Committees were formed from unit members to regulate discipline, finances and 
membership. Prospective members required voting support from two-thirds of the 
committee to be eligible to join the corps.188 It was this practice that ensured that 
many Catholics and political rivals of officers were refused entry. It was only when 
placed on permanent duty that the yeomanry lost their democratic rights, coming 
under strict military discipline and the command of district generals and the 
commander-in-chief of the army. 
Discipline within the corps was self-regulating. Enrolment in the yeomanry 
was seen as socially acceptable and fashionable amongst the middle classes in Britain 
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and Ireland during the period. Peer pressure ensured that volunteers conformed to the 
accepted political attitudes and social behaviours within their local communities. 
Corps committees determined disciplinary practices within individual units, although 
these were based on behaviour codes formulated by captains for their troops. Those 
who breached such codes risked banishment from the corps and social 
embarrassment. It was only in times of war, when under direct command of the 
military that serious breach of conduct resulted in capital punishment. During the 
rebellion of 1798 a small number of yeomen were executed for desertion, with some 
having sided with the rebels.189 However, men who deserted from their corps after 
this time were saved from the hangman’s noose by agreeing to military service 
overseas. Thomas Bartlett argues that lax discipline within the armed forces of Ireland 
during the 1790s can be largely traced to the enormous expansion in numbers, 
especially in the yeomanry where most officers lacked any formal military experience 
and training was generally limited to several days per week.190   
The state maintained some control over the yeomanry by providing every 
corps with pay, uniforms and arms. To promote efficiency and martial appearance, the 
government had agreed to pay wages for each yeoman to train with his corps two days 
per week. Undoubtedly, these wages would have been claimed, but there is little 
surviving evidence to indicate how often the individual units actually spent training. It 
is most likely that the amount of training carried out by units would have been 
determined by the level of enthusiasm of commanding officers. In an effort to deviate 
from the old volunteer units, the government attempted to regulate the uniforms 
issued to the corps. Infantry units were to wear uniforms similar to those of regular 
infantry regiments: white breeches, red jackets with blue collar and cuffs, but without 
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facings, as well as the ubiquitous black felt cocked hats.191 The yeoman cavalry were 
dressed similarly to the light dragoons of the regular army: white riding breeches, 
thigh length boots, short blue or red jackets and ‘Tarleton’ helmets. However, in 
practice, there was a variety of uniforms worn, with the government having to 
compromise in an effort to promote esprit de corps within the yeomanry.192 Providing 
sufficient weapons posed a problem for the government with the distribution system 
unable to cope with the demand. Infantrymen were to be issued with cartridge boxes, 
bayonets and ‘Brown Bess’ muskets, while cavalrymen were to receive pistols and 
light dragoon sabres. However, in January 1797 only 14,000 out of 24,000 yeomen 
had been issued arms, with most of these weapons being in poor condition.193 Many 
volunteers purchased their own weapons through necessity, keeping them at their 
homes instead of being secured at the unit headquarters. Although this was a practical 
measure to provide personal safety, it also made many yeomen targets for rebel 
activities, with houses being raided to secure firearms for the planned rebellion. 
The yeomanry was to become a predominantly Protestant institution, although 
initially Catholics were included in its membership. Contrary to the views promoted 
by some nationalist historians concerning the yeomanry, there was no official anti-
Catholic or anti-Presbyterian policy regarding recruiting: Camden had told Lord 
Waterford that it was unwise to refuse Catholics into the yeomanry and wrote to Lord 
Downshire stating that trustworthy Catholics and dissenters should be included in his 
corps.194 However, the enlistment of Catholics and religious dissenters proved to be a 
contentious issue, especially in Ulster. Catholic enlistment was actively discouraged 
by the opposition within the Irish parliament, as well as the influential ‘Catholic 
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Committee,’ an organisation established in the early 1790s to promote Catholic 
interests, which consisted of leading Catholic gentry, businessmen and clergy who 
saw the yeomanry as a tool of oppression against the Catholic peasantry.195 Camden 
had told Lord Waterford that it was unwise to refuse Catholics into the yeomanry as it 
may lead to further unrest amongst the population.196 However, in a later letter to the 
duke of Portland, he made it clear that he was supportive of them enlisting as 
individuals into existing corps rather than joining ‘en masse’ and forming their own 
units.197 The rarity of complete muster rolls makes it hard to determine a definitive 
denominational breakdown of the yeomanry corps, although there are a number of 
known examples where Catholics played a significant role. Allan Blackstock argues 
that an examination of the surviving ‘Derry Muster Rolls’ suggests that there is a 
correlation between Catholic membership and the concentration of native Irish 
surnames. These records show that the Banagher Yeomen Cavalry had 14 Catholics, 
all with native surnames, out of a membership of 53.198 The dismounted section of the 
same corps had 81 with native names out of a total of 82 members. The Faughan Glen 
Yeomen Infantry proved to be a mixed unit with Catholics outnumbering Protestants 
34 to 18 in 1798 and 33 to 8 in 1800.199 What makes these figures so significant is 
that even after the events of 1798, Catholics continued to be retained in reasonable 
numbers in some corps. Blackstock claims that these indicate that Catholics were 
readily accepted into the yeomanry in areas, such as Counties Derry and Donegal, 
where Catholics owned land and there were few Protestants. 
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Trustworthiness appears to have been the main government criteria for 
membership within the yeomanry, rather than religion. The gentry and other persons 
of property who had the most to lose from rebellion assumed the trust of the state on 
the grounds that they would be determined to defend the status quo, regardless of 
religious denomination. The chief aim of Whig policies in Ireland was to reconcile the 
Catholic gentry and moneyed class to the British state and to cement a ‘union of 
property’ against Jacobin subversion.200 Allowing prominent Catholics to raise 
yeomanry corps to prove their loyalty was an obvious tactic to achieve these goals. 
This was evident with Catholic peers, such as Lord Gormanston, receiving official 
authority to raise and command a cavalry corps in County Meath that consisted of 40 
Catholics.201 Lord Donoughmore’s Cork Legion consisted of many wealthy Catholics, 
where native surnames were prevalent, while Lord Kenmare raised a predominantly 
Catholic cavalry corps in Killarney.202 There also appears to be a strong correlation 
between Catholic membership and wealth and property, which was the general criteria 
for acceptance into yeomanry cavalry corps throughout the kingdom, excepting 
certain counties in Ulster. Each yeoman had to provide his own horse and uniform, 
the cost of which proved prohibitive to both Catholic and Protestant peasants, 
ensuring that yeoman cavalry corps consisted of members of the gentry and the 
middle-classes, along with some of their retainers.203 Blackstock estimates that there 
were 2-3,000 Catholics in the yeomanry in 1797, with most of them in cavalry units in 
the south of the country.204 This was at a time when the yeomanry had a total strength 
of 35,000, of which 14,000 were in Ulster.205 Statistics recorded by the Protestant 
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zealot, Sir Richard Musgrave, in a pamphlet published in 1799, indicate strong 
Catholic membership in the various cavalry corps of Leinster, especially in Wexford, 
where the majority of infantry corps consisted of Catholics. Examples include: the 
Shelmaliere cavalry that contained 24 Catholics, the Castletown Cavalry that had 46 
and the Coolgreary Cavalry that boasted 16. Musgrave also claims that one third of 
the Clane Cavalry in Kildare consisted of ‘papists’, while the Rathcoole infantry 
contained 3 Catholic officers and 42 privates.206 The reliability of Musgrave’s figures 
remains in question due to his overt bias towards the Ascendancy where he has 
attempted to use these figures to argue a Catholic conspiracy with the United Irishmen 
in the rebellion. However, what they indicate is that there was a limited level of trust 
placed in wealthy Catholics, and the extent of their involvement within the yeomanry 
prior to the rebellion of 1798. 
The yeomanry were considered a key element in the defensive strategy for 
Ireland, especially after the attempted French invasion at Bantry Bay in December 
1796. At this time it was feared that any such invasion would be supported by a 
simultaneous internal rebellion led by the United Irishmen. The military strategy 
formulated after the failed landing called for the concentration of the bulk of the 
regular forces and the militia regiments to form a sizable army to either confront the 
enemy in open battle or to man defensive lines based on geographical boundaries, 
such as the rivers Shannon and Blackwater.207 The yeomanry had three important 
roles to play in this strategy. Firstly, the main duty of the corps was to maintain law 
and order in their localities and to quickly deal with any insurgent activities that may 
occur. The yeomanry was expected to perform town garrison duties, including 
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providing guards at gaols, in the case of invasion.208 The second role was to aid the 
military forces by keeping the lines of communication open so that the army could 
receive dispatches, munitions and other supplies required to maintain it in the field. 
The third role involved the yeomen cavalry acting as irregular forces behind enemy-
held territory. It was envisaged the mounted corps would slow the movement of the 
French by employing guerrilla-style tactics of harassing lines of communication, 
destroying bridges, attacking supply convoys and supplying the army with essential 
information regarding enemy troop movements.209 This strategic use of the yeomanry 
was sound in theory as the volunteers would have lacked the training and discipline 
required to confront the enemy in open battle.  
The yeomanry proved most effective when used in policing roles. Prior to the 
rebellion and invasion of 1798 the yeomanry became an essential tool of the 
government in dealing with civil unrest. Throughout 1797-1798 there had been an 
increasing breakdown in law and order in parts of Ireland, especially in the northern 
counties, where the yeomanry were heavily relied upon to provide local intelligence 
and manpower for the escalating counter-terror operations promoted by the 
government. In practice, it was the quality of leadership and discipline within 
individual corps that determined how effectively the yeomanry carried out its 
specified roles. Magistrates came to depend upon the corps to help enforce the 
Insurrection Act. The yeomanry were immediately available and could provide local 
knowledge which the regulars, fencibles and militia lacked. It was the localised nature 
of the yeomanry that was the main feature of its military strength, where as first 
potential victims of insurrection, the yeomen had a vested interest in immediately and 
vigorously reacting to any threat. In March 1797 General Lake was given discretion to 
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act independently of local magistrates if he felt conditions were justified. This led to 
some districts coming under de-facto martial law, with the subsequent security 
operations that followed being known as the ‘dragooning’ of Ulster.210 The lack of 
troops available to carry out such measures ensured that Lake and his subordinate, 
Knox, were reliant on the yeomanry to perform the required duties of searching and 
seizing arms and suspects. Yeomanry were also used in similar operations in Dublin 
and some disturbed southern counties in early 1798. This included County Wexford in 
March and April of that year where the yeomanry was heavily relied upon due to 
maintain the peace due to the insufficient number of troops stationed there, with 
Pakenham claiming their over-vigorous actions promoted the civilian uprising.211 
However, in general, where the yeomanry proved most effective was functioning as a 
deterrent, where its very existence meant a constant local presence of armed strength.  
The weak infrastructure of law and government in Ireland at this time ensured 
some local autonomy for the yeomanry corps. In the provinces the government was 
reliant on local magistrates to ensure law and order, although the magistrates had to 
rely on the army and yeomanry to enforce the law. This situation contributed to 
disorder spreading throughout the kingdom where in some localities the authority of 
the law was supplanted by the personal interests of the commanding officers of the 
yeomanry. In many areas local magistrates had become impotent in administering 
civil law due to intimidation and fear of being murdered by rebels, leading to the 
temporary introduction of martial law. This then ensured that local army commanders, 
who could be impatient of, and contemptuous of civil authority, could conduct their 
counter-insurgent operations without the ‘niceties’ of the legal system. General Knox, 
a strong promoter of yeomanry intervention in Ulster argued that the law was 
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insufficient to quell rebellion: ‘Laws though ever so strict will not do…severe military 
execution alone will recover the arms from the hands of the rebels.’212 Camden and 
his advisors advocated counter-terror tactics and encouraged excessive behaviour by 
the army and yeomanry by proclaiming the suspension of civil rights in disaffected 
areas, thus removing restrictions that some saw as preventing the maintenance of 
order and forestalling insurgency.213 This provided unscrupulous yeomanry officers 
with the opportunity to exceed their authority and seek revenge on local political 
rivals. Such activities included destruction of property, imprisonment without trial, 
and murders for which few was held accountable.214 The ‘independence’ of the 
yeomanry was shown to its full effect in 1798 where the increasingly violent activities 
of insurgents were countered by retaliatory actions of local yeomanry who acted 
without seeking orders from higher authorities.215 It was this inability to effectively 
control the largely untrained and ill-disciplined yeomanry corps that not only fostered 
disorder leading up to the rebellion, but also ensured the government remained 
sensitive to the challenge the corps posed to the state’s monopoly of armed force in 
the kingdom.               
 The yeomanry earned an unsavoury reputation within a short period. The 
yeomanry force crucially functioned as an agent of counter-revolution in the period 
1796-1798, where ‘terror’ was increasingly used by both sides and reached a climax 
with the atrocities committed during the rebellion. Patriotic fervour and over-zealous 
actions within the corps led to numerous official complaints to the government.216 
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This was especially so concerning the operations in Ulster, where the indiscriminate 
violence used by the yeomen, such as hanging suspects by their feet and lashing them 
with ropes and belts, was possibly encouraged, and at the very least, ignored by 
superior officers.217 The use of terror in counter-terror operations was seen at the time 
as the best deterrent to rebellion, and coupled with the indiscipline of the yeomanry, 
ultimately led to numerous floggings, houses burning and deaths.218 The most 
notorious incident occurred in July 1797 at Newry where defenceless civilians, 
including children, were murdered by local yeomanry and members of a Welsh 
fencibles regiment known as the ‘Ancient Britons.’219 And although an official excuse 
was given that such action was taken in response to the murder of a local magistrate, 
on this occasion even loyalists protested at the ‘wanton and gratuitous ferocity of the 
attack.’220 However, in general, most complaints related to the destruction of 
property, that, if not sanctioned by the government, were certainly encouraged by 
Knox who had openly spoken of the need for ‘spiriting up’ opposition to the United 
Irishmen by opposing violence with violence.221 This was further fostered by 
members of the Irish parliament resurrecting the Williamite traditions of 1690 throug






volunteers had been formed in some part as a protest to the economic restrictions 
                                                
ival.222 
Although based on the self-defence traditions of the volunteers, the yeomanry
never represented the old Protestant nationalism promoted by that organization. Th
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placed on the Irish by Britain that had led to anger and calls for self-determination.223 
However, in the 1790s, instead of voicing their need for greater political 
independence that had been the catch-cry of the late 1770s and early 1780s, the 
Protestant Ascendancy was reliant on Britain as an ally to ensure the maintenance of 
power and control in Ireland. British military and naval support was now essential in 
dealing with the increasing threats of internal rebellion and invasion that could 
potentially see the oligarchy of the Ascendancy replaced with a republic. The 
inclusion of the Orange orders into the corps also influenced the character of the 
yeomanry. Orangeism was based on loyalty to the crown, with strong religious 
connections through the Anglican Church.224 With the vast majority of the Protestant 
members of the corps being either Orangemen, Anglicans, or both, it is quite clear 
why, although being an Irish institution, the yeomanry as an organization would be 
more supportive of retaining its British links. The fear of the rise of Catholic 
peasantry who were a substantial percentage of the population was also a huge 
incentive for the yeomanry to support internal intervention by Britain. The increase in 
sectarian violence fostered fears amongst the Protestant minority of religious 
extermination, who argued for Britain to supply a significant increase in loyal troops 
for the garrison to ensure their safety.     
The yeomanry became an integral element within the military establishment of 
Ireland from the time of its inception in 1796 and throughout the years of war with 
France. Dublin Castle was forced to actively support the formal creation of the corps 
to ensure control over the numerous armed reactionary groups that were being 
established in the troubled counties to provide local security for the gentry and middle 
classes. Through rapid augmentation the yeomanry became an essential force in the 
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defence strategy of the kingdom where the corps were to be used as an internal police 
force, especially in counter-insurgent operations, thus in theory freeing the militia and 
regular troops to concentrate on counter-invasion defence (Table 3.2). Issues of ill-
discipline, murder, nepotism and corruption, coupled with the religious fervour of the 
Orangemen who were incorporated into the corps in large numbers, led to the 
tarnishing of the reputation of the yeomanry, although such issues were generally 
overlooked by authorities at the time. Ultimately, the yeomanry developed into a 
powerful para-military organization that not only proved essential in the defence of 
the country, but more importantly for some, it also ensured the armed protection of 
the interests of the Protestant Ascendancy. 
   
Date Establishment Effectives Date Establishment Effectives 
 
Dec.  1796     21,000  Nov. 1804     70,000   64,000 
Dec.  1797     35,000  Dec. 1805    70,000 
May  1798     50,000  Apr.  1806     82,000   64,000 
         1799     66,000  May  1807     69,000   61,000 
         1800     54,000  Apr. 1808     80,000   75,000 
Nov. 1801     52,000  Mar. 1810     85,000  
June  1802     51,000  Dec.  1815    45,000 
         1803     83,000   70,000     
      
      
      
Table 3.2 - Yeomanry Corps establishment, 1796-1815 
 















British Military Presence and the Management of the Irish Garrison 
up to 1798 
 
There is no doubt that the experience of the rebellion of 1798 and subsequent 
French invasion later that year were to determine the military occupation of Ireland by 
Britain. However, a greater understanding of the British military presence in the 
kingdom prior to the rebellion is necessary to emphasize the extent of the latter 
occupation. A deeper study of this period is also necessary to evaluate the affects that 
the dual defence roles of internal and external security had on the Irish military 
establishment, and how the strategies and tactics employed by the government and 
senior army officers influenced the United Irish uprising. The argument within this 
chapter is supportive of the consensus amongst Irish revisionists, such as Thomas 
Bartlett and Marianne Elliott,  that the oppressive nature of the disarming campaigns 
carried out by the armed forces and promoted by the Irish government were 
instrumental in encouraging support for insurrection.225 However, in contrast to the 
traditional view fostered by some British historians, such as Sir John Fortescue, that 
the Irish establishment was incompetent prior to the uprising, such tactics did prove 
effective in weakening the United Irish movement and greatly reduced the chance of 
the rebellion succeeding.226 Furthermore, contrary to the traditional unflattering 
perception of the British fencible regiments that served in Ireland, there is evidence 
that indicates that some regiments, particularly the Scottish units, proved to be quality 
troops and played a significant role in the defence of Ireland, and thus Britain. What is 
evident is that political interference and Ascendancy bias against the Irish militia and 
the Catholic population was detrimental to the effectiveness of the army in Ireland, 
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causing mistrust, confusion and ill-discipline at all levels within the armed forces, not 
just in the militia, which has been the traditional view.227   
Britain had maintained a substantial military presence in Ireland since the 
Williamite Wars of the early 1690s and throughout the 18th century. The perceived 
threat posed to the Protestant oligarchy by Catholics, who accounted for an estimated 
three quarters of the population, ensured the need for a significant number of troops 
being permanently stationed in Ireland.228 Throughout the century Britain was also in 
near constant conflict with France which necessitated a strong garrison to defend 
against the repeated threats of invasion. During this period Ireland was seen by the 
French and the British as a key strategic location that offered both offensive and 
defensive opportunities that could not be ignored. The policies concerning the 
distribution and management of the armed forces stationed in Ireland were determined 
by numerous factors such as internal politics, threat of rebellion, threat of invasion, 
rising sectarian tension and the constant demand for troops for military operations in 
the West Indies and the Continent. The war with Revolutionary France from 1793 
increased the demand for troops and significantly altered the dynamics of the British 
army in Ireland. What resulted was the introduction of conflicting defensive policies: 
counter-invasion, which required the concentration of the army to provide a force 
large enough to defeat any invasion, and counter-insurgency, which required the 
dispersal of the armed forces to police against increasing rebel activity throughout the 
kingdom. These incompatible strategies created tension within Irish political circles, 
as well as amongst the military leadership. Although the threat of French incursion 
remained constant, political pressure from the Ascendancy due to increasing internal 
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violence ensured the dispersal of the army throughout the kingdom, seriously 
hindering its ability deal with any sizable invasion force. 
When the Revolutionary French government declared war on Great Britain in 
February 1793 the British were militarily unprepared. In the ten years following the 
1783 Treaty of Versailles that ended the American War of Independence, the British 
army had been cut back to 44,000 officers and men.229 This was hardly enough to 
maintain the weak overseas garrisons, with only a few thousand men remaining for 
the defence of the British Isles or to carry out any offensive operations. The British 
government was now forced to rapidly mobilise its military forces through heavy 
recruitment drives throughout the British Isles, including Catholic Ireland. At this 
time Britain had entered into a coalition with a number of continental states that were 
also at war with France, such as Spain, the Dutch Republic, Austria and numerous 
German states, and had committed itself to provide a small army for operations in 
Flanders.230 Established regiments of seasoned and experienced soldiers had to be 
found quickly, resulting in the reduction of British garrisons throughout the empire.  
Ireland had the largest garrison and its close proximity to the area of operations 
ensured that the number of troops within the kingdom was rapidly and seriously 
depleted. This posed a major problem for those responsible for the security of the 
country.  
The Irish government was responsible for the military forces in Ireland in the 
late 18th century, with the Irish parliament providing financial support under the 
direction of the lord lieutenant. Prior to 1793 the official ‘Irish Establishment’ 
consisted solely of regular regiments of the British army that had been posted to 
Ireland to perform permanent garrison duties or had been temporarily sent to the 
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kingdom for the purpose of recruiting. However, at the outbreak of war with France in 
1793 Ireland was largely independent of Great Britain in military matters. The Irish 
government was financially responsible for all the troops stationed in the kingdom 
and even funded a number of regiments for overseas service.231 The establishment 
was maintained with resources, such as wheat, barley and horses, from within the 
kingdom and even the army’s gunpowder and small arms were produced by the 
Ordnance department at the arsenal in Dublin.232 However, Ireland became 
increasingly reliant on Britain to provide additional troops for its defence to counter 
the dual threats of rebellion and invasion. Sea links in the Irish Sea remained 
controlled by the Royal Navy ensuring reinforcements could be quickly transported 
when required, although such forces could take weeks to embark due to the few 
regiments available in Britain, as transpired in 1798.233 The Irish establishment was 
directly under the control of the lord lieutenant, who acted as the representative of the 
king, having the title of ‘Captain General and commander-in-chief,’ although most 
viceroys concentrated mainly on civil matters. In 1769 the official peace-time strength 
of the establishment had been increased from 12,000 rank and file to 15,000 which 
had been decided by a vote in the Irish parliament and was to be financed by the Irish 
government.234 It was argued that the security of Ireland had to be maintained not 
only due to its close proximity to Britain but also due to its importance in maintaining  
trans-Atlantic shipping routes that Britain, and thus Ireland, relied on for increasing 
commercial prosperity.  
Military appointments and commissions were made by the lord lieutenant, 
subject to the approval of the king. Ireland had its own War Office that was 
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established as the military department of the chief secretary’s office. This department 
was administered by an under-secretary who presided over six sub-branches that co-
ordinated the logistical requirements of the military establishment: the Commissariat 
which was responsible for food and forage; the Muster Master-Generals office which 
provided monthly returns of regimentals strengths; the Barrack Board and Board of 
Works responsible for the quartering of troops and maintenance of barracks; the 
Ordnance Department which administered the Royal Irish Artillery Regiment and 
Engineers, while also ensuring the supply of small arms; the Army Medical Board 
(established in 1795); and the Army Accounts Office which was established by 
Cornwallis in 1799.235 The establishment also had an army ‘commander of the forces’ 
who was directly responsible to the lord lieutenant and not to the duke of the York, 
who was the commander-in-chief of the British army for most of the period. He was 
supported by a general staff that included an Adjutant General, Quarter Master 
General, Judge Advocate General and a Master General of Ordnance, as well as 
numerous clerks tasked with the daily correspondence required to administer the 
army.236 
In 1793 the military force in Ireland was neither formidable in numbers nor 
quality. The official garrison strength of 15,000 men had never been reached but the 
importance Britain placed on Ireland was evident in that in 1792 a third of the 
regiments in the small British army were stationed in the kingdom.237 In January 1793 
the establishment had only 10,199 troops recorded on the strength, which included 
1,711 cavalry and 8,488 infantry.238 The garrison comprised of ordinary cavalry and 
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infantry regiments of the line that had been mostly raised and recruited throughout 
Britain, as well a number of companies of the Royal Irish Artillery and detachments 
of invalids, soldiers who were no longer fit for active service but who were used to 
man the numerous harbour forts protecting Cork, Dublin and Waterford. There were 
very few locally raised Irish infantry regiments before 1793, with only the 18th 
(Royal Irish) and 27th (Inniskilling) regiments of foot being distinctive Irish infantry 
units in British service.239 This was most likely due to the official anti-Catholic 
recruiting policies of the British army throughout most of the 18th century that 
ensured that Irish recruiting generally occurred in the Protestant strong-holds of Ulster 
and the Pale (Dublin and its surrounding counties). However, much of the rank and 
file of a number of the cavalry regiments was raised within Ireland, with four of the 
dragoon regiments having served in the garrison for so long that they were 
collectively known as ‘Irish Horse’. 240 
The cavalry regiments based in Ireland up until 1798 were considered to be of 
poor quality. This was generally due to a lack of active military service and 
inadequate training, supervision and leadership from officers. Regiments had been 
dispersed throughout the counties to provide small troop-sized garrisons for provincial 
towns, which negated essential regimental drill training, while it was common 
practice for officers to be absent from their troops while seeking a social life in the 
urban centres. The 12th Light Dragoons had been stationed continuously in Ireland 
from 1717, while the 13th and 14th Dragoons were actually raised in the kingdom and 
remained there until after the events of 1798.241 This made the troops more 
susceptible to harbouring sympathies to the local population to which they were 
recruited from and had lived amongst for so long. The most recognised example of 
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this was the regiment of the 5th Dragoons that was disbanded in 1799 at the direction 
of the lord lieutenant, Charles, the Marquis Cornwallis, due to the sympathies held by 
a significant number of the Irish troops towards the plight of Irish rebels. Twenty 
troopers had been tried for high treason and desertion to the enemy during the 
rebellion, with a number shot or hanged. Many within the regiment were sworn 
United Irishmen who were in the habit of drinking seditious toasts and were 
insubordinate, affecting the discipline and reliability of the regiment.242 General Sir 
Ralph Abercromby, appointed as commander-in-chief of the Irish military force in 
late 1797, was highly critical of the cavalry regiments as a result of his inspection of 
the army in Ireland shortly after his appointment. In his famous general order to the 
army of 26 February 1798, he singled out the cavalry: ‘It is of utmost importance that 
the discipline of the dragoon regiments should be minutely attended to…and that they 
should be employed only…on military and indispensable business.’243 However, no 
measures to improve efficiency were implemented before the rebellion. In early 1798 
Thomas Pelham, Camden’s chief secretary, wrote to the duke of Portland describing 
the condition of the cavalry regiments stationed at the camp at Curragh. He claimed 
that the six regiments encamped there appeared to be ‘perfectly ignorant of the new 
(cavalry) exercises’ and that from one regiment alone ‘365 horses were lost or died in 
the course of two years, notwithstanding that no glanders or epidemic disorder 
appeared to have prevailed in that regiment.’244 Desertion and death from disease 
were also rife amongst the cavalry regiments during this period. Taking the above into 
consideration, it is no wonder that this branch of the service proved of little account 
against the insurgents.  
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The outbreak of war in 1793 led to further reductions in the number of regular 
troops in the Irish garrison. Due to its relatively small army, Britain struggled to 
provide sufficient troops to fulfil its commitments to the operations with its 
continental allies in Flanders and Holland, as well as to defend its possessions in the 
West Indies. The Relief Acts of 1792-1793 had provided the Irish government with 
the ability to raise a substantial permanent militia from the relatively untapped 
Catholic population to replace the regular infantry line regiments of the garrison 
which were desperately needed for overseas operations. This ensured that the Irish 
establishment was systematically stripped of the majority of its regular infantry. In 
August 1793 five regiments of infantry and three of cavalry, as well as two companies 
of the Royal Irish Artillery were transferred from Ireland for foreign service.245 By 
the end of 1794 most of the regular regiments that had formerly been part of the Iri
establishment had been sent on active service, leaving only a small number of under-
strength regular battalions that had been specifically sent to the kingdom to recruit. 
Once these units had recruited to full strength they were quickly posted to overseas 
theatres of operation. Between July 1793 and January 1798 the number of rank and 
file regular infantry in Ireland was significantly reduced from 11,094 to 1,830.
sh 
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However, the number of regular cavalry troops available for the defence of Ireland 
substantially increased. For the same period as above the number of regular rank and 
file troopers stationed in the kingdom increased from 2,793 to 3,943.247 It is most 
likely that the main reason the establishment maintained and augmented its cavalry 
force in Ireland was that the theatres of operations involving the British army at this 
time were not suitable for large scale mounted action. It was also thought at the time 
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that mounted troops would be more suitable for internal policing operations due to the 
ability to respond quickly to areas of disturbance and the intimidation factor of 
cavalry against ill-disciplined civilians.248 The available cavalry numbers fluctuated 
slightly during this period; however, it was this arm of the regular army that the 
government was forced to heavily rely on to provide professionalism in the garrison. 
Although war with France led to an immediate reduction in the number of 
regular infantry in Ireland, the period 1793 to 1798 saw an unprecedented rise in the 
available troops on the Irish establishment. Prior to the commencement of hostilities, 
in January 1793 the Irish garrison amounted to only 10,199 rank and file, consisting 
of 1,711 regular cavalry and 8,488 regular infantry.249 And although there is some 
minor discrepancy between these figures obtained from the State Papers Office 
(Ireland) and those in Table 4.1 taken from official Home Office returns, they gave an 
indication of the limited number of regular troops available in Ireland (Table 4.1) 
However, the demands of war led to a massive recruitment drive to bring the 
established regiments up to full strength of 600 men for foot regiments and 400 for 
cavalry. Once at full strength the regiments usually embarked for overseas service 
leaving a void in the garrison. The majority of the 38 new Irish militia regiments were 
quickly raised and were used to replace the regular infantry battalions, significantly 
augmenting the number of foot soldiers in Ireland. However, many in the Ascendancy 
questioned the reliability and loyalty of the untrained, inexperienced, and mostly 
Catholic, militiamen. To further increase the available troops for the defence of the 
kingdom, as well to provide a force to safeguard against any possible treasonable 
action by the militia, the Irish government sought the services of newly raised fencible 
cavalry and infantry from Britain.  




 Cavalry         
 
 Infantry     
 Regulars 
 
Fencibles Regulars Fencibles Militia Yeomanry Total 
Jan. 1793   1,510    8,134       9,644 
Jan. 1794   2,331    8,087    9,627   20,155 
Jan. 1795   2,715    300   6,126      537 12,847   22,525 
Jan. 1796   2,296    508   1,480 10,210 17,162   31,656 
Jan. 1797   3,640    664   1,699   9,085 18,188   33,276 
Jan. 1798   3,957 1,820   1,812 10,788 22,358   36,854  77,589 
Jan. 1799   4,151 3,139   5,572 13,516 32,583   43,221 102,181 
Jan. 1800   1,742 3,738   2,657 16,823 25,542   66,082 116,584 
 
Table 4.1 - The armed forces of the crown in Ireland, 1 January 1793 to 1 January 1800 
 
Sources: ‘Return of the effective men in the British army stationed in Ireland,’ Jan. 1793-Jan. 1806 
(National Archive, Kew, HO 100/176/429); ‘Numerical Strength of the Yeomanry, 1797-1799 
(National Archives of Ireland, Rebellion Papers 620/48/56)   
 
Compared to the rapid augmentation of the army from 1793, there appears to 
have been only a small-scale programme of barrack building in Ireland prior to 1798. 
Permanent barracks were already established in strategic locations such as Belfast, 
Dublin, Cork, Londonderry, Galway and Duncannon Fort near Waterford, although 
some were in a poor state of repair. An Army Medical Board report issued in 1801 
was highly critical of the general state of barracks in Ireland: ‘Permanent and 
temporary barracks have been from necessity greatly over crowded,…many of these 
latter buildings are unfavourably placed, badly constructed and worse ventilated.’250 
The issue of providing adequate accommodation for the troops did lead to the 
construction of a number of new barracks prior to the rebellion, such as Clonmel in 
1793, Belfast and Island Bridge in 1797, and at Tralee in 1798, although the number 
of permanent barracks proved to be insufficient in some areas leading to the 
unpopular practice of billeting of troops amongst the local population.251 In 1798 
there was so little suitable accommodation for the 2,000 troops stationed between 
Cork and Limerick that it was suggested that two regiments should be encamped in 
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tents on open ground.252 What makes this so significant is that this region was 
identified as a likely location for a French invasion in 1796 and obviously inadequate 
measures had been taken to house the sizable force that was to garrison the area 
during the years of hostilities. However, it appears that a number of small barracks 
that could accommodate up to 100 men were established throughout the kingdom 
during the 1790s, either from the construction of new buildings or from modifications 
made to existing structures, in areas where insurgents were active. Typical of such 
buildings was Ross Castle where a single company of the Kerry Militia was stationed 
in 1797.253 What is obvious is, that prior to 1798, the military authorities in Ireland 
had failed to provide suitable and sufficient accommodation for the increasing number 
of troops in the kingdom, especially in regard to the fencible regiments sent from 
Britain.    
Fencible regiments proved to be an essential element in the defence of the 
British Isles during the Revolutionary War and played a significant role in the 
defensive strategy of Ireland until their disbandment in 1802 as a result of the peace 
treaty of Amiens. Fencible cavalry and infantry regiments were initially raised in 
Britain as an emergency measure to supplement the war-time home-defence force. 
Civilians were enlisted for full-time service for a limited period, which was usually 
for the duration of hostilities, as opposed to the life-time service of the regular army 
that discouraged many to enlist. Units were quickly and easily raised due to the 
favourable conditions of length of service and the promise that recruits would not 
serve abroad. Between 1793 and 1802 approximately 34 regiments of fencible cavalry 
and 59 battalions of fencible infantry were raised, of which twelve cavalry and 34 
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infantry units were Scottish.254 Cavalry regiments usually consisted of 300 troopers, 
while infantry battalions had a full strength of 600 men. In all, twelve regiments of 
fencible cavalry, including four Scots units, and 34 battalions of fencible infantry 
served in Ireland during the period, with 21 of the infantry units beings Scottish.255 
This indicates that Scots played a significant role in the defence of Ireland during the 
period, where they equated to 33.3 percent of the fencible cavalry force and 61.7 
percent of the fencible infantry.256      
The negative view held by many British and Irish historians regarding the 
composition and efficiency of the regiments of fencibles that served in Ireland during 
this time is contentious. There were two fencible light dragoon cavalry units and at 
least one fencible infantry battalion raised in Ireland in 1795, with Camden reporting 
to the duke of Portland in July 1795 that he had recently inspected the newly raised 
Irish Fencible Regiment of Foot at Waterford.257 However, most fencible regiments 
that served in Ireland had been sent to the kingdom from Britain, beginning in April 
1795, with the majority of them being of Scottish origin. Camden, though, took 
exception to three of the four regiments sent to Ireland in June of that year, which 
included two regular cavalry regiments and two fencible units, because three of them 
were entirely composed of Irishmen recruited in England.258 A lasting perception 
amongst traditional and nationalist historians is that, in general, fencibles were ill-
disciplined, in poor physical health, and subject to committing atrocities against the 
civilian population. And although there is sufficient evidence to support these views 
regarding some particular regiments, there is also contemporary evidence to suggest 
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that some individual units proved themselves to be of a proficient standard for the 
duties they were expected to perform. 
There was much concern regarding the military effectiveness of a number of 
fencible regiments due to their generally poor physical condition and appearance prior 
to the rebellion in 1798. A recurring criticism was that a large number of the soldiers 
suffered from illnesses, were of a weak physical build and were not fit for service.  In 
October 1795 General Robert Cunninghame, then commander-in-chief of the army in 
Ireland, received a report from Major General Sir James Duff concerning his recent 
inspection of the Perthshire Fencible Regiment. His observations were typical of the 
complaints regarding fencible units, stating the regiment was ‘composed of old men 
and young boys, few of either fit for His Majesty’s service.’259 He further stated that 
there was a high fatality rate within the regiment due to the want of proper clothing 
and that he ‘had not been able to prevail on the officers to have them clothed or to 
provide them with necessities, both of which they are…in want of.’ He concluded the 
report by stating the new recruits mostly proved to be unfit as well.  The most extreme 
example is that of the Leicester Fencible Infantry Regiment that disembarked at 
Dublin in May 1795 but immediately had 80 percent of its men returned to England as 
unfit for service.260 The same month the Prince of Wales Fencibles arrived at the 
same port and were also sent back to Britain, as 396 out the 500-man battalion 
considered unfit for duty due to being ‘too old, too fat, too small, too infirm and too 
young.’
were 
                                                
261  
The poor physical condition of these troops can be attributed to a number of 
factors. One explanation can be sought by examining where the majority of the 
recruits came from. The high death rate from natural causes of fencibles in Ireland, 
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which was five-times higher than the militia, led to an inquiry by the Army Medical 
Board into the disparity in mortality between the two forces. It concluded that the 
Irish militia generally comprised of ‘stout men in the prime of life,’ drawn from the 
peasantry and use to hard work and the Irish climate, whereas the British fencibles 
were ‘either too young or unhealthy old men from unhealthy parts of Britain.’262 Most 
of these men, especially those from England, had been artisans, mechanics and 
labourers recruited from over-crowded and unhealthy sprawling urban centres, and 
generally were less robust and strong compared to the majority of Catholic recruits of 
the Irish Militia who were mainly rural agricultural labourers.263 The fencibles were 
also prone to disease due to exposure to the unfamiliar climate and poor living 
conditions. Barracks were notoriously overcrowded and cold and damp during the 
winter months, which fostered numerous ailments. Duncannon Fort, near Waterford, 
was a typical example where the soldiers had to share three to a bed, which led to the 
rapid spread of fever and deaths.264    
Ill-discipline was another major criticism aimed at the fencibles. This occurred 
due to a number of factors, which included lack of military experience, poor training, 
boredom and poor leadership. The service of the Perthshire Fencible infantry was an 
example of this where it appeared to suffer from poor recruiting and an open feud 
between its commanding officer and some his subordinate officers. This resulted in 
lax discipline, with the regiment behaving badly against the civilian population, 
especially after the defeat of the rebels in 1798.265 The actions of the battalion was 
considered so bad that in late 1798 Cornwallis ordered the disbandment of the 
                                                 
262 Ibid. 
263 Nelson, p. 130 
264 Bartlett, ‘Defence, counter-insurgency and rebellion: Ireland 1793-1803,’ p. 258 
265 Carswell, p.157 
 101
regiment as an example to the rest of the army.266 Similarly to the Irish militia, the 
absence of officers from the fencible regiments reflected a lack of concern for their 
men and affected the efficiency and discipline of the troops when used in counter-
insurgent operations, as well as garrison duty. This appears to have been a constant 
concern for the hierarchy of the army, with the military returns of October 1797 
submitted by Lord Carhampton, then commander-in-chief of the army, showing that 
there were eight fencible officers reported absent-without-leave at that time.267 In 
comparison, the return states there were only three regular officers missing, but 
consideration must be given to the small number of regulars stationed in Ireland at 
this time. The same return reported that there were also eight militia officers absent 
from their battalions without authority. This tends to indicate that the attitudes and 
professionalism of the officer corps within the fencibles and militia was generally 
inferior in standard to that of regular officers, which reflected the standard of 
discipline displayed by their troops. 
A number of atrocities were committed against the civilian population by 
individual fencible units that were instrumental in the lasting unfavourable reputation 
of the corps in Ireland. The most notorious unit was the Ancient British Light 
Dragoons, a Welsh fencible cavalry regiment commonly known as the ‘Ancient 
Britons.’ This regiment was stationed in Ulster and was involved in the combined 
counter-insurgent operations of 1797-1798.  The officers and troops within the 
regiment proved ruthless towards the inhabitants of areas that were suspected of 
supporting the United Irishmen. In November 1797 Robert Livingstone, the agent of 
the zealous Protestant loyalist, Lord Charlemont, complained to his employer, that the 
Ancient Britons, accompanied by yeomanry, had wrecked property and 
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indiscriminately beaten inhabitants of Charlemont’s estate in Armagh, while seizing 
all arms, including those of Protestants who had lawfully registered them.268 The 
counter-terror tactics used by the regiment were so severe that prominent loyalist 
gentry were repulsed by them. John Giffard, an Orangeman who commanded a 
detachment of Dublin militia during the Newry arms searches in County Down, was 
disgusted by the behaviour of the Ancient Britons and accompanying yeomen, who 
burnt houses, took prisoners and fired randomly at anyone they saw, killing up to 
twenty civilians who all subsequently proved to be innocent.269 The regiment was 
never officially held accountable for these murders, which may have attributed to the 
lasting unsavoury reputation of fencibles in Ireland. 
However, contrary to popular tradition, there are a number of incidents where 
fencible units proved to be reliable and effective, especially during the rebellion in 
1798. At the battle of Arklow, County Wicklow, on 9 June, the Loyal Durham 
Fencibles were positioned on the crucial right flank of the government forces 
defending the town and their actions were instrumental in repulsing and defeating the 
rebels.270 This proved decisive in that the large number of casualties suffered by the 
insurgents, forced them to withdraw and concentrate at Vinegar Hill where they were 
subsequently routed and destroyed, effectively ending the rebellion in Wexford. 
During the uprising in Ulster, where a substantial number of fencible units were 
stationed, the Loyal Tay Fencibles, a Scottish infantry battalion, proved most 
effective. The regiment had its headquarters at Carrickfergus, County Antrim, but the 
battalion had been dispersed into small platoon and company sized units to provide 
garrisons for outlying towns and villages. When the rebellion erupted in Antrim on 7 
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June, a small detachment of twenty Tay fencibles commanded by Lieutenant Andrew 
Small, together with a number of loyal armed civilians, successfully defended the 
town against a substantial rebel attack.271 At Bellair another small detachment of Tay 
fencibles, together with the Glenarm yeomanry, took the initiative by seizing known 
United Irish leaders in a pre-emptive strike and subsequently defended the local 
castle.272  
In general, the numerous Scottish regiments proved to be the most effective 
and reliable fencible troops in Ireland. The British government had capitalised on the 
traditional Highland relationships of loyalty to the crown which had developed since 
the defeat of the Scottish Jacobites in 1746 and had exploited the economic 
opportunities available to the landowners through the diminishing clan system by 
fostering patronage. 273 Major Scottish landowners and minor gentry were offered 
political favour or military rank in return for raising battalions or recruiting troops 
from their estates. An example of this is the 2nd Regiment of Argyle Fencibles, raised 
by Colonel Archibald McNeil of Colonsay from his estates in the Western Isles.274 
These policies ensured that whole regiments of fit and active young men could be 
quickly formed, with five of the seven Scottish regiments raised in 1793 being 
Highland units.275 However, some of these corps were not solely ‘Highland’ in 
composition as their titles suggest, with regiments increasingly being forced to recruit 
in lowland areas where the population was always greater and, in the 1790s, 
expanding.276 The traditional relationships between the Highland officers and their 
men, together with their cultural respect for military service, ensured that these troops 
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had the potential to be excellent soldiers once trained. The Reay Fencibles, raised 
from the north-west of Scotland, were particularly well thought of due to their fair 
treatment of the local population and appear to have remained untainted by acts of 
atrocity or indiscipline.277 The Highland soldiers were generally physically hard, 
which made them well suited to the types of counter-insurgent operations that 
followed the rebellion, such as pursuing rebels into remote and mountainous terrain. 
An example was the service of the Dumbartonshire Fencibles, included in an elite 
mobile force which received praise from Sir John Moore after he had led the 
campaign against insurgents in the Wicklow Mountains in late 1798: ‘the fatigue and 
inconvenience of the troops has been very great. In the mountains of Wicklow we are 
obliged to divest ourselves of all baggage, and for a week, notwithstanding hard rain 
and cold, lay on the ground without tents or covering.’278   
Cultural and religious beliefs affected how the Scottish Fencibles reacted to 
their duties in Ireland. Some regiments initially refused to serve in the kingdom and 
mutinied when they were about to embark for Ireland, although, such protest was 
quickly quelled with the arrest of ring-leaders.279 The majority of Lowland regiments 
were recruited from Protestants, ensuring many of the officers and soldiers could 
identify with the Protestant population, especially the Presbyterians of Ulster. This 
was evident through the establishment of Orange lodges within numerous battalions, 
which would have fostered strong partisan feelings towards rebels or suspected rebels. 
It is likely that such attitudes would have led to incidents of ruthless behaviour and 
possible atrocities against civilians, similar to those committed by local yeomanry and 
Irish militia in Ulster in 1797 and during the rebellion of 1798, by units that were 
susceptible to ill-discipline. The Reay Fencibles, a predominantly Protestant regiment, 
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enthusiastically sent sergeants to act as drill-masters to the newly-formed Protestant 
yeomanry corps in Belfast in 1796.280 However, the relationship between this 
regiment and the predominantly Catholic Monaghan Militia that was also stationed in 
Belfast at the time almost led to open conflict. This was reportedly due to the militia 
regiment suspected of having been subverted by the United Irishmen.281 However, 
even Scottish units were not immune from such activity, with two soldiers from the 
Fife Fencibles being executed at Carrickfergus in 1797 for taking the United Irish 
oath.282 In contrast, some Scots felt sympathy towards the situation of the Catholic 
population. The Glengarry Fencibles, a Highland regiment that was composed largely 
of Catholics and even had its own priest, was well regarded for its humane treatment 
of the population of Wexford during and after the uprising.283  
The reputation of the Highland fencible regiments has unjustifiably been 
linked to the poor press that fencibles, as a whole, have received from nationalist 
historians, mainly due to their role in the pacification of Ulster. The Scottish fencibles 
were a more complex and varied force compared to the generally substandard 
regiments from other parts of Britain. And although the Lowland regiments generally 
proved to be of a less physical quality than Highland counterparts, the Scottish 
fencibles remained a loyal and effective military force during the times of crisis in 
Ireland. In contrast to England and Ireland, Scotland had no official militia prior to 
1797 and it is probable that this accounted for the Scottish fencibles, in general, 
attracting a better class of recruit than their English counterparts. The Scots soldiers 
were credited with displaying remarkably good behaviour towards the civilian 
population. Obviously, this was not the always the case, with a number of isolated 
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unsavoury incidents involving individuals from particular regiments having been 
recorded. However, the Scottish fencibles appear to have constituted a relatively 
disciplined force at a time when regular troops in Ireland were desperately in short 
supply. A significant indication of the quality and regard held by military authorities 
for some Scottish fencible regiments was the number that were recruited into regular 
regiments when the fencibles were disbanded in 1802, with some units enlisting en 
mass while they were still stationed in Ireland.284  
 Between 1793 and 1815 Ireland proved to be a crucial source of recruits for 
the regular forces of the British army. During this period it is estimated that 
approximately 150,000 Irishmen enlisted, with the majority serving in regular 
regiments posted overseas.285 The heavy recruiting conducted in the kingdom during 
the 1790s led to an estimated one-third of the British army being comprised of 
Irishmen, with an even higher rate being achieved during the later Napoleonic 
wars.286 In the period 1793-1794 as many as 30 new regular regiments were raised in
Ireland or from the 44 independent companies that were recruited in Ireland and 




 as well 
                                                
287 Although most of the 
troops raised in Ireland at this time were infantrymen recruited from rural peasants 
and poor urban artisans, four new regular cavalry regiments were raised from the
more affluent farming classes. These regiments were subsequently numbered as the 
30th to the 34th Light Dragoons.288 Once the battalions in Ireland had been recruited
to full strength they were immediately posted out of the kingdom, most never to 
return. The two main reasons for this can be attributed to the desperate need to boost 
the number of troops available to defend Britain and its overseas possessions,
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as to build a substantial army for operations against the French on the continent. 
However, this policy was also actively supported by the Irish Ascendancy who we
against the stationing of new regular units in Ireland, as they were mainly comprised 
of Catholic recruits who posed a potential armed threat to the Protestant olig
The experience of the 88th Foot, commonly known as the ‘Connaught Rangers,’ 
(English spelling) was typical of regular regiments established in Ireland. Raised from
mainly within the counties of Connacht in 1793 by the Honourable John de Burgh, 
once it had reached its full complement it was immediately shipped to England a






                                                
Desertion was another reason to remove the Irish troops from the kingdom. 
The insatiable demand for soldiers led to a rapid expansion of the armed forces in 
Ireland in 1793, which ensured deterioration in the quality of recruits. In 1794 a 
memorandum on recruiting claimed that ‘the worst kind of recruits’ were being 
accepted into the army: either inexperienced young men’ or the ‘refuse of 
mankind.’290 It was recruits such as these that caused the desertion rate to drastically 
increase, with Edward Cooke, the under-secretary at Dublin Castle, stating in June 
1794 ‘Desertion is terrible at present…and we know not how to prevent it.’291 
Cooke’s frustration was supported by the comments of the new lord lieutenant, Lord 
Fitzwilliam, a few months later: ‘There is no keeping Irish troops in Ireland, they 
desert so abominably.’292 An example of evidence supporting these claims is a report 
submitted by Colonel E.P. Trench in May 1794 where he states that when he 
inspected his regiment at Granard, County Westmeath, 233 men had deserted out of a 
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total complement of 1,100 and he may have lost more while marching to their port of 
embarkation.293 The inability to adjust to the discipline and rigours of military life 
would certainly have affected many recruits who may never have ventured more than 
a few miles from their family home or village and chose to desert. However, there is 
evidence to suggest that desertion rates rose once the overseas destinations for 
departing regiments were announced. 
Prior to 1798 most regular regiments raised in Ireland were sent for service in 
the West Indies. From 1793 Dundas, as secretary of state for war, constantly received 
requests for troops from generals commanding the various islands that extended 
throughout the region, where tropical diseases such as yellow fever and malaria 
continued to decimate the regiments stationed there, reducing the capacity to 
effectively defend British interests. Britain was highly protective of its possessions in 
the Caribbean as the production of raw materials from these islands, especially sugar, 
were essential in maintaining the booming British economy. Profits and taxes raised 
from these commodities were also essential in financing the war against 
Revolutionary France, not only for the maintenance of the Royal Navy and the British 
army, but also to provide the subsidies that Britain was paying to its allies to help the 
fight against the French on the continent. There were never enough available troops to 
satisfy the insatiable demand for replacements in the Caribbean. The British 
government was forced to prioritise and juggle around what troops it had, including 
withdrawing regiments from its small army in the Netherlands. However, even this 
move proved insufficient and more drastic measures to find the required forces was 
needed. Pitt and Dundas were now forced to look to Ireland to help solve this issue. 
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Ireland proved to be a significant source of regular troops sent to the West 
Indies. Britain was determined to establish dominance in the Caribbean by not only 
retaining its own possessions, but also by depriving France of the islands under its 
control. To this end Dundas intended to commit a further 10,000 men to the West 
Indian campaign season of 1794-95 to complete the conquest of Guadeloupe.294  In 
1793, Dundas had already ordered the flank companies of all the remaining infantry 
regiments in Ireland to embark for service in expeditions to Toulon and Gibraltar, as 
well as the West Indies. In November of the same year, he sent two regiments to the 
Caribbean from the Irish Establishment, followed by another ten battalions the 
following year for the Guadeloupe campaign.295 These units were initially sent to 
Gibraltar to acclimatise before heading to the tropical islands. According to 
Lieutenant General Sir Charles Grey, the officer commanding the British forces in the 
Windward Islands,  these troops ‘were the pick of the Irish army and … it was 
unlikely that such excellent soldiers could ever be assembled again in the war.’296 
Although this may be some exaggeration on Grey’s part, there is no doubt that these 
troops were the most professional element of the Irish establishment and their 
overseas posting had a serious effect on the defensive capability of the army in 
Ireland. By the end of 1794, the 17th Foot was the only regular infantry line regiment 
remaining on the Irish establishment, with four light dragoon regiments also being 
ordered to prepare for service in the West Indies in April the following year.297 
Britain’s focus on the Caribbean ensured that the cream of the Irish army was to 
quickly waste away through campaigning and tropical disease that ensured most of 
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these Irish soldiers never returned to their homeland. It was the military experience in 
the West Indies that also dramatically affected further recruiting in Ireland. 
By the mid 1790s, the fear of serving in the Caribbean led to a reduction in 
Irish recruits volunteering for the regular army. News of the high mortality rate of 
troops serving in the West Indies had quickly filtered back to Britain and Ireland, so 
that by 1796, those cadres of British regiments sent to recruit in the kingdom were 
struggling to reach their full complement. Those units were usually seriously under 
strength and were shipped to Ireland to enlist recruits within the shortest time possible 
before embarking for foreign service. In July 1795, four English regiments were sent 
to Ireland to recruit to full strength and were secretly destined to be re-numbered 
before being sent to the West Indies. These intentions were kept from the troops to 
prevent any desertion.298 However, the information was leaked resulting in the 3-day 
mutiny of the 104th and 111th Foot in Dublin in August 1795 and the mutiny of the 
105th and 113th Foot at Cork in September. The mutineers had taken to the streets 
fully armed in protest, declaring that their conditions of enlistment, which included 
not having to serve outside Ireland or Britain, and been broken.299 And although these 
mutinies were quickly extinguished by militia, aided by small contingents of available 
regulars, news of the events and why they occurred spread throughout the country.  
The demand for troops became so critical that Pitt turned to desperate 
measures. In 1794 he proposed the formation of an ‘Irish Brigade’ of six battalions of 
infantry to be raised from within the Catholic population of Ireland, specifically for 
service in the West Indies. This formation was to be officered by those members of 
the Irish Catholic peerage and gentry who had previously fought against Britain while 
serving in the Irish Brigade in French service, but who were now considered allies 
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due to their continued allegiance to the French royal family.300 These officers were to 
be given the rank that they had previously held in French service.301 Remarkably, the 
most senior colonel of the proposed battalions was the duke of Fitzjames, an 
illegitimate descendant of James II and thereby considered a senior Jacobite. 
However, by this stage of the century Jacobitism no longer posed a military threat to 
the Hanoverian dynasty, with most Irish Jacobites now willing to show allegiance to 
the British crown. But, even these formations struggled to recruit to their full 
complement, with the duke of Portland in February 1796 showing his concern at the 
inability of the officers to find sufficient recruits to bring their battalions to full 
strength: ‘I am willing to hope that the zeal and gratitude of his Roman Catholic 
subjects will render it unnecessary (to reduce the regiments) and that their exertions to 
fulfil his Majesty’s just expectations will correspond with the means which his 
Majesty’s paternal goodness has afforded them of distinguishing themselves in the 
service of their country and of being placed in such honourable and advantageous 
posts of trust and profit as their merits will entitle them to enjoy in common with the 
rest of their fellow subjects of every other religious persuasion.’302 Even this direct 
threat by Portland proved powerless in raising the brigade to full strength. As a result, 
only the two numerically strongest regiments, Dillon’s and Walsh’s (commanded by 
Lieutenant Colonel Edward Stack), saw service in the West Indies. When they 
embarked from Cork in May 1796, the regimental return showed Walsh’s battalion 
having only 495 rank and file, which was well below the official required strength of 
600, although the troops were described as being a good body of men, some having 
long service and being more forward in discipline and drill than others.303However, 
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by 1797 the Irish Brigade was disbanded due to the inability to muster sufficient 
recruits, with the rank and file being drafted into other regiments, while the office
were placed on half-
rs 
pay. 
                                                
There were also other factors that led to fewer Irish recruits ‘taking the king’s 
shilling’ in the line regiments. The formation of the militia in 1793 had provided 
prospective volunteers with an alternative to joining a regular regiment. For many, 
especially married men, there were more incentives to enlist in a county militia 
battalion. By 1795, the experiences of the regular line regiments that had been 
decimated by disease through service in the West Indies were common knowledge 
throughout Ireland and the prospect of serving in a militia regiment that was to remain 
in the kingdom was more attractive. For married recruits, service in a line battalion 
would have meant overseas service and certain separation from family for an 
indefinite time, with any dependants facing destitution in the likely event that the 
recruit was killed in battle, died from wounds or disease, or was crippled from serious 
wounds. Home service with the militia offered soldiers more incentives such as 
limited service, a healthier climate, the option to have family remain with the 
battalion and live in barracks, allowances for a spouse and dependant children, 
regimental schools provided for children, as well as only a small chance of having to 
face an enemy in open combat.304 Also, by this period internal civil unrest was 
reaching a level previously unknown during the 18th century. Protestants felt 
threatened by the increasingly violent activities of the United Irishmen and the 
disaffected Catholic peasantry in rural areas.305 This, coupled with the general lack of 
trust in the militia, ensured that many Protestants believed their military efforts were 
best served by falling back on their tradition of self-defence by forming local armed 
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associations. Evidence of the effects of this can been seen in a letter from Camden to 
Portland in March 1796 where he stated that he had ordered cavalry recruiting parties 
to England due to the lack of recruits, which had previously enlisted from within 
Protestant communities, coming forward in Ireland.306 Eventually thousands of 
prospective Protestant recruits, who may have enlisted in the regular army, 
enthusiastically joined the newly-established yeomanry in late 1796.  Clearly, the 
threat of internal rebellion and the prospect of losing property and power was more 
important to the Protestant population in Ireland than any international politics. 
The divided military defence policies for Ireland up until 1798 determined the 
distribution and use of the armed forces in the kingdom. From the outbreak of war 
with Revolutionary France in 1793, the British government was mindful of an 
attempted invasion of Ireland by French forces at a time when the regular troops from 
the Irish establishment were desperately needed elsewhere. With the substantial 
reduction of regular infantry from the Irish garrison, heavy reliance was placed on the 
Royal Navy to intercept and defeat any French invasion force intended for Ireland.307 
Until 1796, the general attitude of the British government was that although an 
invasion attempt was possible, it was unlikely due to the poor state of the French 
navy.308 This attitude was reflected in the inadequate defensive planning of the 
military in Ireland and the general poor state of the armed forces that was influenced 
by political interference. The army had always had the dual purpose in Ireland to 
assist the civil powers when called upon and to defend against invasion.309 However, 
it was the political influence of the Protestant ascendancy that was determined to 
retain power and the increased fear of rebellion that saw the army being used more as 
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a tool against insurgents. This ensured that the majority of the available troops of the 
garrison were distributed in small contingents throughout the kingdom rather than 
concentrated as an effective fighting force. 
The policies of the lords lieutenant and their local advisors determined the 
distribution of the garrison. The problem that Dublin Castle faced in the 1790s was 
that it had insufficient forces to both effectively combat insurgency in the countryside 
and defend against invasion. During their terms as lords lieutenant, both Westmorland 
and Camden were focussed on counter-insurgent measures.  This ensured that the 
duties of the army changed so that it was vigorously used against the population that it 
was suppose to be defending. To counter any local loyalties, the militia regiments 
were not to be stationed in their counties of origin and were generally rotated from 
localities on an annual basis. Typical examples including the Tyrone Militia that was 
stationed in the western military district in 1797, the southern district in 1798, the 
central district in 1799 and eastern district in 1800; the Kerry Militia had a similar 
experience, being stationed in the northern district in 1797, the western district in 
1798 and posted to the central district in 1800. Some regiments, such as the 
Roscommon and Galway militias, remained in the same districts for the above period 
but were annually transferred to different locations within that district.310 Until after 
the events of 1798, there appears to be no particular pattern to as to where militia 
regiments were posted, with the militia consisting of 77 percent of the armed forces in 
the southern district, 61 percent of the forces in the eastern district and 35 percent of 
the government troops in the northern district.311 As the capital and seat of 
government, Dublin accounted for the largest concentration of troops as the security 
of the capital remained imperative. In 1796 its garrison consisted of one regiment of 
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dragoons, one regiment of fencibles and three regiments of militia, while the nearby 
camp at Loughlinstown had a similar complement which also included several 
companies of artillery.312 The low percentage of militia regiments within the garrison 
of Ulster was due to the battalions being predominantly Catholic regiments from 
southern counties, which General Lake feared would be susceptible to subversion 
from the United Irish.313 This ensured that the majority of the security force in Ulster 
consisted of fencible regiments and some of the few regular units left in Ireland. 
However, every county in the kingdom had a militia regiment stationed in it, with 
most of the battalions being dispersed amongst small towns and villages. It is arguable 
how effective this policy proved in policing against insurgent activities, but it is most 
certain that it hindered the necessary training to establish the militia as an effective 
fighting force in the eventuality of any invasion. 
Political interference further hindered the military command in Ireland during 
the 1790s. The nature of the Irish government was such that its civil and military 
affairs were integrated. The lord lieutenant’s dual responsibilities as the senior civil 
and military leader led to Camden relenting to pressure from the Ascendancy, 
ensuring that the army was divided in its primary functions. This came to a head with 
the resignation of Abercromby in March 1798, mainly through his criticism of the 
state of the army, but also through his frustration with Camden’s weakness in cowing 
to the constant appeals from the gentry for troops to provide protection for themselves 
and their property.314 Abercromby had been critical of the dispersal of the army and 
believed that it could only be forged into an effective counter-invasion force by 
concentrating the regiments. This philosophy was in complete contrast to his 
predecessor, Carhampton, who was also a member of the Irish parliament, and Lake, 
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who was to replace him. Both men were zealous advocates of the Ascendancy cause 
and were applauded for their vigorous counter-insurgency operations in Connacht and 
Ulster prior to the rebellion.315 Cornwallis had the same opinion as Abercromby when 
he became the lord lieutenant, and unlike Camden, he generally refused to bow to the 
constant demands of the Protestant oligarchy.316 However, such change in policies 
and attitudes within the high command led to confusion within the lower levels of the 
army. Officers and soldiers who had actively been encouraged to administer severe 
punishments on disaffected populations were then expected to show more leniency for 
the months Abercromby was in command, only to revert to their previous tactics 
when Lake was appointed.317 The counter-terror tactics were also advocated by many 
colonels of militia regiments, who as members of the Ascendancy were able to 
combine their military and political influence to protect their own interests. One 
example was General John Knox, who as a member of the leading family in County 
Tyrone, used his political connections to promote the establishment of various 
yeomanry corps within the county when there were insufficient troops to protect his 
extensive estates.318 Ultimately, the official use of ‘terror’ by the army was dictated 
by who was in command at the time, and the political influences and ideologies of 
those commanders. The underlying political subordination within the Irish 
establishment was lessened with the appointment of Cornwallis in 1798.   
The counter-insurgent operations of the Irish army limited its effectiveness. 
The dispersal of individual regiments into company, troop and small squad-sized 
formations throughout the country prevented the continued training required to ensure 
the soldiers and their officers reached and maintained a proficient level of military 
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professionalism. Such training was not only essential for the militia and fencible 
regiments that did not have a cadre of experienced officers and NCOs, with the units 
having little opportunity to instil discipline or encourage esprit de corps within the 
battalions, but also for the few weak regular regiments in the kingdom that were 
reliant on reaching full strength through recruiting in Ireland. In isolated locations 
where there were no established barracks, what discipline there was within regiments 
was soon eroded through troops being billeted in homes of the local population, which 
on occasions could be 20-30 miles from the company or battalion headquarters 
preventing supervision from officers.319 Military advisors at Dublin Castle were fully 
aware of the detrimental effects detached service was having on the army and sought 
to rectify matters by establishing a number of training camps throughout the kingdom. 
In April 1795 Camden became the new lord lieutenant and proposed the establishment 
of summer camps to provide the required battalion and brigade training for the 
infantry of the regular, fencible and militia battalions. It was proposed that training 
would be conducted on a seasonal rotation system where eventually every individual 
battalion would spend around three months experiencing large formation drill. 
However, the logistics of implementing the system proved daunting, with Camden 
complaining in June of 1796 that although there were near 40,000 men in Ireland at 
the time, the troops were so scattered that only 6,700 could be spared to attend the 
training camps.320 There is insufficient contemporary data to establish every unit that 
attended the summer camps, but taking into consideration that there was only a small 
percentage of troops available to do so in 1796, and probably even less the following 
year due to the increase in insurgent activities, it is likely that a significant proportion 
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of the Irish army had no more than basic musket and platoon drill at the time of the 
rebellion.    
The counter-insurgent operations had a negative effect on the discipline of the 
army in Ireland. Some troops became demoralised through the constant use in 
excessive policing roles within the communities they were required to live. Lord 
Carhampton, commander-in-chief of the army in 1795, directed a swift and ruthless 
campaign against Defenders in Connacht that year that set the tone of future 
operations. Draconian measures were taken where homes were indiscriminately 
burned, livestock slaughtered and many Defender suspects were imprisoned without 
trial, some being unlawfully pressed into service in the Royal Navy.321 The inability 
or hesitance of the local magistrates to enforce the rule of law at the time, and later in 
some counties of Ulster in 1797, effectively saw martial law declared through the 
Insurrection Act. This provided the army with extended powers for search for arms 
and ability to impose curfews, with troops being authorised to act in dispersing 
unlawful assemblies if there was no magistrate present.322 It is easy to see how the 
morale of the troops could be affected by such operations, especially the Irish 
Catholics who could have some empathy with the plight of the Defender suspects, 
when they were given orders such as those by Sir John Moore. When conducting 
search and seizure operations for weapons in early 1798 he directed his men ‘to treat 
the people with as much harshness as possible, as far as words and manners went, and 
to supply themselves with whatever provisions were necessary to enable them to live 
well.’323 Moore’s approach can be considered moderate compared to others, such as 
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General Whyte who at the direction of General Lake, ordered the Monaghan Militia to 
destroy the offices of the newspaper, the Northern Star, in Belfast because of its 
sympathies towards the republican cause.324 It was such direction from senior officers 
that promoted excesses by the troops and fostered a breakdown in discipline. 
The attempted invasion by the French at Bantry Bay in December 1796 
exposed the incompetence of the army command at that time. Prior to this there had 
been no comprehensive defensive plan, as it was felt that the French navy was too 
weak to support a substantial invasion, with Dublin Castle placing heavy reliance on 
the Royal Navy to intercept any French fleet intended for Ireland.325 This false sense 
of security had ensured that only rudimentary plans had been formulated. In March 
1796 Camden sought authority from Portland to establish the training camps at Blaris, 
Loughlinstown and Ardfinnan on a permanent basis as part of a defensive strategy. He 
argued that it was essential to defend Dublin and that a large body of men should be 
stationed in the near vicinity.326 The military thought at this time was that the most 
likely areas the French would land would either be in the south, where there were a 
number of substantial harbours to help establish a bridgehead, or in the north that also 
had sizable harbours and where disaffection was strongest. It was thought unlikely 
that any landing would take place on the west coast due to its unforgiving coastline. 
Camden argued that the camps would have a dual purpose of providing essential 
formation training as well as providing concentrated reserves that could react to any 
invasion or rebellion in these regions. 
  However, from examining Camden’s proposed changes to the garrison for the 
summer of 1796, it is clear that the size and experience of these reserves was limited. 
The Dublin garrison comprised 2,250 men from one fencible and three militia 
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battalions, with the 9th Dragoons providing the only regular regiment.327 A further 
1,830 men were to provide support from the one fencible and three militia regiments 
stationed at nearby Loughlinstown. The reserves at Ardfinnin and Blaris camps only 
equated to 2,740 and 2,260 respectively, and were comprised on a similar number of 
fencible and militia battalions such as that at Loughlinstown, although it is believed 
that small contingents of artillery were also based at these camps.328 Significantly, 
there were no regular units to provide stability to these reserves. At this time there 
were only six cavalry and two infantry regiments of the line on the Irish establishment 
and they had been posted throughout the kingdom. And although Camden’s proposal 
shows he intended to have some concentration of forces at Cork, Belfast and Dublin, 
generally the army was too dispersed throughout the country to allow for a substantial 
force to rapidly come together to meet any threat. 
There also appeared to be a lack of planning on the part of the high command 
at this time. In October 1796, Ireland was divided up into five military districts in an 
attempt to simplify the management of the army. Each district, Northern (Ulster), 
Western (Connacht and part of Munster), Midland, Eastern (Leinster) and Southern 
(Munster and part of south-west Leinster) was to be commanded by a general who 
was responsible for the troops and military activities in his area. This was followed by 
a general order that directed the brigading together of regiments for training and 
emergencies, although it appears this only occurred on an ad-hoc basis.329 Evidence 
of poor planning or incompetence on the part of the military leadership came from
within the army itself. In early December, at a time when the government had 
intelligence of an impending French invasion, Brigadier General Eyre Coote had 
written to his superior, Lieutenant General William Dalrymple, indicating Bantry Bay 
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as a suitable and likely strategic landing place for the French and that steps should be 
taken to plan for such eventuality.330 However, Dalrymple, who was in command of 
the forces in the southern district, was not in a position to take such steps until any 
such landing was confirmed, although he did make a token gesture in ordering a 
detachment of the 5th Dragoons to the area.331 His main priority was the defence of 
Cork and its harbour, which appeared to be a challenge with the insufficient resources 
available. This was outlined in a report submitted the same month by Major Brown of 
the Royal Engineers, who stated that there were crucial problems in the defence of the 
city due to insufficient artillerymen and infantry, as well as incomplete defences.332 
Considering that Cork was regarded as the second city of the kingdom and its port 
was crucial to Britain’s overall strategy, the lack of resources and poor planning for 
its defence gives some indication of the insufficient planning conducted for the 
defence from invasion for the rest of the Ireland. 
The attempted invasion of Ireland by the French in December 1796 posed the 
most serious military threat to Ireland during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. 
A substantial French fleet of eighteen ships-of-the-line, thirteen frigates, seven 
transports and eight smaller vessels had sailed from Brest on 16 December 1796 
carrying 14,450 regular troops, 41,644 stands of arms and 5,000 uniforms.333 This 
formidable force was under the command of General Louis Hoche, an experienced 
officer who had recently defeated the Royalist uprising in the Vendee. Another 
French army of 14-15,000 men was assembling in Brest to reinforce Hoche’s 
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proposed invasion.334 The mouth of the River Shannon was the original proposed 
landing area for the French army. However, the fleet became dispersed due to a storm 
and unfavourable winds prevented it from reassembling. As a result only 35 ships 
arrived off Bantry Bay on 21 December, excluding the ship carrying Hoche. The fleet 
then divided in two, with nineteen ships remaining outside the bay while the rest 
entered it. Another storm several days later scattered the ships at the head of the bay, 
reducing the fleet to sixteen ships. This ensured that the French now only had an 
available force of 6,500 troops and four artillery pieces to establish a bridgehead. For 
a time indecision prevailed amongst the French as Hoche and the naval commander, 
Admiral Morard de Galles, who were together on the same frigate, had failed to 
rendezvous with the main fleet due to unfavourable winds.335 However, although a 
decision was eventually made by General Grouchy, the most senior army officer 
present, to land this force in an attempt to capture Cork, continued rough weather 
prevented a landing. The naval commander, Bouvet, fearing being trapped in the bay 
by the Royal Navy, decided to withdraw the fleet on 25 December and returned to 
France.336 Noted Irish military historian Paul Kerrigan argues that had it not been for 
the weather, the French could have marched to Cork in four days and easily captured 
the city and port, as the inadequate and inexperienced defending force of regulars, 
fencibles and militia would have been no match for the invaders.337    
The military response to the arrival of the French in Bantry Bay was chaotic. 
The operation to mobilise a force to counter the expected landing was poorly run by 
army staff that had been surprised by the arrival of the sizable French force. Although 
any unlikely invasion was expected to be in the south, the majority of the military 
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forces were stationed in Ulster and in the east to protect Dublin. This clearly indicates 
that the government’s emphasis was more on countering insurgency which was 
presenting an immediate danger than preparing for an invasion that may never have 
eventuated. It was not until 1797 that General David Dundas, who believed that any 
French invasion would most likely occur along the southern coast or near the Shannon 
estuary in the west, formulated a plan of defence that focused on defending strategic 
geographical boundaries such as the River Shannon in the west and the rivers Lee and 
Blackwater in the south. Dalrymple admitted that he had not formulated any plan for 
the defence of Cork and that the insufficient and inexperienced force that he had 
gathered together to meet the French was only a diversion to allow time for a sizable 
army to be concentrated.338 At the time he had no more than approximately 5,600 
troops, comprising mostly of militia and fencibles, to defend the whole southern 
district, but believed he could only muster around 2,000 to challenge the French near 
Bandon.339 Confusion reigned amongst the military hierarchy, which lacked 
inspiration from the commander-in-chief, Carhampton, who conceded that Cork and 
Limerick might be captured by the French.340 Regiments were ordered south to 
establish a concentrated force near Cork, but Carhampton wrote to Pelham stating that 
he believed no more than 8,000 men could be collected together in time to defend the 
city and that it might be better to form a strong defensive line at Fermoy on the River 
Blackwater, where a force of 12,000 infantry supported by cavalry and artillery would 
be more effective.341 Thirty-one of the 38 militia regiments were mobilised and 
moved south, leaving the policing of most of the country to the fledgling and 
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inexperienced yeomanry.342 However, no proper system had been adopted for troop 
movements which saw many regiments making disorganised forced-marches in the 
middle of winter. There had been little or no provision made for feeding the troops on 
the march, with most having to improvise by buying their own food or by relying on 
the generosity of the civilian population.343 The important part the population played 
during this time was emphasized by Dalrymple in a letter published in the Dublin 
Journal where he stated that the inhabitants were ‘displaying every proof of loyalty 
and attachment’ to the troops.344 The military authorities had been anxious about a 
possible invasion from September 1796 and had taken some measures. Supply depots 
were established at Clonmel, Bandon, Galway, Banagher, Portumna, Omagh, 
Hillsborough, Newry and Dundalk, while ovens had been built at Athlone, Birr and 
Omagh.345 However, these proved insufficient during the emergency. There were 
deficiencies evident in medical services and artillery supplies, with the commissariat 
being incapable of providing enough food and fodder for the troops and horses.346 
Clearly, the Bantry Bay crisis highlighted the complacency of the leadership and 
inadequate planning that the Irish army and government needed to address. 
However, the condition of the army in Ireland prior to the rebellion in 1798 
remained poor. Lord Carhampton had lost the confidence of the majority of his 
subordinate officers, as well as Camden, who eventually was to replace him with 
General Sir Ralph Abercromby. This was after a number of experienced senior 
generals had refused to serve in Ireland due to the well-known difficulties the position 
posed. Abercromby, who had a reputation as a credible and capable experienced 
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general officer, had arrived in the kingdom in early December 1797 to commence his 
duties. However, he resigned in March 1798 as a result of his unpopular criticism of 
the state of the army in Ireland and the government policies affecting its use. Little 
had been done to improve the organisational faults highlighted twelve months earlier 
despite Carhampton’s attempted reforms that included strengthening the garrisons of 
Cork and Limerick, along with the formation of four new battalions of light infantry 
created from the detached elite companies from each militia regiment.347 On his 
arrival Abercromby wrote to his friend Brigadier General John Moore that he found 
that the logistical requirements for the army had not been sufficiently attended to: ‘On 
my arrival here…I found an army of upwards of 40,000 without any arrangement 
made for their substance (in the case of them having to take the field). No artillery 
were in a condition to move. Even the guns attached to the regiments were 
unprovided with horses. No magazines were found for the regiments and there was 
little or no order or discipline.’348 He also considered the cavalry unfit for service, 
with the infantry officers showing very little ability in commanding their troops.349  
Abercromby’s greatest concern was the strategic policy that had been 
implemented. He was alarmed at the way the regular army had been scattered into 
small units throughout the kingdom. Soon after his arrival he wrote to General Lake, 
commanding the northern district, of the necessity of concentrating the troops into 
large formations: ‘In their present state they are exposed to be corrupted, to be 
disarmed and made prisoners.’350  The army had been dispersed to protect the gentry 
in disaffected areas which made it difficult to quickly assemble a sizable and effective 
field army to meet any possible French landing. He was of the belief that policing 
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duties should be left to the yeomanry, that the dispersed nature of the army was 
‘ruinous to the service’ and that ‘the best regiments in Europe could not long stand 
such usage.’351 Abercromby argued that the gentry needed to attend to their own 
protection through service in the yeomanry, while the army should be used for 
garrison duty and to provide a substantial reserve. By ordering the withdrawal of the 
troops from their current deployment he hoped to restore discipline, as well as 
establish a number of permanent formations at strategic points.352 At this time 
Camden fully supported his new commander-in-chief and reported to Portland that he 
would follow through with Abercromby’s suggestions to enable the army to 
regroup.353 However, although Abercromby was successful in improving the 
logistical requirements for the army by establishing a chain of supply depots 
ammunition and provisions, as well as strengthening the forts guarding the along the 
south-west coastline, the general concentration of the army was not implemented. 
for arms 
                                                
Internal Irish politics determined the state of the army prior to the rebellion. 
On 26 February 1798 Abercromby issued a general order that was highly critical of 
the condition of the army: ‘The very disgraceful frequency of courts martial, and the 
many complaints of irregularities in the conduct of the troops in this kingdom having 
so unfortunately proved the army to be in a state of licentiousness which must render 
it formidable to everyone but the enemy.’354 Abercromby’s intentions were for the 
improvement of the military situation in Ireland; however, the wording of the order 
created a political backlash. The commander-in-chief immediately lost the support of 
a vast number of officers within the army, who took the order as direct criticism 
against them. The British government also saw the order as a criticism of its policies 
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in Ireland and feared the Whig opposition would use it to gain political points. 
However, it was pressure from the Irish parliament that led to Abercromby’s 
resignation in late March. The Ascendancy, led by such Protestant zealots such as 
Lord Clare and John Beresford, believed that Abercromby had been too lenient on the 
disaffected population by employing less harsh measures to ensure the seizure and 
surrender of arms. Although his policy of threatening ‘free-quartering’ of troops in the 
disaffected counties of Kildare and King’s and Queen’s had been successful in 
increasing the number of weapons surrendered to authorities and restoring peace, his 
rejection of counter-terror tactics was seen as half-measures that had created 
bitterness within the gentry who were the main targets of the insurgents.355 This led to 
a united move from the Irish parliament to lobby Dublin Castle for Abercromby’s 
dismissal.356 Although backed by a small core of professional officers, Abercromby 
had lost the support of the army and parliament, forcing Camden to seek his 
resignation. 
 The change in command of the army had a direct link to the rebellion. 
Camden was now forced to make Lake the command-in-chief as he was the most 
senior general willing to accept the position. He had not been his first choice as he 
was not of great intellect and Camden was not in favour of the excessive actions he 
had promoted towards the civilian population, especially in Ulster.357 From the time 
Lake took command in April, the kingdom was set for general insurrection due to his 
reckless and ill-coordinated disarming policy. Counter-terror was reintroduced with 
vigour, especially when martial law and free-quartering was declared in the 
disaffected counties. The declaration of the Insurrection Act throughout the country 
on 30 March saw the government actively encourage excesses against suspected 
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insurgents with Pitt directing Camden to make a ‘speedy and well-concerted effort for 
crushing the rebellion by the most vigorous military exertions in all the disturbed 
provinces,’ and that he was not to concern himself unduly with army discipline.358  
Although the policy proved fruitful in gaining rebel arms and the arrests of the 
majority of the United Irish executive, the excesses of flogging, house-burning, 
‘pitch-capping’, murder and torture occurred on a large scale. The army was now seen 
as an oppressive tool of the Ascendancy that had become increasingly fearful of the 
Catholic peasantry, leading to large-scale confiscation and destruction of agricultural 
produce that people relied on for income and sustenance. The excesses committed by 
the military and fostered by the government only led to further alienation of sectors of 
the population that had previously been neutral, but who were now forced to defend 
themselves and their property. Such actions polarised the kingdom and led to open 
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           Chapter 5 
 





The role of the Irish militia in the suppression of the 1798 rebellion and the 
defeat of the French invasion later that year has been marginalised in traditional 
historiography of the era. The initial defeat of the North Cork Militia at the hands of 
the Wexford rebels during the uprising and the rout of the British forces by the French 
at Castlebar have been perpetually used by British historians as examples of the poor 
quality of the Irish militia that necessitated the augmentation of the British forces in 
Ireland after 1798. However, a closer analysis of the government forces available to 
suppress the rebellion, together with a clear appreciation of the actions in which 
militia regiments were involved, provides quantitive evidence that the Irish militia 
was crucial in the defeat of the insurgents before the bulk of reinforcements were sent 
from Britain. Furthermore, there is compelling evidence to show that contrary to the 
traditional view, the Irish militia regiments performed well at Castlebar and that the 
defeat was due more to the decisions of the senior commanders present. In general, 
although there were serious weaknesses within the Irish establishment at the time of 
the uprising, the military forces proved adequate in quickly dealing with the 
insurrection. However, if the rebellion had spread throughout the country and had 
been simultaneously supported by a large French invasion force, then the ability of the 
government to deal with these dual threats would have seriously stretched military 
resources. Ultimately, the poor reputation of the militia proved politically expedient 
for the Ascendancy and the British government in arguing for a greater reliance on the 
yeomanry and the augmentation of British forces in the kingdom. 
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Many Ascendancy-minded and nationalist historians have tended to focus on 
specific events surrounding the rebellion and subsequent French invasion of 1798, 
while either ignoring or limiting any analysis of the cause and effect of such violent 
times. Ascendancy, and thus British, bias has traditionally viewed the rebellion as a 
Catholic uprising that was belatedly followed by an invasion by their French allies. 
The Irish nationalist view of the nineteenth-century promoted this, especially by 
exalting the leadership of the rebels by local Catholic priests. Prominent twentieth-
century Irish historians, such as Thomas Bartlett, David Dickinson and Marianne 
Elliott have promoted alternative views surrounding the uprising and invasion by 
portraying the rebellion, which they argue was more a reaction to government 
oppression rather than the influence of French revolutionary ideology, in a broader 
context based on social pressures rather than a religious crusade. However, their 
revisionist work must be viewed as being somewhat partial towards the nationalist 
view that demonises the Protestant oligarchy by focussing on the numerous atrocities 
committed on the civilian population. Thomas Pakenham provides the most detailed 
narrative of the rebellion in his book The Year of Liberty: The bloody story of the 
great Irish Rebellion of 1798. While relatively more even-handed, Pakenham fails to 
appreciate the significant part the militia played in quelling the uprising. Moreover, 
his work does not provide in-depth evidence of the political machinations of the 
Ascendancy that were crucial to how the government dealt with the dual threats of 
civil insurrection and foreign invasion. By taking a more analytical approach, this 
chapter reveals the social, political, religious and military complexities that influenced 
the failed rebellion and subsequent French invasion. What is obvious is that the 
polarisation of the Irish population was at its zenith at this time, but that it can not 
simply be blamed on religious differences. A thorough understanding of what caused 
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these events and a more analytical view of what followed is essential to achieve a 
greater appreciation of why Britain was determined to take control of the kingdom.   
The year 1798 was a watershed in Irish history. The rebellion that erupted in 
May of that year, followed by the invasion of a small French force in August, not only 
led to a change in the dynamics of the army in Ireland but also led to lasting political 
and social structures within the kingdom. The Protestant oligarchy had feared popular 
rebellion throughout the country for some years; however, when it occurred the 
government was militarily unprepared. The bulk of the fighting against the rebels and 
the French was conducted by the Irish militia, British fencibles and Irish yeomanry. 
Contrary to the historiography surrounding these events, the inexperienced and semi-
trained Irish militia generally proved their loyalty and fought well, leading to the 
eventual defeat of their foes. However, the government victories during the year also 
came about due to the lack of organization and leadership within the rebel armies, as 
well as the limited size of the French invasion force. The Royal Navy also played a 
major role in the defence of the kingdom by intercepting and defeating a series of 
French fleets carrying troops intended for Ireland. Ultimately, the rampant militant 
republicanism and militant loyalism that had polarized the Irish population and had 
reached crisis point that year, led to atrocities typical of civil wars and the estimated 
death of 25,000 rebels and non-combatants, along with hundreds of soldiers.359 
However, although the rebellion was a Continental-scale uprising and an extremely 
‘bloody’ affair, it was successfully dealt with quickly, leading to Britain imposing 
greater control over the troubled land. 
Clearly, in early 1798 the British and Irish governments had failed to make 
sufficient military preparations for the simultaneous insurrection and French invasion 
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that had been the long term goal of the United Irish. In May of that year the Irish 
establishment was of insufficient strength to cope with a widespread popular uprising 
and an invasion. According to the official return of the government forces in Ireland 
submitted in January of that year, there were a total of 41,068 rank and file troops 
serving in the kingdom at that time.360  This included 3,493 regular line cavalry, 1,816 
fencible cavalry, 1,830 regular line infantry, 10,751 fencible infantry, and 22,728 Irish 
militia.361 There was no further return made until July of the same year, which was 
after the rebellion had been smothered and the garrison, boosted by reinforcements 
from Britain, had been increased to 48,332.362  It is probable that when the rebellion 
erupted in May the number of troops in the kingdom would have been similar to 
numbers given in the January return. Although General Sir Ralph Abercromby had 
improved the concentration of some regiments in an effort to provide reserves and 
improve training, the majority of troops were now mainly dispersed to defend against 
a French invasion, ensuring that regiments were either posted to garrison strategic 
cities, towns and coastal forts, such as Dublin, Belfast, Cork and Limerick, or 
stationed at one of the permanent camps to provide reserves.363 Those individual units 
that were scattered throughout rural Ireland were commonly dispersed into small 
troops or companies to protect the local gentry and to assist in the search and seizure 
of arms. An example of this was the North Cork Militia which was the only regiment 
stationed in the county of Wexford on the eve of the uprising. This battalion had been 
divided into platoons and companies that were stationed in Wexford town and several 
smaller provincial towns, such as Enniscorthy and Ferns, not only to assist in counter-
insurgent operations but also to assist local magistrates and yeomanry in maintaining 
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the law.364 This ensured that when the rebellion broke out in Wexford, there were less 
than 500 troops between the Wicklow/Wexford border and Duncannon Fort near 
Waterford.365 Few troops had been stationed in County Wexford as rebellion was 
unexpected there due to the prosperity within the county and the lack of known 
United Irish activity there.  
The initial defeat of the North Cork Militia was due to the military force in 
Wexford being inadequate and totally unprepared for the popular uprising in the 
county. The government had not expected any trouble in the south-east of Ireland, 
either from the United Irish or their French allies. This is evident by analysing the 
concentration of the Irish garrison at the time. In May 1798 half of the Irish 
establishment was stationed in Munster and concentrated along a short defensive line 
from Limerick to Cork due to the belief that any French attack would most likely 
occur in the south.366 The rest of the Irish army was clustered in the midlands to 
protect Dublin, while there was a sizable force maintained in Ulster where the United 
Irish where perceived to be strongest. The North Cork Militia had only recently been 
sent to Wexford, either in late April or early May, to assist in the search and seizure of 
arms. According to Sir Richard Musgrave, the battalion headquarters was established 
in the town of Wexford, where around nineteen officers and 369 rank and file were 
stationed.367 Only three companies were distributed elsewhere in the county, with 
Captain Snow’s company and 30 men from Captain de Courcy’s company posted at 
Enniscorthy, one subaltern and 30 men stationed at Gorey, as well as the same 
number billeted at Ferns. 368 The only other armed forces immediately available in the 
county to assist the militia were the yeomanry. The nearest available reinforcements 
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were scattered in neighbouring counties, with the Antrim Militia at Arklow, County 
Wicklow, the Meath Militia and 86 soldiers of the 13th Foot in Waterford City, along 
with the 9th Dragoons stationed in Carlow.369 The distance these units had to march to 
support the North Corks, coupled with uncertainty and the necessity to maintain the 
peace and security of the areas in which they were garrisoned ensured that sole militia 
regiment in Wexford was initially forced to confront the numerically superior rebel 
forces on its own. 
The Irish militia deserves more credit for the suppression of the rebellion and 
the recapture of Wexford than the traditional historiography has acknowledged. By 
analysing the composition of the government forces in the principal actions against 
the rebels, it becomes obvious that the militia provided the major element of the 
infantry. In most modern accounts of the battles the involvement of the militia has 
either largely ignored or criticised. However, militia regiments provided the bulk of 
the government forces in all of the crucial actions that led to the containment and 
defeat of the rebels: including Newtownbarry with 61 percent; New Ross with 100 
percent; Arklow with 64 percent; and Vinegar Hill with 65 percent.370 These battles 
were crucial in the defeat of the insurrection: at Newtownbarry the insurgents were 
prevented from advancing into County Carlow; at New Ross they were stopped from 
moving into counties Kilkenny and Waterford; and at Arklow the rebels were 
prevented from advancing on Dublin. Defeat in these actions greatly demoralised the 
United Irish forces and forced them to concentrate at Vinegar Hill where they were 
totally destroyed on 21 June. Even in Ulster, where there were only a few militia 
regiments in 1798, the militia provided one-third of the government infantry at the 
principal battle of Ballynahinch which saw the defeat of the rebels and the end of the 
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uprising in the province.371 The serious reverses at Oulart Hill and Tubberneering, 
where the militia provided 100 percent of the infantry force, most certainly added to 
the unfavourable reputation of the militia. However, these defeats were not due to the 
poor quality of the troops, but more to the inexperience and over-confidence of the 
commanding officers. At Oulart Hill a single company of the North Cork militia was 
ordered to charge up hill in a position where their left flank was exposed to a flank 
attack, while at Tubberneering a column of militia led by an inexperienced regular 
officer, Colonel Walpole, was ambushed in a defile due to Walpole failing to deploy 
scouts.372 What is evident is that these actions which resulted in the defeat of the 
rebellion within five weeks, all took place before any significant reinforcements could 
be sent from Britain. 
Date Action Proportion of Militia in infantry 
engaged 
 
24 May 1798 Naas 100 percent 
 Kilcullen None 
 Prosperous (defeat) 100 percent 
25 May 1798 Carlow 60 percent (estimate) 
27 May 1798 Oulart Hill (defeat) 100 percent 
28 May 1798 Enniscorthy 27 percent 
1 June 1798 Newtownbarry 61 percent 
4 June 1798 Tubberneering (defeat) 100 percent (estimate) 
5 June 1798 New Ross 100 percent 
7 June 1798 Antrim 100 percent 
9 June 1798 Arklow 64 percent 
12 June 1798 Ballynahinch 33 percent (estimate) 
21 June 1798 Vinegar Hill 65 percent (estimate) 
26 June 1798 Kilconnell Hill  100 percent 
5 July 1798 Whiteheaps 100 percent (estimate) 
 
Table 5.1 – Irish militia involvement in the 1798 rebellion 
(Source: Nelson, The Irish Militia, 1793-1802, p. 214) 
 
Although the French invasion of August that year came too late to support the 
United Irish and proved nothing more than an ill-advised ‘forlorn hope’, the defeat of 
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the government forces at Castlebar led to the permanent tainting of the reputation of 
the Irish militia and thus, ultimately determined the future composition of the Irish 
military establishment. The Longford and Kilkenny militias were made the scapegoats 
for an ignominious rout known as the ‘Castlebar Races’ which occurred on 27 August 
when the French advanced on the town, that proved a major embarrassment for the 
British army. The traditional historiography surrounding the battle places the blame 
for the sudden government retreat on the Longford Militia who were placed at the rear 
of the government defence line. Criticism of the militia came from both General 
Hutchinson and Lieutenant General Lake, who were the senior officers present and 
although disagreeing over who was in command, concurred that the whole force 
broke due to the militiamen suddenly falling back from their position.373 However, 
both Hutchinson and Lake were attempting to deflect blame from their own part in the 
debacle. In a letter to Cornwallis after the battle, Lake attempted to avoid any 
responsibility by blaming the militia: ‘I think that it is absolutely necessary to state for 
your Lordship’s information that it is impossible to manage the militia; their whole 
conduct has been this day most shameful, and I am sorry to say that there is a strong 
appearance of disaffection…I have thought it necessary to march to this place in hope 
that the soldiers will get the better of their panic, which is beyond description.’374 In a 
letter of resignation sent by Hutchinson to Cornwallis at the end of September he 
claimed that the two militia regiments under his command had been ‘previously 
tampered with’ by the United Irish and that their known disaffection had induced the 
French to attack.375 He further laid blame on the militia stating that they had run off 
after having fired volleys on the French without orders and before the French were in 
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musket range.376 Such comments were conveniently used by the military 
establishment to cover up mistakes made by the senior commanders and cemented the 
lasting poor reputation of the Irish militia. 
Contrary to the historiography promoted by nineteenth century Ascendancy 
historians such as Sir Richard Musgrave, the Irish militia proved an effective and 
loyal force during the turbulent year of 1798. To be sure, the militiamen were prone to 
bouts of ill-discipline, especially when let loose on the defeated rebels, but in general 
the militia regiments proved their worth in battle when well led. The prime example 
was at the battle of New Ross where the entire government infantry consisted of 
militia. The personal courage and determination of General Johnson inspired the 
soldiers to tenaciously defend the town against overwhelming numbers and they 
proved steadfast in their determination to defeat the rebels through repeated counter-
attacks. Likewise at Arklow, the militia accounted for the majority of the government 
troops that stoutly defended the town with disciplined musketry, which coupled with 
the artillery, ensured the eventual rout of the United Irish army that was attempting to 
march on the capital. Again, in Kildare and Meath the militia provided the bulk of the 
forces used to surround and defeat the insurgents before the rebellion could spread 
further. In Ulster, the Monaghan Militia, whose loyalty was under question due to the 
high number of Catholic rank and file, as well as the recent executions of a small 
number of disaffected militiamen, proved to be most reliable at Ballynahinch where 
their discipline and doggedness saw them rout the rebels who had mounted a surprise 
attack with superior numbers.377 These events all proved to be decisive in the defeat 
of the rebellion before reinforcements could be mobilised and sent from Britain. The 
criticism aimed at the militia during the uprising appears to be in regard to the 
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behaviour towards civilians and property after battles had been won. However, it is 
easy to understand how any such conduct occurred when it had been actively 
encouraged in previous operations led by Carhampton and Lake.  
It is clear that in general the quality in leadership determined the behaviour of 
the militia and that the officer corps must be held responsible for any valid criticism 
against their troops. The most obvious example was at Castlebar where the disaster 
was conveniently blamed on the ill-discipline of the militia. Ivan Nelson convincingly 
argues that there was a measure of political expediency in attributing the defeat to the 
poor quality of the militia and disaffection in the regiments, since this proved to 
contemporaries that the defence of Ireland was best handled by the British 
government in London.378 And although Cornwallis was a prime supporter of such 
national defence policy, it was plain to him where the real blame should lie. In a reply 
to Hutchinson’s letter of resignation, the commander-in-chief stated that he believed 
the general had made a rash ‘error in judgement’ in moving forward too early without 
orders. He further stated that it was not prudent or advisable to place inexperienced 
troops in a situation of being attacked by seasoned regular forces or to have to make a 
‘precipitate’ retreat.379 However, Cornwallis did not accept the general’s resignation 
and only added to the false reputation of the native troops through his official 
correspondence where he claimed he could not release any regular troops from Ireland 
for the campaign in Egypt due to him being burdened ‘with a militia on which no 
dependence whatever can be placed.’380 His opinion of the militia was obviously 
influenced by the reports of his subordinates and the views of the Ascendancy from 
what he stated in a letter to Major General Ross in September 1798: ‘the Irish militia, 
from their repeated misbehaviour in the field, and their extreme licentiousness, are 
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fallen into such universal contempt and abhorrence, that when applications are made 
for the protection of troops, it is often requested that Irish militia may not be sent.’381 
In truth, Hutchinson was responsible for the defeat and not the militia. He had 
made a number of fundamental errors, with the greatest being the ordering of his 
troops to retreat at a time when they were holding favourable defensive ground. The 
first line, which included the Kilkenny Militia, had just successfully routed the Irish 
levies under French command and the commanding officers refused to retire when the 
order came. However, the whole line began to retreat toward the town when 
Hutchinson sent a second order to retire, stating that failure to do so would lead to 
punishment for disobedience.382 The order proved disastrous in that not only did the 
French then seize the favourable ground, but the confusion and disorder in the 
government army led to a rout. The first unit to break was a regular cavalry regiment, 
the 6th Dragoon Guards, which rode through the Longford Militia who were being 
held in reserve. The disorderly retreat continued through Castlebar where the 
Longford Militia made a determined stand against experienced French grenadiers at 
the bridge in an effort to allow the government forces to escape.383 The defenders 
eventually surrendered only when the French had cut off their line of retreat. The 
courageous actions of the militia were tainted by 53 members of the Longford 
regiment joining the French forces once captured, although this was obviously just an 
attempt to escape captivity for most of them as the majority had deserted before they 
reached Ballinamuck.384 This was obviously accepted by some military authorities 
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who showed clemency to one of the alleged deserters when he stated that he had stood 
his ground at Castlebar and that it was the army that had deserted him.385 
The year 1798 marked a turning point in the fortunes of the Irish militia, 
which from this time had lost the confidence which the British government had 
previously placed in it to defend Ireland. A better understanding of the rebellion and 
the events immediately leading up to it provides an insight as to how this occurred. 
The increasingly violent counter-insurgent operations being carried out by 
government forces, which included the bulk of the militia, created tension within the 
disaffected counties and had an impact on the military capabilities of United Irish. 
The continual arm seizures and arrests of senior rebel leaders had reduced the 
effectiveness of the organisation. Months of fruitless waiting for French action had a 
corrosive effect on rural supporters who had been the subjects of military oppression 
during April and May. This had damaged revolutionary morale and heightened 
religious tensions.386 Arthur O’Connor and Father Quigley were the first of the United 
Irish executive to be captured when they were arrested in Margate, Kent, on 28 
February 1798 after being sent to negotiate with the French Directory for military 
support in the proposed insurrection.387 This was followed by the mass arrest of 
sixteen of the most senior United Irish executives, including the Leinster leadership, 
at Oliver Bond’s Dublin address on 12 March. Such disasters urged those of the 
executive still at large, such as Lord Edward Fitzgerald, John Lawless and John 
Sheares, to attempt a coup before the government had succeeded in destroying the 
rebel infrastructure.388 The luke-warm response of their allies led to the new United 
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Irish leadership determining to raise a rebellion on their own in the hope that it would 
prompt the French to send an invasion force once the revolt had begun.389  
The fundamental purpose of the United Irish rebellion in 1798 was the 
overthrow of the Irish administration in Dublin. The primary military objective was 
the capture of the capital. This was dependent on participation of rebels over a wide 
area. The success of the United Irish uprising was reliant on a three-stage strategy. 
Central to this plan was the capture of key sites in Dublin, such as the Customs House 
and Four Courts, in the belief that depriving the government of such buildings would 
cripple the established infrastructure of the kingdom.390 The second priority was to 
secure the regions immediately outside the capital to establish a defensive ring around 
the city. A letter from an informer, Francis Higgins, sent to Edward Cooke on 20 May 
indicated that the insurgents had intended to occupy positions from Garretstown, 
Naul, Dunboyne, taking a circuitous route around the city to Dunleary.391 The third 
phase of the operation revolved around establishing sufficient forces to defend against 
the inevitable counter-attack from the government army.392 It was determined that the 
uprising would begin on 24 May, to be signalled by the stopping of the overnight mail 
coaches on the outskirts of Dublin on the evening of 23 May. It was hoped that such 
tactics would spread panic to the garrison towns and help paralyse the government.393 
The executive believed that victory would be obtained through superior numbers 
provided by the thousands of Catholic Defenders and the support of disaffected 
members of the militia.394 
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The success of the uprising was jeopardised before it began through the loss of 
its operational leader. The arrest and fatal wounding of Lord Edward Fitzgerald in 
Dublin on 19 May was a disastrous blow for the United Irish cause. Higgins had 
informed Dublin Castle that this revolutionary Irish peer was to be the commander-in-
chief of the rebel forces, due to his high profile and that he was the only executive 
member to have had any military experience.395 His capture ensured that there was a 
lack of coordination and leadership which prevented an effective rising in Dublin. 
Fitzgerald’s name had given credibility to the planned revolt, and his arrest had 
persuaded many in the capital that the cause was already lost.396 Not only did the 
United Irish now lack any central leadership, but thanks to informers such as Higgins 
and planted spies within the insurgent organisation, such as Francis Magan and 
Captain John Armstrong, the government was fully aware of the intended plans of the 
rebels. Troops, which mainly consisted of militia regiments together with several 
regiments of fencibles and regular cavalry, were wisely concentrated in and around 
Dublin where measures were taken to discourage insurgent attacks on government 
buildings within the capital by increasing armed patrols and strengthening guards at 
strategic points, such as Dublin Castle.397 Camden ensured that the streets of the city 
were saturated with troops who were employed in arresting suspects and searching for 
arms, with the summary burning of all buildings where pikes were found.398 And 
although Pakenham claims that confusion reigned amongst the Dublin garrison when 
the alarm was called and that there had been insufficient steps taken to secure vital 
bridges, the show of force was enough to persuade the estimated few hundred 
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leaderless rebels within the city on 23 May not to take any action.399 Such activities 
discouraged a general uprising in the city, which was necessary for the United 
Irishmen to achieve their first objective. The seizing of Dublin was imperative for the 
success of the rebel strategy and the failure to do so ensured the revolt was no longer 
a coup d’etat, but a series of uncoordinated local actions that lacked direction.     
The rising in the surrounding counties of Dublin met with some success due to 
the rebels having the initiative. Although the government had been aware that the mail 
coaches were to be targets of the insurgents, officials believed the rising had been 
planned for a later date and it was a shock to them when they received a letter from an 
informer on the afternoon of 23 May stating that the revolt was to begin that 
evening.400 Couriers were immediately dispatched to Lord Gosford commanding at 
Naas and General Wilford at Kildare, however, the numerous smaller detachment 
scattered in towns and villages in the surrounding Dublin could not be informed in 
sufficient time to prevent them being surprised by the United Irishmen.401  
Subsequently, that night cells of United Irishmen in counties Dublin, Meath, Kildare, 
Kings’, Queen’s and Wicklow gathered along the main roads leading from Dublin on 
which the various mail coaches travelled. Road blocks were established not only to 
seize the coaches but also to sever communications between the high command at 
Dublin Castle and the government forces in the provinces. The rebels were able to 
quickly gather together substantial forces that ensured superior numbers when 
launching surprise attacks on small garrisons of government troops. Near Naul 2,000 
rebels surrounded the Westpaltown barracks, while at Curragh around 1,000 
insurgents marched down the village street armed with pikes and muskets.402 
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Roadblocks were formed along the Navan road, the Galway road, as well as the main 
road leading south to Cork, and it is estimated that by the morning of 24 May up to 
10,000 rebels had formed a secure crescent around the capital.403     
It was the isolated garrisons of militia and yeomanry that were the first targets 
of the rebels. The excessive counter-insurgent operations that had been directed by the 
government and carried out with much vigour by the army and yeomanry, had 
resulted in a number of atrocities that alienated the local populations. One of the most 
famous examples was that of Captain John Swayne who commanded a detachment of 
the City of Cork Militia in the town of Prosperous, County Kildare and who was 
notoriously known for advocating the torturous practice of ‘pitch capping’ suspects. 
On the night of 23 May when the rebellion began, Swayne was murdered in his bed 
and his troops were surprised and locked in their barracks, where they all perished 
after it was set alight.404 The policy of free-quartering also proved disastrous for some 
troops who were separated from their officers when the revolt erupted. In Clane, 
County Kildare, soldiers from the Armagh Militia were still in their billets when the 
rebels attacked the village. They had to desperately fight their way to their officer in 
small groups, losing two killed and five wounded, before they could form an effective 
defence.405 On the same night a detachment of Tyrone Militia stationed at Ballymore 
Eustace, County Wicklow, fought off a determined rebel attack but lost an officer and 
four men in doing so.406  The insurgents proved successful in capturing a number of 
small towns, forcing the surprised garrisons to flee, while any army officers, such as 
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Lieutenant William Giffard of the 82nd Foot, who had the misfortune of travelling by 
coach and being stopped by the rebels, were usually murdered.407 
The insurgents gained some initial success against the government forces 
through the element of surprise and superior numbers. At Prosperous the rebel force 
comprised of 500 men who were mainly farmers and cotton mill workers led by Dr. 
John Esmonde, an officer in the local yeomanry.408 This mob marched to the town 
barracks and forced their way into the guard house where the twelve militiamen 
present were all dispatched. A detachment of the Ancient Britons stationed at the 
cotton factory was subsequently attacked and overwhelmed. Of the 57 soldiers who 
had formed the garrison, only nineteen managed to escape with their lives.409 
Ironically, most of those killed were Catholic. Synchronized attacks had also been 
launched at the nearby towns of Clane and Naas where the surprised government 
troops had managed to beat off the first attacks, but with some losses. However, the 
small combined garrison of local yeomanry and Armagh Militia at Clane was forced 
to retreat to Naas due to the large number of rebels who threatened to surround them. 
At Naas the garrison of around 220 men was attacked by three separate columns of 
rebels, amounting to several thousand, who were intent on capturing the town 
barracks and gaol. Only after repeated charges by the mounted Ancient Britons, but 
mainly through the telling fire of the militia artillery, were the insurgents forced to 
retreat.410 At the village of Old Kilcullen, Kildare, the aged Lieutenant General Sir 
Ralph Dundas, commander of the midland district, was unable to organise a counter-
attack as he himself was beleaguered by 300 rebels who had occupied the local 
churchyard. With only a mixed force of 20 fencible infantry and 40 cavalry of the 
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Romney Fencibles and 9th Dragoons, Dundas ordered the mounted element of his 
force to repeatedly charge the fortified rebels. This was disastrous for the government 
force, in that the cavalry proved ineffective against the insurgent pikemen, resulting in 
the heavy loss of 23 soldiers killed.411 Dundas was then forced to fight his way out of 
the village in an attempt to concentrate the dispersed troops in the county. The rebel 
cause was further helped by an order for the government troops in County Kildare to 
initially withdraw and concentrate at Kildare town in an effort to create a sufficient 
counter-attack force. This enabled the United Irish to establish a small enclave that 
was successful in severing communications to the south and west of the capital in a 
time of confusion and uncertainty. 
However, the United Irish success in most of Leinster was limited and short-
lived. There had been fourteen engagements in the first 24-hours of the rebellion, of 
which only two had been victories for the insurgents. In most cases small government 
garrisons had been able to repel rebel attacks and in some cases rout the ill-disciplined 
mobs. The rebels had managed to occupy a number of towns and villages, but mainly 
through them not being garrisoned or through the government troops being 
strategically withdrawn. Those villages that had been seized were soon recaptured, 
such as Rathangan, County Kildare, which had been secured by the insurgents on 23 
May but subsequently recaptured by the City of Cork Militia the following day.412 
The abortive rebel attacks on Lucan, County Dublin, Kilcock, County Meath, and 
Leixlip, County Kildare on 25 May led to insurgents withdrawing to a defensive camp 
at Dunboyne. Lack of leadership then led to indecision, resulting in the rebel army 
being attacked and routed at the battle of Tara in Meath two days later. The uprising 
in the counties of the Pale was effectively over with the surrender of 3,000 rebels at 
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Knockallan Hill, Kildare on 28 May, with only a number of small bands of ineffectual 
United Irish remaining scattered throughout the countryside. Thomas Pakenham 
convincingly argues that those locations that the United Irish had occupied were of no 
strategic value and that no military threat to the capital ever materialised.413 However, 
news of this localised rebellion had quickly spread throughout the kingdom and had 
inspired thousands of other disaffected Irishmen in Wexford to take up arms against 
the state.  
It was the rebellion in Wexford that posed the most serious threat to the 
Ascendancy in Ireland. This was the only county where the United Irish were able to 
raise a number of armed civilian mobs that was large enough to overwhelm the 
limited government forces in south Leinster. The exact number of disaffected who 
joined the uprising in Wexford will never be known as the rebel columns consisted of 
clusters of localised forces of volunteers or impressed civilians that were never 
formed into formal regiments. An army in name only, these assemblies had no 
structure and were mostly led by individuals who had no military experience, relying 
on the fervour of the crowd to obtain success.  Pikes, which were made locally and 
readily available, were the most common weapons of the rebels and proved effective 
against yeoman cavalry, while agricultural implements were also weapons of 
necessity due to the scarcity of firearms.414 The number of rebel ‘volunteers’ 
remaining in the field was fluid and determined by the successes or defeats of the 
insurgents. Nevertheless, some indication of the size of the rebel forces can be 
established from contemporary accounts of the rebellion. The first encounter between 
government troops and United Irishmen in Wexford occurred at Oulart Hill on 27 
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May, where Cornwallis claims the rebel force consisted of 5,000 men.415 Ivan Nelson 
in his recent book, The Irish Militia, 1793-1802: Ireland’s Forgotten Army, claims 
that there were approximately 6,000 rebels involved in the attack on Enniscorthy on 
28 May 1798, although he fails to reveal his source.416 The figures given for the rebel 
army that attacked New Ross on 5 June were greater. The figure of 30,000 quoted by 
the Protestant zealot, Sir Richard Musgrave, can be disregarded as a gross 
exaggeration due to his obvious bias in his attempt to magnify the Catholic threat.417 
However, the numbers of 10-15,000 given by Miles Byrne, a United Irish officer who 
fought in the uprising, seem more likely, indicating that the rebel army was 10-15 
times the size of the defending government force.418 He claims that the insurgent 
force that attacked Arklow on 9 June consisted of 20,000 rebels, but that their defeat
was due to only 2,000 men having muskets for which there was very little 
ammunition.
 
roughout the kingdom. 
                                                
419 What these figures indicate is that the United Irish were able to 
muster a horde of 30-40,000 men in a very short time. It was imperative for Dublin 
Castle that the rebellion be contained before it could spread th
Contrary to the historiography of a Catholic crusade promoted by 
contemporary historians such as Musgrave, the rising in Wexford gained popular 
support due to localised economic depression. This had caused some disaffection 
amongst the middle-classes, as well as the Catholic peasantry, ensuring the 
membership of prominent Protestant and Catholic gentry, such as Bagenal Harvey, 
who provided leadership amongst the United Irish in the county.420 Intelligence 
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gained from government spies, informers and from the arrest of United Irish leaders, 
such as Anthony Perry of Inch, had led to an increase in counter-terror activities in 
northern Wexford.421 These increasingly violent activities of search, seizure and 
arrests, coupled with propaganda sponsored by the rebel leadership and local 
magistrates, had polarised the community. Protestants were fearful of Catholic 
insurrection, while the Catholics peasantry was continually being exposed to 
floggings, house-burnings and ‘pitch-capping’ by the yeomanry.422 A wave of 
hysteria swept through the county, with stories of atrocities committed by the 
yeomanry encouraging those who had previously sworn allegiance to the crown to 
take up arms against the local government agents. On 26 May news of the mu
rebel prisoners by the garrison at Dunlavin, Kildare, along with the same plight o
prisoners at Carnew on the Wicklow border, convinced many that the rumours of the 
planned extermination of the Catholic population had begun.
rder of 
f 28 
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news of the rebellion in Kildare and Meath had spread throughout Wexford. 
Ultimately, it was the fear of torture, death and destruction of property, together with 
the stories of rebel successes that convinced thousands to join the armed resistance.424  
The character of the rebellion was more of a peasant jacquerie than of a 
revolution. With the arrests of the senior leaders within the Leinster United Irish 
movement, the subsequent rebellion became a spontaneous and disorganised revolt. 
The rebels lacked any central direction once they rose against the local garrisons, with 
any further action being determined by local leaders who were not privy to any grand 
strategy proposed by the imprisoned rebel executive. This ensured that many rebels 
only rose after hearing of similar actions occurring elsewhere, while others quickly 
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surrendered once it became clear the rebellion would fail.425 The support that the 
uprising did gain was fuelled more by resentment than politics. In Wexford the rebel 
leadership was comprised of disaffected Protestant and Catholic landed-gentry who 
were suffering from an economic downturn due to poor grain prices and resented the 
indifference of the government towards their plight. The peasantry gave their support 
due to resentment of the oppressive nature of the government counter-insurgent 
operations rather than from any desire for shared political power, with leadership 
provided at parish level by local Catholic priests, such as Fathers John and Michael 
Murphy and Philip Roche.426  Thomas Cloney, a young Wexford farmer who joined 
the rebels at Vinegar Hill only took up the cause as he felt he had no alternative due to 
coercion from the insurgents and tactics of the government: ‘The innocent and the 
guilty were alike driven into acts of unwilling hostility to the existing government; but 
there was no alternative; every preceding day saw the instruments of torture  filling 
the yawning sepulchres with the victims of suspicion or malice; as a partial resistance 
could never tend to mitigate the cruelty of their tormentors, I saw no second course 
for me, or indeed for any Catholic in my part of the country, to pursue.’427   
By holding the initiative, the United Irish were able to initially defeat the 
inadequate government forces in Wexford and take control of the county. The 
rebellion erupted in Wexford on the evening of 26 May when a party of insurgents led 
by a local parish priest, Father John Murphy, intercepted a patrol of the Camolin 
yeomanry near the village of the Harrow, near Ferns. An attempt to disarm the mob 
by Lieutenant Bookey, the officer-in-command of the patrol, led to him and another 
member of the local gentry attached to the corps being killed.428 This incident ignited 
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rebellion in the county, with the yeomanry seeking revenge by indiscriminately killing 
suspects and burning houses in the area, while thousands of the peasantry joined the 
insurgents in attacking isolated yeoman garrisons and the homes of Protestant 
magistrates, who were seen as agents of the government, and gentry in an effort to 
gain firearms. With the yeomanry mainly based in various towns, the United Irish 
were able to effectively mobilise in the countryside unhindered.429 News of a large 
force of insurgents having gathered at Oulart Hill, fifteen miles north of Wexford 
town prompted Colonel Foote of the North Cork Militia to march against them on 27 
May. A force of 109 militiamen and nineteen mounted yeomen met the estimated 500 
rebels who had strategically placed themselves at the top of the hill.430 According to 
Thomas Pakenham, Major Lombard of the militia instigated an uphill charge on the 
rebel position without the permission of Foote, who had wisely determined not to 
attack due to the superior numbers of the insurgents and the likelihood of being 
outflanked.431 As a result, after firing their muskets, the inexperienced and 
outnumbered government force was outflanked and annihilated, with only Foote and 
three soldiers managing to escape with their lives.432 Victory in this skirmish was 
crucial to the rebel cause in that it not only gave the insurgents confidence in facing 
government troops, but led to thousands more joining the revolt. It was the rapid rise 
of the disaffected populace, coupled with the shock of defeat that dramatically 
reduced the morale of the government forces in the county. The superior number of 
rebels eventually forced the inadequate and isolated militia and yeomanry garrisons to 
retreat from Ferns, Gorey and Enniscorthy where they had concentrated. On 28 May 
Father Murphy led 6,000 rebels in an attack on the 300-man garrison at Enniscorthy, 
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which included 80 North Cork militiamen and over 200 yeomen from three local 
corps.433 And although the garrison was able to successfully withdraw from the town, 
it was at the cost of 74 men killed and 17 wounded.434  The loss of so many of their 
comrades at Oulart Hill and Enniscorthy had caused a collapse in morale of the North 
Cork Militia, and it was the regiment’s perceived unreliability and reduction to only 
273 rank and file that led to its evacuation of Wexford town on 30 May.435 Once the 
town was abandoned by the militia, the United Irish occupied it and proclaimed the 
creation of the Republic of Wexford. In effect, mass support for the rebellion ensured 
that the United Irish quickly gained control of the whole county, with the government 
forces now having to prevent the rebellion from spreading. 
Confusion and lack of experience within the officer corps of the local 
government forces initially aided the rebel cause.  With the majority of the county 
under rebel control, Wexford town was besieged. At this time the garrison was 
approximately 1,000 strong which included the remnants of the North Cork Militia, 
various yeomanry corps, as well as 200 soldiers of the Donegal regiment that had 
marched to the town from their post at Duncannon Fort. The officer now commanding 
in the town was Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell of the Donegal Militia who had called 
for more reinforcements. A force comprising the Meath Militia, a severely under 
strength battalion of the 13th Foot and several pieces of artillery, had reached 
Taghmon about twelve miles west of Wexford town on 30 May. However, confusion 
and inexperience led to the advance guard of the column, including the artillery, being 
ambushed and annihilated at Three Rocks. The commander of the main column, 
General Fawcett laid the blame on Captain Adams, a company officer of the Meath 
Militia: ‘Owing to extreme ignorance, and a total inexperience of any service or his 
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duty as an officer, instead of waiting to receive any orders from me, proceeded. 
Adams, with no precaution taken, or weapons loaded, was ambushed and cut to 
pieces.’436 This proved disastrous for the relief of Wexford in that Fawcett then chose 
to retreat due to the overwhelming number of rebels, further reducing the morale of 
the besieged garrison. A similar incident occurred at Tubberneering, near Ballymore, 
on 4 June where a column of militia, commanded by the inexperienced Colonel 
Walpole and sent from Dublin to reinforce General Loftus in his advance from 
Arklow into Wexford, was ambushed and routed. Walpole had  been a staff officer 
more concerned with fame and glory, who had not only disregarded superior orders 
by taking an alternative route, but had also failed to place advance guards and flankers 
on the march.437 This event proved crucial in that it caused panic amongst the 
government force commanded by General Loftus that had gathered at Gorey for an 
advance into the rebel held county. Confusion then led to the whole force abandoning 
Gorey to the insurgents and a general retreat of government troops through Arklow to 
Wicklow.438 These incidents allowed time for the United Irish to form their rapidly 
increasing army of disaffected civilians into three sizable columns, with the intention 
of marching into neighbouring counties to spread revolution. The suffering of such 
reverses also provided the Ascendancy with evidence to support their questioning of 
the competence of the militia.  
However, once Dublin Castle had recovered from the initial shock of the 
uprising, the military hierarchy in Ireland effectively contained and extinguished the 
rebellion. The government reaction to the revolt revolved around three priorities: 
firstly, the protection of Dublin, then the defeat of the rebels in Kildare and Meath, 
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and finally the recapture of Wexford.439 Dublin had remained secure from the outset 
of the uprising and by 1 June the army had regained the initiative in the counties 
surrounding Wexford. By 28 May many of the rebels in Kildare had seen the futility 
of further resistance with 3,000 surrendering to General Dundas at Knockallan Hill, 
while General Duff had relieved the beleaguered garrison in Kildare town on the same 
day. On 1 June the crown forces prevented the rebellion from spreading into Carlow 
by defeating a large insurgent army that had launched an attack on the garrison at 
Newtownbarry. However, the most significant encounter occurred at New Ross, 
County Kilkenny, on 5 June, where a rebel force led by a prominent Protestant 
magistrate of Wexford, Bagenal Harvey, was decisively beaten in a hard fought battle 
that was characterised by brutal and determined street fighting. The determination of 
the 1,400 man garrison of militia, yeomanry and 5th Dragoons was not enough to 
prevent the insurgents, whose force was estimated to be ten times that of the 
defenders, from entering the town. However, the placement of artillery in strategic 
spots led to shocking carnage that had reduced the rebel army to only 2-3,000 
effectives by the end of the day.440 What makes this battle so significant is that it not 
only prevented the rebellion from spreading into Kilkenny, but the defeat and loss of 
life reduced the morale and confidence of the insurgents, while boosting the morale 
and confidence of the government troops. 
The government victory at New Ross was the turning point for the uprising in 
Wexford. The battle was characterised by numerous attacks and counter-attacks that 
lasted throughout the day, with the ebb and flow of the dispersed street fighting 
causing much confusion on both sides. Harvey’s rebel force eventually melted away 
due to exhaustion and panic that had quickly spread as a result of the number of 
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casualties sustained in the attack.441 Thousands of insurgents lost heart in the revolt 
and simply returned to the homes, while many others flooded back to Wexford town 
with exaggerated stories of defeat. Victory proved costly for the government with the 
death of Lord Mountjoy, commander of the Dublin Militia, along with 86 soldiers 
killed, 58 wounded and five officers and 76 men reported missing.442 The loss to the 
rebels was immense, with one eye witness stating that 62 cart-loads of bodies were 
dumped into the local river, in addition to 3,400 that were buried in a mass grave.443 
However, this may have been an exaggeration, with James Alexander, a prominent 
loyalist who was tasked with arranging the disposal of the bodies estimating a total of 
2,600 deceased rebels, including 1,010 bodies removed from within the town 
streets.444 The battle had also been costly to the United Irish in loss of materiel, with a 
large quantity of muskets and pikes, as well as nineteen field guns, being left 
behind.445 Although not routed, the southern United Irish army of Wexford withdrew 
back towards Wexford town, where under the new leadership of Father Philip Roche, 
its main focus was now on the defence of the republic capital and raiding operations. 
The government army seized the initiative and went on the offensive with the 
defeat of a large rebel force at Arklow, County Wicklow. On 9 June the northern 
United Irish army, estimated to be 19,000 strong and led by Father John Murphy, 
launched an attack on the government held town in an effort to spread the revolt 
outside Wexford and march on Dublin.446 However, a garrison of 1,335 militia and 
fencible infantry, along with 500 cavalry, defended the town and had been placed in a 
strong defensive position on its outskirts by the commanding officer, General 
                                                 
441 Pakenham, pp. 236-237 
442 Faulkner’s Journal, 9 June 1798, quoted in Nelson, p. 200 
443 Pakenham, p. 328 
444 Alexander to Pelham, 10 June 1798 (British Museum, Add MSS 33/105/400), quoted in Pakenham, 
p.  328 
445 Ibid. 
446 Pakenham, p. 281 
 156
Needham.447 The rebels launched a frontal attack in two columns, but both were 
eventually forced to withdraw due to high casualties sustained from the superior 
firepower of the government troops. Unlike New Ross, rebel casualties at Arklow 
were measured in the hundreds, not thousands, with an estimated 300 bodies being 
left on the field.448 The government casualties were extremely low as very few rebels 
managed to breach the government lines due to the effective firepower of the 
artillery.449 What makes the government victory at Arklow so significant is that it was 
the second serious defeat for the insurgents in four days. The government had 
succeeded in preventing the popular uprising from spreading outside of Wexford and 
from this point the rebellion began to collapse in the south-east of the kingdom. By 21 
June the rebels had retreated to Vinegar Hill, near Enniscorthy, where their 
consolidated force of approximately 20,000 was surrounded by the converging 
government forces of four columns commanded by generals Johnson, Duff, Loftus 
and Needham, and led by Lieutenant General Lake.450 The firepower of the 
government artillery, plus no attempt by the rebels to fortify the position, ensured that 
the United Irish army was routed with great loss. Although a number managed to 
escape the encirclement and withdrew to the Wicklow Mountains where they 
continued a campaign of guerrilla warfare, the serious military threat in Wexford had 
been extinguished. On the same day Wexford town was recaptured by Brigadier 
General John Moore, an experienced regular officer who had been in Ireland since 
1797, after the column that he led had routed a rebel force at Foulkes Mills the day 
before. The series of defeats and subsequent government reprisals ensured that the 
popular support that the United Irish needed for the rebellion to spread and succeed 
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had quickly dissolved, ensuring that the rebel forces were now reduced to a number of 
small isolated bands that were easily accounted for in the following mopping-up 
operations. 
In comparison to the rising in Wexford, the rebellion in Ulster failed to gain 
sufficient popular support and was quickly extinguished. The dragooning of the 
province by government forces in 1797 and early 1798 ensured that there was little 
chance of any such rebellion succeeding. The counter-terror activities may have 
inspired some to take up arms against the government but the fear of reprisals also 
persuaded many to remain at home when the uprising broke out in Antrim on 7 June. 
There was dissention within the United Irish leadership in Ulster over the limited 
chance of success of any uprising without military support from the French, which 
ensured confusion and luke-warm responses to the call-to-arms.451 Active popular 
support for the rebellion was restricted to isolated disaffected locations within 
counties Antrim and Down, where the traditional democratic philosophies of the 
dominant, but politically repressed, Presbyterian population led to support for a 
revolution. Such fractions within the United Irish movement ensured that the rebel 
forces were easily contained and defeated. 
In contrast to the military situation in Wexford, the Irish army was in a 
stronger position to deal with any rebellion in Ulster in 1798. The province had been 
the birthplace of the United Irish movement and it was here that the government 
expected open rebellion to occur. From the time that the militant republican 
organisation had been outlawed in 1795, Dublin Castle had been generally supportive 
of the counter-revolutionary measures taken by the army in the north of the kingdom, 
although the severity of such steps was questioned at times. The policy of disarming 
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of Ulster had been in place from March 1797 when General Lake had launched a 
series of search and seizure operations that had critically weakened the military 
effectiveness of the insurgents through arrests and seizure of weapons. This seriously 
disrupted the United Irish executive in Ulster, with R.G. Morton claiming that a 
‘period of sullen quiescence’ within the revolutionary movement remained until the 
uprising in Antrim and Down the following year.452 The fear of an uprising in Ulster 
also ensured that there was a concentration of troops to counter such action, as well as 
a strategic plan to contain any rebellion. Major General George Nugent, an 
experienced and competent officer, commanded the government forces in the north.  
In June 1798 he had at his disposal approximately 9,000 soldiers, which were mostly 
Irish militia and British fencibles, along with 5,000 yeomen.453 He had formulated a 
sound strategy of placing company and troop-sized garrisons of infantry and 
yeomanry in disaffected locations whilst maintaining a substantial reserve at Blaris 
Camp, near Belfast. Nugent had also fostered an effective network of informants and 
spies to provide essential intelligence to counter any insurgent moves. This ensured 
that when the rebellion did erupt the government forces could quickly regain the 
military initiative. 
The rebellion in Ulster was easily defeated due to confusion and lack of co-
ordination within the United Irish leadership. The leadership of the Ulster insurgents 
was in disarray due to the number of arrests carried out by the government troops. 
Many of those who had escaped such action were disillusioned by the absence of any 
French military support and showed little enthusiasm for rebelling. This led to Henry 
Joy McCracken assuming the responsibility of commander-in-chief of the rebel forces 
in Antrim. The rebellion in Wexford had inspired him to launch simultaneous attacks 
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on Antrim and Randalstown, County Antrim, on 7 June in an effort to seize the local 
magistrates that were meeting in Antrim on that date. He mistakenly assumed similar 
attacks would be conducted by United Irishmen in County Down on the same day. 
However, poor communications within the organisation ensured that the risings in 
Antrim and Down became uncoordinated isolated rebellions that were defeated in 
turn. Had McCracken and Henry Munro, leader of the Down rebellion, been able to 
conspire to simultaneously launch their attacks, they may have had more success by 
forcing Nugent to fight on two fronts. However, this was not the case, with the 
uprising in Down erupting on 9 June at a time when the rebellion in Antrim was 
effectively spent. 
The rebels found little success in Ulster. The insurgents were divided, even 
before the attack on Antrim town was carried out, due to the defection of 5,000 
Catholic Defenders who had previously promised to rise. Many other contingents 
failed to arrive at the rendezvous point arranged by McCracken, but he eventually 
gathered together a force of 6,000. However, by the time he launched his attack on the 
small garrison, unbeknown to him, a reinforcing column of government troops were 
also entering the town. Prior to the rising General Nugent had received a copy of 
McCracken’s orders from a defecting United Irish colonel by the name of Magin.454 
This ensured that he could dispatch a sizable force to locate and destroy the main 
rebel army, as well as relieve the smaller garrisons that had been targeted in 
McCracken’s orders. The rebels had some success with the brief occupation of 
Randalstown and Ballymena, but their attacks on Larne and Antrim was repulsed due 
to determined defence by the small garrisons, allowing time for relief columns to 
arrive. The clash at Antrim was a confused bloody affair, typical of street fighting, 
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which ultimately led to panic amongst the rebels and their retreat from the town, 
leaving 300 dead.455 And although the rebels had succeeded in seizing control of most 
of the county, except for Carrickfergus and Belfast, the defeat at Antrim had broken 
the confidence of the insurgents. Wary of possible risings in Belfast and Down, 
Nugent then successfully negotiated the surrender of rebel arms by offering a general 
amnesty.  
The defeat of the rebels in County Down effectively extinguished the rebellion 
in the north. On 9 June a mixed force of York Fencibles and local yeomanry were 
surprised by a large rebel force that had gathered at Saintfield, ten miles east of 
Belfast. After defeating the government troops, Henry Munro, the rebel leader in 
Down, marched his army of 7,000 rebels to the important market town of 
Ballynahinch where they encamped in a wooded park and remained largely inactive. 
By 12 June General Nugent had advanced on the town from Belfast with a force of 
1,500 men, which included the Monaghan Militia, part of the 22nd Dragoons, a 
detachment of artillery and 600 fencibles.456 The following morning Munro led the 
rebel attack against Nugent’s force that held the centre of the town but were 
subsequently repulsed by artillery fire. Nugent estimated that 3-400 insurgents were 
killed out of a force of 4-5,000, while his casualties were considerably light with one 
officer and eight soldiers killed, along with thirteen wounded.457 With the capture and 
execution of Munro the rebel army in Down dissolved, thus effectively ending the 
rebellion in Ulster. The uprising in the north had lasted only one week and had been a 
complete failure in attempting to inspire a general rebellion in the province. 
Ultimately, what resulted was the complete destruction of the United Irish movement 
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in the north, where the failure of the rising, coupled with the following reprisals 
ensuring there was little support for any future republican revolts.  
The defeat of the rebellion in Ireland in 1798 was due to a number of factors, 
which included the failure to co-ordinate Presbyterian discontent and Catholic 
disaffection with a simultaneous French invasion, and the flawed rebel strategy of 
fighting against government troops in open battle. The decision to launch an uprising 
without French military support was a gamble that proved disastrous for the 
revolutionary cause. The rebel strategy of relying on overwhelming the government 
forces with superior numbers had some merit but was basically flawed. They may 
have had the initiative when the rebellion was first launched, but once the government 
forces were able to concentrate, the United Irish armies lacked any trained and 
disciplined formations needed to successfully confront the government army in open 
linear-style battle. The counter-terror operations of the government had seriously 
depleted the number of firearms available to the insurgents, ensuring that the rebel 
troops had to rely heavily on the use of pikes, which although lethal, were most 
effective as defensive weapons, such as when attacked by cavalry. This was evident at 
New Ross where elements of the 4th and 5th Dragoons charged a mob of retreating 
rebels, only for the pikemen to turn and dispatch the cavalry commanding officer and 
28 of his troopers.458 The limited number of firearms ensured that the United Irishmen 
were reliant on the tactic of a shock charge, similar to the tactics used by Jacobite 
infantry in the 1745 rebellion in Scotland, to engage with the enemy.459 This proved 
successful against poorly trained and numerically inferior formations, such as the 
North Cork Militia at Oulart Hill. However, as with the Jacobite charge at Culloden in 
1746, it proved disastrous against a force of disciplined troops who could maintain 
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superior fire power, such as the government defence of Arklow.460 What also proved 
significant was that the rebels lacked a sufficient number of trained artillerists to put 
the captured field guns to good use. The rebel need for such experience was so 
desperate that at New Ross they forced captured artillerymen to load and fire the 
cannons at gun point.461 The sections of Royal Artillery and Royal Irish Artillery that 
accompanied the government forces were the best trained and most professional corps 
within the Irish establishment and it was their ability to maintain constant accurate 
fire against the rebels that inflicted high casualties on the insurgents that reduced their 
morale. It was the effect of artillery fire that ensured the defeat of the insurgents at 
New Ross, Arklow and Vinegar Hill.462 By waiting for the landing of a French army 
the rebellion would have had a greater chance of success. Not only would the French 
have provided the republican cause with the experienced troops and materiel 
necessary to achieve victory against the Irish army, but Dublin Castle would have had 
to withdraw regiments from parts of the kingdom in an effort to consolidate its forces 
to face the French in open battle, thus leaving the defence of large areas of rural 
Ireland to the inexperienced yeomanry.  
The lack of effective leadership within the United Irish movement, which had 
passed from Ulster to an executive committee in Dublin, was significant in the defeat 
of the rebel armies. The arrest of the Leinster executive in March of 1798 effectively 
crippled the United Irish movement, ensuring command and organisational structures 
were limited to local control, fostering confusion and lack of direction amongst the 
rebel cells within Dublin and surrounding counties, some who chose not to act 
without orders from the executive.463 This was evident in every separate uprising, 
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where indecision prevailed once the rebels had failed to achieve their goals. In Meath 
the isolated rebel bands drew together at an encampment at Tara and remained there 
inactive until surrounded and routed.464 The republicans responded similarly in 
Wexford, when they converged on Vinegar Hill and were destroyed after failing to 
break out of the county. Insufficient military experience amongst the leadership also 
limited the chance of success, with Lord Fitzgerald being the only member of the 
executive to have served as an officer in any capacity. There were a small number of 
deserters from the officer corps of the militia and yeomanry that joined the insurgents, 
such as Doctor Esmonde at Prosperous, but the prominent leaders of the rebellion 
were mostly inexperienced civilians.465 In Wexford local Catholic parish priests, such 
as Fathers John and Michael Murphy, as well as Father Philip Roche, were 
inspirational in leading their disaffected parishioners but were ignorant of military 
tactics. The same can be said of Anthony Perry and Bagenal Harvey, who as local 
gentry provided traditional leadership but whose lack of military knowledge seriously 
jeopardised the success of the revolt. Similarly, the leadership in Ulster was lacking in 
military experience, with Henry Joy McCracken being a prosperous cotton 
manufacturer, while Henry Munro was a draper.466 It was this lack of military 
experience and knowledge amongst the leaders that ensured the rebels armies were 
decimated on repeated murderous frontal attacks that not only weakened the rebel 
numerical advantage but eventually broke the morale of the disaffected population. 
Another factor in the failure of the rebellion was the lack of active support 
from the general populace throughout the majority of other counties within the 
kingdom. British historians, such as R.F. Foster, claim that the French revolution had 
                                                 
464Francis Higgins to Edward Cooke, 25 May 1798 (National Archives, Ireland – Rebellion Papers 
620/18/14), quoted in Liam Chambers, ‘The 1798 Rebellion in North Leinster,’ in 1798: A Bicentenary 
Perspective, eds. Thomas Bartlett, et. al. (Dublin, 2003), pp. 125  
465 Pakenham, p. 127 
466 Nelson, pp. 206-207 
 164
polarised the Irish population and that there was large-scale support amongst liberal 
Protestants, Presbyterians and Catholics for a similar uprising in Ireland to provide 
male suffrage and Catholic emancipation.467 Arguably, this may have been true 
amongst the educated middle-classes but not so for the Catholic peasantry, most of 
whom could not read.468 The revolutionary ideology fostered by the United Irish was 
a foreign concept to the uneducated Irish peasantry and the idea of a democratic 
nation governed by the people was alien to the peasantry that had traditionally relied 
on the aristocracy for leadership and protection.469 They had always been ruled by 
kings and the Irish Catholics had generally remained loyal to the exiled House of 
Stuart throughout the eighteenth century. The French revolutionary philosophies were 
extremely secular and critical of the influence the Catholic Church had over the 
state.470 Any such propaganda distributed by the United Irish would have discouraged 
many Catholics from participating in a rebellion that threatened the continuation of 
their religious practice. The fact that the Catholic bishops in Ireland, together with the 
Catholic Committee, had actively discouraged their flock from supporting any 
insurrection would most certainly have accounted for the general lack of popular 
support. This was evident in the open displays of loyalty and support by the peasantry 
in the south of the kingdom towards the crown forces marching to counter Hoche’s 
invasion in 1796.471 They had a basic fear that the United Irish were in league with 
the French to drive Catholics off the land.472 This suspicion is understandable wh
considering that the United Irish was mainly based in Ulster amongst educated young 
en 
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radicals of the middle classes who saw Catholicism as an oppressive religion based on 
superstition.  
One point that traditional and revisionist historians, such as Musgrave and 
Bartlett, agree on is that as viceroy, the earl of Camden was ineffective in providing 
decisive leadership in a time of national crisis. As lord lieutenant, Camden was also 
head of the military establishment in Ireland, although at the time he had a designated 
commander-in-chief of the army, Lieutenant General Lake, who served under him and 
was responsible for the administration and operational control of the armed forces. 
However, although Camden openly displayed a lack of confidence in Lake and the 
troops under his command, believing their quality and numbers were inadequate to 
deal with the rebels, he encouraged Lake to carry out counter-terror campaigns 
knowing that such measures would lead to more disaffection amongst the 
population.473 He saw rebellion as an opportunity to crush dissention in Ireland, 
however, once the uprising had begun, he faltered when he became infected with the 
panic that quickly spread throughout Dublin and the Ascendancy.474 This panic was 
fuelled by the numerous reports received from panic-stricken gentry and magistrates 
throughout the kingdom, with Camden writing to the British Home secretary 
demanding troops be sent from Britain to help end the revolt: ‘Unless great Britain 
pours an immense force into Ireland, the country is lost. Unless she sends her most 
able generals those troops may be sacrificed…from the delay in sending the 
reinforcements which were promised, the rebellion has much extended itself, that it 
now assumes so formidable a shape that I think it my duty to state…the country is 
lost, unless a very large reinforcement of troops is landed.’475 This comment is 
significant in that by the time he wrote this letter on 11 June, the rebels in Meath and 
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Kildare had been defeated and had surrendered, while the rebellion in Wexford had 
been contained with the United Irish defeats at New Ross and Arklow. By this time 
the government forces had seized the initiative, forcing the insurgents to withdraw to 
Vinegar Hill and at this stage it was only in two counties in Ulster that the rebels had 
any chance of overwhelming the Irish army. Camden also came under attack from 
members of the Ascendancy for his inertia and was heavily criticised for preventing 
Lake from marching out of Dublin with a column to reinforce General Dundas in 
Kildare. He repeatedly argued that the security of the capital was paramount, stating 
that no such mission could take place until reinforcements arrived in the city from 
Britain.476 This led to the rural gentry of the county claiming that they had been 
abandoned by the army and government, resulting in many being unnecessarily 
murdered in their homes by rebel mobs. 
The actions of some senior army officers fostered a contemporary belief that 
the military hierarchy proved ineffective during the revolt. This perception was 
initiated by Abercromby’s comments earlier that year, and reinforced by later 
criticism from Camden and others within the army, such as Sir John Moore. Camden 
had little confidence in his commander-in-chief, which may have attributed to Lake’s 
actions against with the rebels: ‘General Lake is not fit to command in these difficult 
times…He has no arrangement, is easily led, and no authority…I am sure you must be 
aware how very unpleasantly circumstanced I am without a commander-in-chief upon 
whom I have the most perfect reliance.’477 Other generals were berated for their lack 
of aggression against the insurgents, especially by loyalists who suffered at the hands 
of the rebels. Major General Sir Ralph Dundas was heavily criticised by the 
Ascendancy for his strategic decision to withdraw his scattered detachments in 
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Kildare to concentrate at Naas when the rebellion first erupted.478 This ensured that 
the whole of the county was abandoned to the rebels who were able to target the 
unprotected Protestant gentry. With the benefit of hindsight the criticism against 
Dundas was understandable. However, at the time he was not aware of the general 
failure of the United Irish and had prudently decided to concentrate his troops rather 
than leave them exposed in isolated positions where they could have been annihilated 
by overwhelming superior numbers, especially as Camden had refused to send 
reinforcements from Dublin. His greatest censure came when on 28 May he 
negotiated generous, but unauthorised terms for the surrender of 6,000 insurgents at 
Gibbet Rath.479 He was ridiculed for such humane actions by Lake, who on 24 May 
had ordered no prisoners to be taken, as well as the vengeful Ascendant population 
who were clearly seeking a more brutal end to the uprising.480 Other officers to suffer 
public criticism were Major General Fawcett, who led a column from Duncannon Fort 
to relieve Wexford town, but was ambushed and hastily retreated, making no further 
advances into rebel-held territory, while Major General Johnson was described by 
Cornwallis as being ‘no soldier.’481 However, the comment regarding Johnson seems 
somewhat unjustified considering it was he who rallied the panicking militia at New 
Ross and inflicted a major defeat on the United Irish.  
Ultimately, the high command of the Irish establishment proved competent 
enough to crush the rebellion. Justified criticism has been aimed at Lake for causing 
much disaffection amongst the population prior to the uprising through his brutal 
disarming campaigns, as well as encouraging many rebels to continue to fight by 
authorising atrocities during and after the uprising. However, he managed to 
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formulate the successful strategy of containment that led to the defeat of the revolt in 
Wexford, using mainly the inexperienced and semi-trained militia and fencibles that 
made up the majority of the military force in Ireland at the time. Some of his 
subordinates forged admirable military reputations during the rebellion, especially 
Brigadier General John Moore who was later knighted and promoted for his recapture 
of Wexford town. Cornwallis was so impressed with Moore that he gave him 
independent command of the elite force used to combat the small insurgent groups 
who had retreated into the Wicklow Mountains once the main rebel army had been 
destroyed in Wexford.482 Major General George Nugent also proved himself worthy 
of high praise with his swift and total destruction of the United Irish armies in Antrim 
and Down within a week. Others, such as General Sir James Duff and General Sir 
James Craig were commended by Lake and members of the Ascendancy for their zeal 
in leading counter-insurgent operations, which although merciless, proved effective in 
extinguishing the rebellion in the areas they commanded.483 
The British government proved effective in preventing the revolt of 1798 from 
becoming as widespread as a similar insurrection mounted by the Royalists of the 
Vendee in France. The eighteenth-century British army was generally not well-suited 
or equipped for counter-insurgent operations, being numerically small and with 
training restricted to musket and formation drill specific to linear warfare. 
Nonetheless, Dublin Castle had succeeded in weakening the military potential of the 
United Irish through mass arrests and the seizure of arms during the counter-insurgent 
operations of 1797-1798, especially in Ulster where weapons had been retained by 
previous members of volunteer associations. Dublin Castle had also succeeded in 
penetrating the United Irish movement by cultivating an intelligence network that 
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provided details of planned actions.484 This ensured that pre-emptive strikes could be 
made against the cause, such as the arrest of the Leinster executive committee, which 
would seriously hinder rebel success. Information regarding the planned uprising also 
ensured that government troops could be concentrated in strength at locations targeted 
by the insurgents, such as prominent government buildings in Dublin. Certainly, the 
failure of United Irish to gain widespread active support throughout the country 
limited the chance of the rising to becoming a national revolution, thus limiting its 
likelihood of success. When the rebellion came the government troops quickly 
isolated and defeated the rebel forces, thus preventing the revolt from spreading and 
discouraging others from rising in support. The ability to make good use of secure 
internal sea links through the Irish Sea ensured reinforcements available from Britain 
could be sent within a short time, although only several regiments had arrived prior to 
the rebellion being effectively crushed at Vinegar Hill. However, the rapid influx of 
units from Britain ensured that Cornwallis had a large enough army to easily surround 
and defeat the small French invasion force led by General Humbert at Ballinamuck, 
County Longford, on 8 September the same year.   
The rebellion was characterised by atrocities committed by both the rebels and 
government forces, contributing to thousands of deaths of surrendering antagonists 
and non-combatants. The precise number of people killed during the uprising and the 
subsequent invasion by the French could never be established due to the high number 
of civilians involved. The nature of the United Irish peasant armies meant that there 
were no regular military formations where muster roles would have provided an exact 
number of combatants and casualties. Therefore, the most accurate estimation of the 
number of lives lost during the conflicts is provided by contemporary records and 
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observation made by those who witnessed the events. The estimation of the total 
number of those killed varies from 20-30,000, although many historians now tend to 
accept a figure of 25,000 as being realistic.485 This became the bloodiest civil conflict 
in Ireland since the Civil Wars of the 1640s and 1650s, and the Williamite War of 
1689-1693. When comparing the official casualty figures provided for the Irish 
government forces to the estimated total deaths during the uprising and French 
invasion, it is clear that the vast majority of those killed were either civilian insurgents 
or non-combatants. The number of those killed in battle is easily accounted for by the 
number of bodies recovered and disposed of. However, it is impossible to account for 
the thousands of civilians, both Catholic and Protestant, who were slaughtered 
indiscriminately while attempting to escape from the conflict or who had the 
misfortune of living in the location where the rebellion erupted. 
Numerous atrocities during the uprising were initially inspired by the actions 
of government troops during the disarming campaigns, as well as religious fervour 
and fear promoted by both the Ascendancy and the republicans.486 News of such 
events quickly spread, fostering a hardening of attitudes and promoting a sense of 
desperation amongst the belligerents. Heinous acts were repeatedly committed by 
factions who now saw the conflict as a struggle for survival, typical of civil wars 
where the normal rules of society are disregarded. The temporary eviction of 
government troops from Wexford allowed many rebels to seek vengeance for past 
oppression by attacking and murdering loyalist gentry and citizens who had been held 
prisoner in the town gaol.487 News that troops at New Ross had hanged or shot every 
rebel they had found created hysteria in Wexford that led to the massacre of 97 
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loyalist men and women prisoners at the town bridge by a republican mob.488 The 
other most notorious rebel atrocity occurred at Scullabogue on the day the United 
Irish were defeated at New Ross, where more than 100 loyalist prisoners, including 
women and children, and some Catholics, were burned in a barn after 35 men had 
already been shot in front of their families.489 Such incidents only promoted further 
murderous activity which ensured that the majority of deaths were suffered by non-
combatant from both sides. 
However, some atrocities committed by government troops had been given 
official sanction. Lake’s order of 24 May that no rebel prisoners were to be taken 
during the military operations became common knowledge throughout the kingdom 
ensuring that quarter was seldom given by either side. The rebellion now became a 
conflict where only the complete eradication of the enemy forces would ensure 
victory. The eighteenth century was dubbed as the ‘age of reason’ where unwritten 
rules of war were accepted by civilised European states.490 The voluntary ‘laws of 
nations’ that were the accepted rules of conduct of between warring European states,  
prohibited measures that were themselves unlawful, including the massacre of an 
enemy who had surrendered.491In the 1798 rebellion these rules were ignored by 
many within the Irish military establishment, especially the yeomanry, who zealously 
followed Lake’s lead. An example was General Duff who authorised the massacre of 
350 rebel prisoners at Gibbet Rath on 31 May after they had already negotiated terms 
with General Dundas.492 This was followed by the standard practice of dispatching all 
rebel wounded found on the battlefield, as well as the indiscriminate execution of 
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insurgent suspects.493 Such actions were vigorously carried out by government troops 
at Vinegar Hill, where the rebel hospital in nearby Enniscorthy was burned while the 
wounded were still inside.494  These practices that were promoted by Lake were 
considered ruthless by many of his contemporaries, with Cornwallis giving a clear 
indication of the state of affairs in a letter to the duke of Portland on his arrival in 
Ireland: ‘The accounts that you see of the numbers of the enemy destroyed in every 
action, are, I conclude, greatly exaggerated; from my own knowledge of military 
affairs, I am sure that a very small proportion of them only could be killed in battle, 
and I am much afraid that any man in a brown coat who is found within several miles 
of the field of action, is butchered without discrimination.’495 
The responsibility of the atrocities committed by the government forces, 
including the militia, during the rebellion and subsequent French invasion lies with 
the high command. Lake’s orders, especially in regard to the order to refuse quarter to 
surrendering rebels at Ballinamuck, were certainly in breach of these principles and it 
could be argued that his directive removed all culpability from his subordinates and 
troops for their murderous actions. According to these rules of war, a general had the 
right to sacrifice the lives of his enemy to ensure his safety and that of his own men if 
he was dealing with an inhumane foe who frequently commits ‘enormities.’496 This 
authorised him to refuse quarter to some of his prisoners and to treat them as his 
people have been treated. However, unlike the earlier United Irish uprising, the 
discipline of the French forces during the failed invasion had ensured very few 
atrocities were committed by their rebel allies.497 It is clear that Lake certainly 
believed that the rebellion seriously threatened the survival of the Ascendancy, and 
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that the uncivilised actions of some of the rebels placed him in such a position: ‘I 
really feel most severely being obliged to order so many men out of the world; but I 
am convinced, if severe and many examples are not made, the Rebellion cannot be put 
to a stop.’498 Certainly, the generals were within their rights to order the destruction of 
homes and property of known insurgents and supporters if by depriving them of their 
property they were weakening the enemy in order to render him incapable of 
supporting unjust violence and depriving the rebels of means of resistance.499 
 However, the deaths of so many women, children and sick and feeble old 
men, who were either camp followers or had the misfortune of living in areas of 
insurrection, was unjustifiable. Lake’s attitude towards the rebels was a reflection of 
the belligerent sentiment of the Ascendancy which had resulted from insurgent 
activity prior to the uprising, with his order to refuse quarter to rebel prisoners being 
made before the alleged atrocities of the rebel mobs had been committed. There is no 
doubt that the indiscipline of some of the government troops, as well as that of the 
insurgent armies, would have led to some atrocities being carried out by both sides. 
However, although much blame was conveniently aimed at the ill-discipline of the 
Irish militia, the ultimate liability lies with their commander-in-chief. During this 
period the ‘Law of Nations’ removed any accountability from the officers and soldiers 
as they were considered as instruments of war for the sovereign and state, where they 
executed his will and not their own.500 However, in the case of the Irish Rebellion of 
1798 the responsibility of the systematic butchering of rebel suspects and prisoners 
lies directly with Lake. The orders that he issued were of his own volition and had not 
been sanctioned by the crown. It could be argued that Camden must share some 
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responsibility, as his weakness at preventing such measures resulted in both he and 
Lake being replaced by Lord Cornwallis in late June, before the rebellion had finally 
been extinguished. 
The opposite approach taken by Cornwallis towards the insurgents led to a less 
blood-thirsty end to the rebellion. When he took office as the lord-lieutenant and 
commander-in-chief of the armed forces in Ireland on 22 June 1798 he was convinced 
the actions promoted by Lake had left the rebels with no other option but to remain 
fighting: ‘The violence of our friends, and their folly in endeavouring to make it a 
religious war, added to the ferocity of our troops who delight in murder, most 
powerfully counteract all plans of conciliation.’501 By this time the rebellion was 
restricted to guerrilla-style warfare in the Wicklow Mountains. In an attempt to end 
hostilities he directed General Moore and a force of regular troops that he could 
depend on to confront the rebels to ‘try either to seduce them or invite them to 
surrender, for the shocking barbarity of our national troops would be more likely to 
provoke rebellion than to suppress it.’502 However, Cornwallis firmly believed that 
the system of counter-terror carried out by the government forces was led by t
Protestant Ascendancy who were adverse to all acts of clemency. This belief was 
reinforced during the French invasion, when General Lake who as a firm supporter of 
the Ascendancy, ordered that no quarter be given to the Irish rebels who were 
attempting to surrender with their French allies at Ballinamuck on 8 September.
he 
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destruction of the country.504 Ultimately, it was Cornwallis’s humane and just 
treatment of those insurgents remaining under arms after Vinegar Hill and 
Ballinamuck, but who had later surrendered, that convinced many insurgents to lay 
down their arms.  
The unsuccessful French invasion of Ireland in the same year was an ill-
advised and maverick campaign that provided nothing more than an epilogue to the 
1798 rebellion. When the United Irishmen launched their uprising in May of that year, 
their hope was that the insurrection would prompt the French to send an invasion 
force of regular troops needed to promote their success. However, when the long-
awaited expedition did arrive, it proved to be too little and too late for the rebel cause 
that had effectively been destroyed at Vinegar Hill. Dublin Castle was shocked when 
news of the landing reached the capital, but at the time the Irish army had sufficient 
strength to defeat such a small force. The subsequent defeat of the government force 
at Castlebar, County Mayo, was an embarrassment to the crown and did cause 
concern within the kingdom, but without reinforcements and the promised general 
uprising of the Irish peasantry, the French and their Irish allies were doomed to defeat. 
However, a lasting consequence of the campaign was the permanently tarnished 
reputation of the Irish militia. Revisionist historians such as Nelson and Bartlett argue 
that this perpetual memory of the corps, especially in regard to the reports of 
militiamen deserting to the enemy, was politically motivated by the Protestant 
Ascendancy who were untrusting and fearful of armed Catholics who potentially 
threatened the current social order in the kingdom.505 Such attitudes subsequently led 
to major changes in the military establishment in Ireland. 
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The element of surprise ensured initial success for the French invasion. On 22 
August 1798 a fleet of three frigates and one corvette carried a small French army into 
Killala Bay, County Mayo. Initially meant more as a reconnaissance force for an 
intended larger army that was still gathering in France, the number landed was 
certainly insufficient to pose a major threat to the Irish government. Under the 
experienced command of General Jean Joseph Humbert, the French force comprised 
888 infantrymen (mainly of the 70th demi-brigade), 42 artillerymen, 57 cavalry 
troopers (mostly of the 3rd Chasseurs a cheval) and 35 staff.506 The French had been 
militarily unprepared to offer substantial support when the United Irish had risen in 
May; their navy was weak, finance was limited and a large number of their available 
forces were already earmarked for Bonaparte’s expedition to Egypt. Due mainly to 
the promises of the Irish republican, Wolfe Tone, that a French invasion would be 
supported by a general uprising, plans were hastily formulated for an 8,000 man 
expedition to be led by General Hardy.507 However, political intrigue within the 
French Directory, possibly promoted by Count d’Antraigues who was receiving 
payments from Pitt’s secret service, ensured the withholding of the necessary funds to 
mount the large-scale operation.508 Subsequently, Humbert embarked without waiting 
for Hardy’s troops and after escaping detection by the Royal Navy successfully 
landed unopposed at the isolated coastal village of Killala. Humbert’s rash actions 
jeopardised the success of the whole venture, with the news of his landing leading to 
the forfeiture of surprise and tightening of the naval blockade of the French coast that 
hindered Hardy from providing the necessary reinforcements. 
Although Humbert proved successful in defeating the initial forces sent to 
oppose him, he was effectively leading a ‘Forlorn Hope’. Victory in a skirmish at 
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Ballina with a small force of local yeomanry opened the way for the French to march 
further into the interior. On 27 August Humbert routed 1,700 troops under Lake’s 
command at Castlebar, which caused major embarrassment to the military 
establishment.509 Humbert immediately set up a provisional government in the town, 
which according to his second-in-command, General Jean Sarrazin, was mainly for 
the purpose of providing bread for the troops.510 The French remained in the town for 
nine days awaiting news of a landing by Hardy and were disappointed with the small 
number of disaffected Irishmen that had joined them. Without receiving any 
reinforcements from France and with news of four columns of government troops, 
amounting to 11,000 men, converging on his position, Humbert was now on the 
defensive. He was convinced by Sarrazin that their best option was to march into the 
interior to support the insurgents who had risen in counties Westmeath and Longford, 
before continuing their march onto Dublin with the intention of releasing imprisoned 
United Irish leaders.511 On 4 September, the day before Cornwallis began his advance 
on Castlebar from Hollymount, less than twenty miles to the south, Humbert led a 
column of 840 Frenchmen, 600 Irish and four cannon, north toward Ulster.512 
Marching in this direction was meant as a ruse de guerre to convince Cornwallis to 
directly follow, ensuring that Humbert would not be outflanked before crossing the 
river Shannon.513 At Collooney, County Sligo, a skirmish took place where the 
Limerick Militia were routed after they had attempted to intercept the invading force. 
This proved to be a pyrrhic victory for the French who not only sustained 40 
casualties, but who were now hotly pursued by the converging crown troops.514 Three 
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days later, after a forced march of 120 miles, the exhausted French column was finally 
surrounded at Ballinamuck, County Longford, where they were forced to surrender 
after putting up some token resistance. 
Three main factors determined the failure of the French invasion. Firstly, the 
inability of the French to effectively coordinate the simultaneous landing of all the 
troops allocated for the campaign hindered any chance of success. The force of 8,000 
experienced men intended for the invasion would have posed a serious military threat 
to Dublin Castle, who could only rely on the few regular regiments that had remained 
in the kingdom after being sent from Britain during the rebellion.515 An even larger 
expedition under the command of Irish-born, General Kilmaine, was being gathered at 
Brest to reinforce Hardy, and had it actually sailed to Ireland, avoiding the naval 
blockade, the French would have been able to field an army of nearly 20,000 
experienced troops.516 However, the French plan was flawed through the near 
impossibility of having the separate forces embarking from Rochefort, Dunkirk and 
Brest converging on the west coast of Ireland at the same time. The weather 
determined when the fleets could sail and then they had to negotiate the blockade of 
the Royal Navy. Secondly, the location of the landing was unsuitable. The province of 
Connacht was the least likely region to rise in support of the invasion. Although there 
was widespread sympathy for the rebel cause, the United Irish were poorly organised 
in the western counties, with the Catholic Defenders very weak as a result of 
Carhampton’s counter-insurgent measures in 1795.517 The French were reliant on the 
population rising up against the government not only to provide an auxiliary force to 
augment their army, but also to ensure the dispersal of crown troops to counter 
insurrection. The third factor that finally sealed the fate of the French invasion was 
                                                 




the ability of the Royal Navy to intercept the subsequent French fleets carrying 
reinforcements. On 12 October a British naval squadron under Admiral Warren 
engaged a French fleet commanded by Admiral Bompard near Lough Swilly, 
Donegal. Bompard was carrying General Hardy and a force of 3,000 men, which was 
the largest of the expeditionary forces sent to Ireland. Six of the nine French ships 
were taken, along with Wolfe Tone, the United Irishman who had been instrumental 
in persuading the French to invade. Four days before the surrender at Ballinamuck, a 
small expedition of only 270 grenadiers had sailed from Dunkirk, which included 
another Irish republican, Napper Tandy. However, by the time the fleet had reached 
Rutland, County Donegal on 16 September, news of Humbert’s surrender resulted in 
its immediate return to France and the abandonment of Kilmaine’s reinforcing 
expedition. Depending on what could be captured through invasion, realistically, the 
dominance of the Royal Navy would have made the resupply of any sizable French 
force in Ireland near impossible, ensuring its isolation and eventual defeat. 
The increase in the military establishment of Ireland during the rebellion 
ensured Cornwallis’s defeat of the French invasion. Camden’s repeated calls for 
reinforcements during the uprising had led to an influx of British regular, fencible and 
militia regiments into the kingdom. At the time of the French landing Cornwallis had 
approximately 100,000 men under his command in Ireland, although only 10,000 
were regulars. News of the invasion ensured that another 10,000 were sent from 
Britain in September, but the French had been defeated before most had arrived.518 
The inexperienced militia, fencibles and yeomanry remained the greater part of the 
government force available to meet the threat. The most professional element of 
Cornwallis’s force was the Royal Irish Artillery which consisted of a battalion of ‘six-
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pounder’ cannon that had a round-shot range of 600-800 metres. These guns proved 
most effective in engaging and dispersing the enemy well before they could get into 
musket range.  
It was the ability to coordinate and concentrate superior forces that ensured 
victory for Cornwallis. When Humbert landed at Killala, the government had less than 
4,000 troops in Connacht, and those they had were mainly militia and yeomanry 
under the command of General Hutchinson.519 In a rash move, and against the orders 
of Cornwallis, Hutchinson divided his forces and marched from Galway with a 
combined force of 1,700 men to take up a position at Castlebar in an effort to gain 
intelligence regarding the movements of the enemy.520 The new lord-lieutenant had 
dispatched General Lake to take command of the government troops west of the River 
Shannon, and he arrived at Castlebar on 26 August, the night before the French attack. 
By this time, Cornwallis himself was heading towards Connacht with a column of 
7,000 men hoping to engage the French only once he had reinforced Lake.521 
However, as a result of Humbert’s victory at Castlebar, the commander-in-chief had 
to formulate a new strategy that involved the convergence of three columns to 
surround the invaders. Cornwallis then ordered General Nugent to march to 
Enniskillen to prevent Humbert from moving into Ulster, while he directed General 
Hewitt to assemble the available troops from the south and east at Portumna to create 
a blocking force to prevent any movement on Dublin. Cornwallis took control of the 
offensive in the west and followed the French, hoping to prevent them crossing the 
Shannon. A light force commanded by Colonel Robert Craufurd, constantly harried 
the French column from the rear, leading to exhausting forced marches by the French 
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which eventually led to a break down on morale.522 Although Cornwallis was 
criticised in some quarters, especially from prominent members of the Ascendancy 
with whom he had previously clashed, for initially being too timid in his handling of 
the campaign, his strategy proved effective. The French were defeated and captured at 
Ballinamuck on 8 September, only eighteen days after they had landed, while the few 
Irish rebels that rose in support of the invasion had either been killed, captured or 
dispersed. This second defeat, coupled with the oppressive mopping-up operations, 
proved devastating for the republican cause, with the enduring images and 
experiences of death and destruction remaining with an Irish population that never 
again challenged the might of the military establishment in open combat until the 
Easter Rising of 1916, more than a century later. 
The atrocities committed by the government forces in the rebellion were 
repeated during the French invasion campaign. Unlike the earlier uprising, the French 
received minimal popular support. The insurgents that did rise up were mainly 
restricted to around 600-700 rebels that joined Humbert when he landed at Killala, 
followed by around 3,000 after the victory at Castlebar, which included some 
militiamen and yeomen.523 However, apart from the few middle-class Catholics, such 
as James MacDonnell, who were made officers, the majority of rebels were of poor 
peasant stock and prone to desertion. A small number of rebels also enlisted in the 
French force when the column marched into the interior, while several thousand had 
risen up in Counties Longford and Westmeath hoping to link up with Humbert. Once 
defeated, the French were humanely treated as prisoners of war, especially the officers 
who were paroled and entertained in Dublin. However, the Irish officers, including 
those officially in the French army, such as Humbert’s adjutant, Bartholomew 
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Teeling, were treated as traitors and subsequently executed, mostly without trial. At 
Ballinamuck, General Lake promoted the slaughter of the Irish levies by encouraging 
the cavalry to run the rebels down instead of accepting their surrender.524 Captain 
Pakenham, the lieutenant-general of the government ordnance, told the rebels to run 
before they were cut down but the warning came too late. Of the 1,000 rebels still 
with the French at the time of surrender over 200 were indiscriminately killed while 
either trying to surrender or attempting to escape.525 However, about 90 insurgents 
were taken prisoner on the battlefield only to be executed a short time later, including 
nine deserters from the Longford Militia who had joined the French at Castlebar.526 
Prior to this the rebels in the midlands suffered the same fate. On 5 September at 
Wilson’s Hospital, near Longford, more than 200 rebels were hunted down and killed 
by a force of local yeomanry and Highland fencibles while the insurgents were 
negotiating a surrender, while at Granard an unsuccessful attack on the garrison led to 
a rout of the rebels and the massacre of more than 400 insurgents, many of them while 
attempting to surrender.527 The bloodshed continued with the end of the campaign in 
County Mayo, where 400 rebels were sabred to death by fencible cavalry in the streets 
of Killala on 23 September after their attempts to surrender were refused.528 
Subsequently, the zeal of the military forces, especially the yeomanry, ensured that 
many innocent civilians, including women, children and priests, became victims of an 
unofficial counter-insurgent policy of extermination that remains a stain on the 
reputation of the Irish army of the period. 
Ultimately, the defeat of the rebellion and the French invasion marked a 
turning point in the military establishment of Ireland. The violent times had ensured 
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that attitudes had hardened with sectarianism coming to the fore. The Protestant 
Ascendancy would no longer tolerate the defence of the kingdom being left to the 
militia, which was seen by many as providing the Catholic peasantry with the means 
to rise again. The uprising and subsequent invasion had ensured that the British 
government were determined to maintain the security of Ireland as part of the defence 
of Britain, which necessitated political dominance from London through an act of 
union. Ireland was now to be not only a major recruiting ground for the expanding 
armed forces of Britain, but it was to be turned into a military bastion that would 


































            Chapter 6  
 
Outcomes from 1798 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to bring into context the post-rebellion policies 
of Britain concerning Ireland. In short, there is compelling primary source evidence 
that proves that the British government believed it could not rely on the defence of 
Ireland by the Irish, and that it systematically established a military occupation of the 
kingdom. John Cookson points to this in his book The British Armed Nation, 1793-
1815, using evidence of troop numbers and increased infrastructure, such as barrack 
building to prove this. Such data proves compelling when compared with official 
correspondence between Cornwallis and the Home Office. This chapter provides a 
more comprehensive analysis of the post-rebellion policies concerning Ireland than 
Cookson has been able to provide in his work that concentrates more on the defence 
of Britain. Cookson is of the view that the militia interchange system was a deliberate 
policy instigated to reduce the number of armed Catholics in Ireland, which in effect 
resulted in a Protestant ‘armed hegemony’.529 However, although this may have been 
favoured by the Ascendancy, there is no surviving official correspondence that 
confirms this theory. What has become obvious through close examination of relevant 
documents, such as regiment returns and personal correspondence, is that Irish 
Catholics proved to be loyal to the crown and became an important facet of the British 
military forces, despite negative propaganda fostered by the Ascendancy. What is also 
apparent, and not part of the traditional historiography promoted by either nineteenth-
century Ascendancy or British historians, is that the Irish yeomanry were not fully 
trusted by the British administration, due to the potential power of the para-military 
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organisation, and that the military occupation of Ireland was as much to keep the 
corps in check as it was to defend against Catholic insurrection or French invasion.    
The upheavals of 1798 were to have a lasting effect on the military 
establishment of Ireland. Post-rebellion politics heavily influenced the composition 
and use of the armed forces in the kingdom, with the Act of Union bringing Ireland 
under the direct control of the Westminster parliament in 1801. The importance of 
Ireland in the overall security of Britain was more appreciated during the wars with 
France, where the kingdom was perceived acutely as the soft-underbelly in the 
defence of the realm. The potential for invasion and the constant fear of renewed 
insurrection prompted Pitt and Cornwallis to convince the various factions within the 
Irish society that their interests would now best be served by being governed from 
London. Surprisingly, it was the mistrusted Catholic population that gave the greatest 
support to the Union, with the Protestant Ascendancy hesitant to relinquish political 
control.530 However, it was the Act of Union that eventually brought greater stability 
to the country, while strengthening the position of the Protestant minority. This came 
about by the rapid augmentation of the yeomanry through the mobilization of the 
Protestant male population, which in effect supplanted the role of the militia in the 
garrison. The political and sectarian-motivated attitudes which led to the poor 
reputation that the Irish Militia had been labelled with from the events of 1798 
ensured that this force could not be trusted by the Ascendancy and government in the 
defence of the kingdom. This ensured that the militia was now seen as an institution 
for providing semi-trained recruits to the regular army or relegated to provide 
garrisons where loyal forces could supervise them. Ireland became a major source of 
military manpower, especially when the threat of invasion lessened after 1805 and 
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with the renewed determination of the Irish Catholics to prove their loyalty to the 
crown ensuring little support for any future attempted uprising, such as Emmet’s 
rebellion in 1803.531 British regular, fencible (until 1802) and militia regiments were 
continually posted and rotated throughout Ireland post-1798 to counter the perceived 
unreliability of the militia, ensuring that in effect the Catholic population were placed 
under the military occupation of Protestant forces. 
The most significant political response to the events of 1798 was the Act of 
Union. Ireland was in a state of chaos that was seen to threaten the security of Britain. 
British Prime Minister, William Pitt and his supporters were of the opinion that it was 
better to have the kingdom included in the British state and governed from a single 
parliament than to allow the continuation of a neighbouring semi-independent state, 
whose volatile domestic issues and poor state of defence seriously compromised the 
defence of the realm.532 Pitt was hopeful that by drawing Ireland into the British 
union the power of the Irish Ascendancy could be broken, leading to a greater 
inclusion of Catholics and Presbyterian dissenters in the political process through 
emancipation which he had indicated would occur through the union, thus, ultimately 
ensuring less internal tension.533 The violence and destruction experienced in the 
rebellion and French invasion ensured that more factions within Irish society were 
now amenable to a union with Britain. Pitt had gained general Catholic support for the 
move by indicating full emancipation for Catholics under the union, an entitlement 
that they were unlikely to receive from the Ascendancy, especially in the wake of the 
uprising which had seen the total destruction of the independence movement. Yet, the 
move also gained support from many Protestants who preferred a reduction in their 
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political powers and the protection of Britain rather than face further domestic 
insurrection and invasion.534 However, not all of the Irish oligarchy favoured 
surrendering their power, especially those members of Orange orders who were 
against the franchising of the Catholic majority. In January 1799, just four months 
after the last action of the campaign against the French invasion force, the Irish 
parliament rejected the proposed union. Determined to see the Act of Union come into 
force, Pitt, assisted by Cornwallis and his chief secretary, Lord Castlereagh, used 
bribery and bullying tactics to ensure they gained sufficient support in the Irish 
parliament for the bill to proceed.535 This ensured that the Act was passed when the 
government next debated the issue on 15 January 1800, where the vote resulted in 138 
members supporting the move with 98 opposing it.536 The parliament had voted itself 
out of existence with the Act of Union taking effect on 1 January 1801, ensuring 
Ireland was now completely controlled from London. 
                                                
The events of 1798 and the Act of Union led to military repercussions in 
Ireland. The most significant was the rise in the dominance of the yeomanry. Thomas 
Bartlett argues that the continued insurgency from 1798 and 1803, which ended with 
the failure of Emmet’s rebellion in Dublin in July 1803 and the subsequent surrender 
of Michael Dwyer and his followers, prompted a vital change in the composition of 
the military force that was to garrison and police the kingdom.537 In the aftermath of 
the rebellion the yeomanry increasingly replaced the militia in the vanguard of the 
defence force, where internal security remained the main priority. This shift in 
military policy was not through any official directive but more from necessity and a 
lack of faith in the loyalty and capabilities of the militia. As a professional soldier, 
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Cornwallis was angered and reluctant to have to rely on a yeomanry force that he 
perceived as ill-disciplined and lacking in training: ‘these men have saved this 
country, but now they take the lead in rapine and murder.’538 However, the yeomanry 
were militarily essential in the defence of Ireland in a period when the demand for 
regular regiments in foreign campaigns ensured that very few were posted to the Irish 
establishment. Those units that were sent to the kingdom were generally numerically 
weak, where it was intended that they recruit up to strength before embarking for 
other service.539 A proposal for militia interchange with Britain was on the agenda 
soon after 1798 but was initially rejected due to the anti-Catholic attitude of the 
king.540 Unwilling to rely on the Irish militia and without a substantial number of 
regular troops to count on, the lord lieutenant was forced to become reliant on the 
Protestant yeomanry at a time when problems of rising sectarianism in Ireland were 
secondary to the greater military needs of Britain. 
 
Date Cavalry Infantry 
 
Dec.  1796 10,000 10,000 
Dec.  1797 18-20,000 15-17,000 
May  1798 15,000 21,000 
         1799 13,000 53,000 
Oct.  1801 10,000 40,000 
Dec. 1803   9,000 57,000 
Dec. 1804   7,000 52,000 
Dec. 1805   8,000 58,000 
Dec. 1806   6,000 53,000 
Dec. 1807   7,000 50,000 
Mar. 1810   9,000 71,000 
Dec. 1815      100 43,000 
 
Table 6.1 - Yeomanry Cavalry and Infantry Numbers, 1796-1815 
 
(Source: Blackstock, An Ascendancy Army, p. 116) 
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The rapid augmentation of the yeomanry post-1798 made it the largest 
element of the Irish military establishment. When the rebellion erupted in May 1798 
the official number of men enlisted in the yeomanry was 50,000, which included 
15,000 cavalrymen.541 However, the perceived threat of invasion, but more 
importantly the constant fear of rebellion, ensured that yeoman numbers continued to 
increase after the crisis of 1798. There was some fluctuation in numbers, mainly due 
to the short-lived peace treaty of Amiens, but by 1810 the yeomanry had reached its 
greatest strength, amounting to 85,000 effectives.542 The greatest period of 
augmentation took place under Henry Addington’s administration which restored only 
a numerically small Irish militia, but increased the yeomanry from 45,000 in 450 
individual corps to 80,000 in 800 corps by 1804.543 However, experience during 1798 
led to a change in the structure of the corps (Table 6.1). Prior to the rebellion the 
yeomanry consisted of a high proportion of cavalry, but these proved unsuitable 
against the rebel pikemen who inflicted high casualties on the mounted yeomen. The 
cost of maintaining such a large number of cavalrymen also proved prohibitive for the 
government and local gentry, ensuring that yeomanry corps was increasingly made up 
of infantrymen from as early as 1799. An examination of available returns provide 
evidence of this: in May 1798 the yeomanry corps consisted of 15,000 cavalry and 
21,000 infantry; in 1799 there were 13,000 cavalrymen and 53,000 infantrymen, 
while by 1810 the yeomanry consisted of only 9,000 cavalry but included 71,000 
infantry.544 And although the force was truly a national institution with corps being 
established in every county, city and major town throughout the kingdom, the largest 
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concentration of yeomen remained in Ulster which had 36,782 enlisted yeomen in 
1810.545 By this time, and mainly in response to the rebellion, the yeomanry was 
almost exclusively Protestant, with Catholics being purged from many corps due to 
their perceived unreliability.546 In effect, the yeomanry had now become the 
established military arm of the Ascendancy who were determined to maintain control 
over the Catholic population. 
The yeomanry became an integral part of the home defence strategy for 
Ireland in the years 1798 to 1815. When Cornwallis took office as commander-in-
chief in 1798 he formulated a new plan for the defence of the kingdom. This involved 
dividing the army into five separate military districts where the available units were to 
be brigaded into stationary and movable forces. It was intended that these troops were 
to be engaged in normal garrison duties, but could be rapidly concentrated to counter 
any invasion force.547 The yeomanry became part of the stationary force where 
individual corps came together to form infantry battalions and cavalry squadrons. 
Cornwallis considered the yeomanry unfit for field service with regular units and 
intended that these formations be used to occupy strategic strongpoints, bridges, 
passes and supply depots.548 In the case of insurrection the yeomanry were primarily 
intended to defend their immediate locality in the first instance. This policy 
emphasized the main feature of the corps as a military force in that it had a vested 
interest in local defence where propertied Protestants were most likely to be the first 
victims of any rising. 
Essentially, during the post-rebellion period, the yeomanry established itself as 
an important armed political force. With the militia being tainted with the 
                                                 
545 Abstract of Yeomanry Inspection Report, 24 March 1810 (National Archives, HO 100/155) 
546 Hill, p. 1057 
547 Ross, p. 298 
548 Ibid., p. 73 
 191
unjustifiable reputation of being disloyal and unreliable, the government and the 
gentry became reliant on the yeomanry to maintain the rule of law through power and 
control. This was formalised through the Irish Yeomanry Act of 1802 that legalised 
the continuation of the yeomanry during times of peace, ensuring the Ascendancy had 
a permanent armed formation to protect their interests.549 This strengthened the 
political position of the Protestant gentry who established a greater relationship with 
the government through ties of patronage, political expediency and mutual inter-
dependence. The British government became reliant on the yeomanry to maintain law 
and order, where the corps functioned as a deterrent and whose very existence meant 
a constant local armed presence. An example of this was the period from 1803 to 
1805 when martial law was enforced as a result of Emmet’s failed coup.550 However, 
this relationship with the government had a negative impact for Irish Catholics whose 
support for the union in the hope of emancipation was in vain. The political strength 
of the Ascendancy was maintained through the government reliance on the yeomanry, 
with any move to alter this balance gaining minimal support. This ensured Irish 
Catholics remained disenfranchised for a further two decades. 
The increase in size of the yeomanry directly corresponded with the rapid 
growth of the Orange orders. Although initially wary of the radicalism of the various 
loyalist lodges, Dublin Castle had agreed to the incorporation of the societies into 
newly raised yeomanry corps early in 1798 prior to the rebellion when insurgent 
activities where becoming increasingly violent.551 During the uprising and the years 
following the yeomanry proved to have self-discipline and were effective when 
defending their own property, but were often ‘licentious’ when attacking property of 
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others, especially Catholics and dissenters.552 Such behaviour can be understood 
when examining the ethos that the Orangemen brought to the organisation. Irish 
society had been polarised by the violence of the 1790s leading to the rise in 
sectarianism. The incorporation of the Orange factions into the yeomanry further 
fostered the growth of loyalism and Orange traditions in the corps through memories 
of the Williamite wars of the 1690s.553 This led to the rise in ‘popular loyalism’ 
throughout the Protestant population, with the yeomanry providing an opportunity to 
revive the self-defence traditions that had been stifled through the abolition of the 
volunteer movement in 1793. Blackstock estimates that when the yeomanry reached 
its zenith circa 1810 the Protestant population of Ireland was approximately one 
million, which included 500,000 males of all ages.554 Taking into consideration that 
the official strength of the corps was 80,000 at this time, this indicates that one in six 
of Protestant males were enlisted in the yeomanry. John Cookson’s estimation that 
one-in-three of all Protestant males fit for military service joined the yeomanry seems 
reasonable when considering those who would have been excluded due to age, illness 
and deformities, and that age structure of the time indicated that about one-third of the 
population was aged between 18 and 45.555 Strong social and religious links bound 
the yeomen through blood and kin, where the need to protect family and home 
determined excessive behaviour towards the perceived enemy. Attitudes had hardened 
from experience of the uprising, with many loyalists viewing the rebellion as a purely 
religious war, where victory over the Catholic peasantry was seen by some as divine 
intervention in securing the survival of the true faith.556 
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Ultimately, the yeomanry became the military expression of the Protestant 
state where it symbolized the physical embodiment and security of the Ascendancy.  
With the denial of Catholic emancipation in 1800, which was reaffirmed throughout 
the Napoleonic wars and after, Dublin Castle became exclusively committed to the 
dominance of the Protestant population.  During this era the term ‘loyal’ became 
synonymous with Protestantism and the Ascendancy, while ‘disaffected’ meant 
Catholic and disloyal.557 This could account for the significant number of ex-radical 
Presbyterians who enlisted in the yeomanry in the post-rebellion period to prove their 
allegiance to the Protestant cause.558 Loyalism was seen as support for the status quo 
in the dominance of church and state, and led to the emergence of a new Protestant 
Irish nationalism that was promoted within the yeomanry. It was such beliefs that led 
to the exclusion of many Catholics from the corps following the rebellion, ensuring 
that from 1800 the yeomanry was a nearly exclusive Protestant force. However, the 
British government never truly trusted the yeomanry and from 1798 it achieved 
greater control of the corps with the employment of brigade-majors from each county 
who were appointed by the lord lieutenant. This ensured that individual corps 
commanders were more answerable to the direction of central government, ensuring 
Dublin Castle controlled the para-military force at a national level. This provided the 
commander-in-chief of the army with more flexibility in determining it use. After the 
rising the function of the yeomanry changed in that the corps were now not only to be 
used as a local police force, but also as a reserve of light troops, permanently on duty 
for the duration of the war and no longer limited to service in their immediate 
locality.559 In effect, the yeomanry had become a permanent army, at the disposal of 
the Protestant oligarchy, which was readily available to counteract any perceived 
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internal or external threat. The yeomanry had now evolved from a corps established 
for the protection of lives and property to one of defence of the Protestant state. 
The poor reputation of the Irish militia was fostered by the criticism of British 
generals and other senior regular officers. Critics such as Abercromby, Cornwallis 
and Moore believed that the militia was inefficient due to nepotism, where colonels 
nominated mainly inexperienced relatives and close associates for commissions based 
on their social connections rather than ability.560 Moore recorded in a diary entry that 
the militia officers were ‘profligate and idle, serving for the emolument, but neither 
from a sense of duty nor of military distinction.’561 Such criticism had some 
justification, although this system of patronage was an accepted practise throughout 
eighteenth-century British and Irish society. The poor reputation of the Irish militia 
determined the role of the organisation in the Irish establishment in the post-rebellion 
years. Prior to the uprising the 38 militia regiments formed the nucleus of an Irish 
army that had very few regular troops on strength and it remained the largest part of 
the army up until 1802, comprising an average of 53 percent of the crown forces in 
the kingdom between 1793 and 1802.562  However, although the militia lacked the 
discipline of regular infantry units, the regiments proved loyal and performed well 
when led by competent officers. Official correspondence to the contrary, as well as 
popular anti-Irish Catholic caricatures by Gillray and Cruikshank, have been used by 
numerous historians to substantiate the negative view that was promoted by the Irish 
Ascendancy. The militia was made the ‘scape-goat’ of the few reverses that the crown 
forces suffered in 1798 and it was eventually superseded by the yeomanry as the main 
internal defence force. However, it was the perception that the militia was a solely 
Catholic institution that was the main reason for its eventual relegation to a recruiting 
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corps for the regular army. And although those militiamen who enlisted in regular 
regiments were volunteers, such religious bias led to post-rebellion policies that 
ensured thousands of young Catholic men were either shipped off for foreign military 





 Militia Fencibles Regulars Other Total Percentage 
Militia 
1793 July 5,150  11,094  16,244 32 
1794 Jan. 9,495  8,514  18,009 53 
 July 11,967  4,134  16,101 74 
1795 Jan. 13,336  6,708  20,074 67 
 July 15,959  13,335  29,294 54 
1796 Jan. 17,437 10,068 1,676  29,181 60 
 July 18,093 8,612 1,936  28,641 63 
1797 Jan. 18,132 9,141 1,906  29,179 62 
 July 20,753 11,874 1,821  34,448 60 
1798 Jan. 22,728 10,751 1,830  35,309 64 
 July 22,930 13,247 2,380 2,516 41,073 56 
1799 Jan. 22,383 12,490 2,335 14,339 51,547 43 
 July 16,765 14,661 2,839 6,843 41,108 41 
1800 Jan. 18,183 16,934 2,338 2,108 39,589 46 
 July 16,765 15,965 8,258 2,787 43,775  38 
1801 Jan. 16,473 16,368  8,259 41,100 40 
 July 25,337 16,368 8,259  49,964 51 
1802 Jan. 25,245 14,827 10,407  50,479 50 
 
Table 6.2 – Irish establishment, 1793-1802 
(Sources: Kilmainham Papers- National Library of Ireland; Rebellion Papers- National 
 Archives of Ireland; Ferguson, ‘Army in Ireland,’ quoted in Nelson, p. 248) 
 
Contrary to the propaganda of the Ascendancy, the militia proved to be an 
effective and loyal component of the Irish establishment. The constant rotation of 
regular regiments to and from the kingdom ensured that the government was still 
reliant on the militia to provide the majority of its permanently mustered infantry 
force throughout the years of war with France. When Cornwallis formulated his new 
strategy of defence for Ireland in April 1800, he was forced to include the militia in 
the field force due to the lack of available troops. This policy involved the creation of 
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a mobile force of 20,000 and a stationary force of 15,000.563 It was intended that the 
mobile force would assemble at various locations before concentrating to challenge 
any invasion force. The stationary force, which was to comprise primarily of the 
militia, supported by fencibles and yeomanry, was intended to provide local defence 
and garrison strategic ports and cities. However, by May 1801 the Antrim, 
Roscommon, Fermanagh and Londonderry regiments, predominantly Protestant in 
rank and file, were included with the four battalions of light infantry, formed from the 
light companies of various militia regiments, in the mobile force.564 From this time 
the militia became more effective and professional through improved drills and 
training. In the same year drills books were issued to all sergeants and ranks above in 
an effort to counteract the inadequacies that had been exposed during the rebellion. 
And although the militia was never to be involved in any further action after 
Humbert’s invasion, the subsequent training received by the militiamen after 1798 
ensured that the militia became a more professional military organisation than the 
semi-trained establishment of the early 1790s. It had to be, as the militia veterans of 
1798 constituted the bulk of those that volunteered for regular service in the British 
army from 1800, ensuring that for a time the militia comprised largely of raw and 
undisciplined recruits.565  
The loyalty of the Irish militia towards the crown was obvious from the large 
number who volunteered for long-term service in the regular army. In March 1799, 
less than a year after the rebellion, Cornwallis had been approached by Dundas with a 
proposal of procuring recruits for regular regiments from the militia due to the 
deficiency in the British offensive force; ‘how far it is possible for your to prevail on 
the Irish Parliament to give us the power of recruiting into your regular 
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regiments…volunteers from the Irish militia. I understand from everybody that the 
men are excellent, and the defect in these militia corps arises from their being badly 
officered.’566 At this time Britain was desperate to replace the troops it had lost in the 
campaigns in the West Indies and on the continent. Dundas stated that if such a policy 
was followed the Irish establishment would be strengthened by having a complement 
of ten full-strength regular regiments, which together with the battalions of fencibles, 
would be of a sufficient force to counter any possible invasion, negating any reliance 
on either English or Irish militia.567 Cornwallis was mindful that such a move would 
upset the militia colonels, whose regiments would in effect be relegated to training 
cadres for the army. He was also wary that once line units had recruited to their full 
complement in Ireland that they would be immediately posted elsewhere, negating 
Dundas’s argument of strengthening the military forces of the kingdom.568 However, 
there was little opposition to the proposal, ensuring that volunteers were called for 
from January 1800.  A ceiling of 10,000 men from the militia was stipulated, with 
each regiment being delegated a quota based on their established full complement.569 
The total number of volunteers received in this initial call was 8,138, with them being 
distributed amongst the nine regular regiments that were stationed in Ireland at the 
time. To encourage the militiamen, bounties of eight guineas were offered for general 
service at a time when many were due for release from service into a country that was 
suffering from a poor harvest and unemployment.570 Although the economic crisis 
may have accounted for some to enlist, there is evidence that many volunteered 
through loyalty to their comrades as well as the crown. Thirteen militia regiments 
either reached or exceeded their quota of volunteers, with many militiamen joining 
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particular regiments en masse; the 68th Foot was the most popular with 1,777 
enlistments, the 54th received 800, the 64th gained 592, while the 13th enlisted 535.571 
Most of these volunteers were to see active service with Abercromby in Egypt the 
following year, where they were considered a superior class of recruit due to their 
previous military training.572 By 1805 an average of 3,000 militiamen annually were 
enlisting into regular regiments.573Their service and the constant demand for troops 
ensured that the call for recruits from the Irish militia was eventually to become an 
annual event during the wars with France. 
The unsavoury reputation that the militia had gained from the events of 1798 
ensured that many regiments wanted to prove their loyalty through service outside of 
Ireland. Although there was no legal authority to allow such service, some officers 
and enlisted men felt they could prove their questioned loyalty as part of a greater 
defence force. As early as 1796 individual regiments, such as the Dublin City and 
Queen’s County militias offered to serve in England but such offers were rejected.574 
From 1799 Dublin Castle received a flood of offers from regiments volunteering to 
serve anywhere in the British Isles, with the Queen’s County Militia offering to serve 
on the continent.575 Such proposals are understandable when coming from the 
predominantly Protestant officer corps, but some written offers had either been signed 
by warrant officers on behalf of their men or by the rank and file themselves, who 
were largely Catholic in composition. Dublin Castle had also favoured such moves in 
June 1798 where a system of interchange of militias between England and Ireland had 
been argued by Castlereagh. However, the infamy of the militia resulting from the 
debacle at Castlebar, together with the negative response of King George III, ensured 
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such measures were shelved: ‘I can by no means encourage the idea of any of the Irish 
militia coming to Great Britain; it would with reason offend the English militia; some 
going to Jersey, Guernsey, or North America might be countenanced.’576 The 
compromise offered by the king led to the King’s County Militia embarking in June 
1799 for a one-year garrison duty in Jersey, with the Wexford Militia sailing to 
Guernsey for similar service in August of the same year.577 Although the king 
relinquished his opposition to the proposed system in 1804, it was not until 1811 that 
there was sufficient political support for parliament to pass an act that provided for the 
interchange of the English and Irish militias. 
Revolutionary War 
 
 Napoleonic War  
July 1794 11,967 Jan 1804 18,639 
July 1795 15,959 Jan 1805 19,423 
July 1796 18,093 Jan 1806 18,750 
July 1797 20,753 Jan 1807 21,473 
July 1798 22,930   
July 1799 16,756 in Ireland Jan 1811 24,733 
Aug 1800 18,118 Feb 1812 14,149 in Ireland 
Feb 1801 22,886 Dec 1812 12,550 in Ireland 
July 1801 25,337 Dec 1813 12,901 in Ireland 
Jan  1802 25,245   
 
Table 6.3 - Irish Militia: Rank and File Strength 
 
(Source: Return of Effectives –State Papers office, Ireland, 620/50; Official Returns of Irish 
establishment- Home Office Papers: HO 100/35-102, National Archives, Kew)   
 
The interchange system was not without controversy. John Cookson’s claim 
that the introduction of the interchange system formalized the ‘Britannicization’ of the 
Irish garrison and the military occupation of the kingdom has some merit.578 As a 
result of the rebellion two distinctive strains of nationalism developed in Ireland. The 
loyalist Protestant minority displayed their British nationalistic fervour through 
service in the yeomanry, while Catholic military service was firmly identified through 
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enlistment in the militia and regular regiments, encouraged more by the opportunities 
for regular better-than-average pay, improved living conditions and adventure than 
any strong sense of British nationalism.579 The polarisation of the population 
intensified with the Ascendancy fearful of the military potential of the militia, whose 
association with the discontented peasantry was perceived as a continued threat. 
However, the Catholic population essentially remained loyal, with Catholics now 
concentrating on seeking representation and other rights from the British state rather 
than seeking any alliance with France. There was some concern from Catholic 
quarters that service in England would lead to Catholic militiamen being forced to 
attend Protestant church services, but such fears were soon abated when steps were 
taken for them to attend mass instead. Eventually, there were only two periods of 
interchange, 1811 and 1813 where a total of 29 regiments out of 38 served in Britain 
as part of the new system.580 Initially fourteen units were exchanged with English 
militia regiments in 1811, with all of these Irish corps remaining stationed in Britain 
until 1813. That year a second exchange was carried out where 14 Irish units 
transferred to Britain where they remained until late 1814 after the cessation of 
hostilities with France.581 The Meath Militia was the only regiment to be exchanged 
in 1812, while nine units were never exchanged. The Irish Catholic emancipationist, 
Daniel O’Donnell, vigorously protested against the bill in parliament, claiming 
(amongst other points) that the act was a conspiracy to take away Ireland’s native 
army and that it would lead to an annihilation of the Irish militia.582 What gives 
credence to the theory of ‘Britannicization’ is that in 1811 when the first exchange 
took place, 27 English militia and Scottish fencible regiments were transferred to 
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Ireland compared to the 14 Irish posted to Britain.583 It could be argued that the large 
number of regiments transferred from Britain to Ireland were simply to boost the 
strength of the garrison at a time when there were only a few weak regular battalions 
in the kingdom. However, whether or not by design, such moves ensured a significant 
increase in the number of perceived loyal Protestant troops in Ireland at the same time 
that there was a dramatic decrease of Catholic soldiers in the kingdom through the 
combination of interchange and enlistment in regular regiments.  
Prominent members of the Ascendancy, such as Castlereagh, may well have 
seen the interchange of militias as an opportunity for the de-Catholicization of the 
armed forces in Ireland, though there is no surviving correspondence that openly 
confirms this. Ironically, the militia was primarily seen by loyalists as a Catholic 
institution even though most of its officer corps, and at least a quarter of the rank and 
file, were Protestant. This fact has influenced the historiography surrounding the 
interchange system where it has been argued that it was predominantly ‘Catholic’ 
regiments that were posted out of the kingdom. The problem with this theory lies in 
determining what constituted a Catholic corps. There are insufficient surviving 
records of the Irish militia to confirm the religious composition of every regiment, 
with any estimation being based on the documentation regarding the composition of 
the light battalions and the comparison of the population of each corresponding 
county. However, this too may be misleading as Nelson argues that there was a 
tendency in some counties for a higher proportion of Protestants to enlist than the 
religious ratio of the population.584 What is clear is that a greater number of regiments 
from the Protestant stronghold of Ulster were never exchanged. These included the 
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Armagh, Cavan, Donegal and Tyrone militias, while only three regiments from 
provinces with high Catholic populations remained in the kingdom.585  
There is evidence to suggest that decisions regarding what Irish militia 
regiments were to be interchanged were determined by the regiments themselves. It 
appears that the majority of the militiamen favoured service in Britain. Subsequent to 
the bill being first introduced to parliament in May 1811, the lord lieutenant submitted 
a list of 23 regiments that had volunteered to serve in Britain, which included 929 
sergeants, 415 drummers and 16,218 other ranks.586 By the end of July 34 out of the 
38 units had volunteered, with the prospect of service in England acting for example 
as a stimulus in recruiting for the Clare Militia.587 The act stipulated that service in 
Britain and Ireland was to be limited to two years, with no more than one quarter of 
the English militia to serve in Ireland at any one time, while no more than one third of 
the Irish regiments were to be posted to Britain at one time.588 This ensured that no 
more than fourteen Irish regiments could serve outside the kingdom at any time. 
Overseas service for existing personnel was to be voluntary, where they had to swear 
a new oath to serve faithfully in any part of the United Kingdom. It was the 
recommendation of the lord lieutenant that the regiments should be exchanged 
according to the order in which their tender of service had been received.589 This may 
be one reason that few Ulster regiments were exchanged, in that there were no units 
from that province in the first interchange. This indicates that perhaps the Ulstermen 
were more interested in protecting their interests in Ireland than experiencing the 
excitement of service abroad and that the aforementioned Ulster regiments may have 
been amongst the four units that declined to volunteer. 
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Ireland’s greatest military role in the years 1799 to 1815 was as a source of 
recruits for the British army. The demands of war had ensured Catholics, as well as 
Protestants, had been recruited from the kingdom during the Seven Years war and the 
American War of Independence, even though at the time it was illegal for ‘Papists’ to 
serve in His Majesty’s forces.590 The repeal of the Penal laws and continued war with 
France ensured that Ireland was to provide Britain with a readily available supply of 
volunteers in the post-rebellion period. It was to this end that during this time the 
kingdom was to see a constant rotation of regular British regiments. Although there 
were numerous invasion scares in 1799, 1804, 1808 and 1811, the country was 
considered stable enough by the British government to allow the gradual reduction of 
regular troops from the Irish establishment. Britain’s army was relatively small 
compared to those of the major continental states, with the defence of the realm 
traditionally falling upon the might of the Royal Navy. However, campaigns in 
Flanders, the West Indies, the Iberian Peninsular and North America necessitated the 
augmentation of the army and the constant need to provide replacements of casualties. 
And although the garrison of Ireland was increased to safeguard against any possible 
insurrection or invasion, the kingdom was to prove to be an untapped source of man-
power that would eventually see 159,000 Irishmen integrated into British 
regiments.591 
An examination of official returns shows to what extent Ireland proved 
important to recruitment in the British army. The Irish establishment reached its 
greatest strength in January 1799, when there were 60,820 troops recorded in the 
kingdom.592 Only 11,183 of these were regular soldiers, with the rest being either 
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fencibles, yeomanry or militia.593 However, there was a decline in the size of the 
establishment, especially in the number of regular troops from this time. By the 
following year the establishment had been reduced to 50,502, with a massive 
reduction of regulars which then only equated to 3,976 remaining in Ireland.594  From 
1800 the number of regular troops permanently stationed in Ireland remained static, 
while the number of line regiments sent to the kingdom increased. Viewing the 
disembarking and embarkation returns shows a trend that continued up to the end of 
hostilities with France in 1815. Most regular units sent to Ireland were seriously 
under-strength on arrival but within a matter of months had recruited up to a full 
complement. These regiments were then posted elsewhere and replaced by other 
‘skeleton’ units where the process was repeated. An example was the two battalions 
of the 20th Foot, as well as the 36th Foot, that arrived in the kingdom in February 1800 
and embarked the following month after reaching full strength.595 The 63rd Foot 
arrived in February and took four months to reach its full complement before being 
posted elsewhere, while the 82nd Foot arrived and left in the same month.596 What 
becomes clear is that most of those Irishmen recruited into these regular units came 
from the militia. Numerically weak British battalions were sent to Ireland at a time 
when the period of service for many of the militiamen was due to expire.  
The offer of lucrative bounties, coupled with the promise of regular income 
and the chance to experience action and adventure in foreign service enticed 
thousands of young Irishmen to ‘take the king’s shilling.’ Militiamen were the most 
preferred recruits for regular regiments as they were considered semi-trained and had 
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already experienced the discipline of military life.597 The success of recruiting in 
Ireland is obvious when comparing the strength of regiments on their arrival to when 
they embarked for other service; the 13th Foot had only 271 rank and file on its arrival 
but left with 806; the 64th disembarked with 318 and left with 910; while the most 
popular regiment appears to have been the 68th Foot that only had 199 men when 
posted to Ireland but recorded a strength of 1,976 when it was posted elsewhere.598 
Another source of volunteers came from the Scottish fencibles. In July 1800 
Cornwallis reported that 2,500 men from the nineteen Scottish fencible units currently 
stationed in Ireland had volunteered for regular service in six Scottish line 
regiments.599 The criticism from colonels of the militia who argued that the bounties 
offered by the regular regiments would prevent the militias from securing enough 
recruits to replace those who had volunteered or were discharged generally proved 
unfounded. Ironically, another notable source of recruits came from captured Irish 
rebels who chose to enlist rather than face execution or transportation to the prison 
colony at Botany Bay.600 The significance of Irish recruitment into the rank and file of 
the British regular regiments, especially during the campaigning years of the 
Peninsula War, is evident by examining the composition of the battalions; in 1809 34 
percent of the 57th Foot were Irish, while in 1811 Irishmen accounted for 37 percent 
of the 29th Foot.601 Such ratios were typical of English infantry battalions throughout 
the period. 
Experience during 1798 ensured a change in the components of the Irish army. 
Most notable was the reduction of cavalry and the increased reliance on British 
fencibles. In a letter addressed to the duke of York in 1802 where Cornwallis outlined 
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his recommendations for the force required to successfully garrison the kingdom, he 
argued for less cavalry; ‘there is no part of the whole island where that species of 
troops can act in a body…I am of the opinion that 2,500 would be sufficient for any 
purposes which the services of that country could require.’602 His argument that heavy 
cavalry was impracticable and that only light dragoons should be employed 
influenced the increased reliance on the mounted corps of the yeomanry. Light 
cavalry were required to provide reconnaissance and intelligence, which the 
yeomanry with their local knowledge could provide. A second consideration in the 
reduction of this arm of the establishment post-1798 was the poor performance of 
cavalry against the rebel pikemen who caused considerable casualties when making a 
determined stand. The discipline and the loyalty of the ‘Irish Horse’ regiments, 
namely the 4th, 5th ,6th and 7th Dragoon Guards who had been a permanent feature of 
the establishment throughout the 18th century, was also in question due to the 
perceived disaffection within the ranks, leading to these formations being transferred 
to England in 1799.603 Of lesser importance was the disestablishment of the Royal 
Irish Artillery in 1801, when the ordnance and personnel were transferred to the Royal 
Artillery due to the Act of Union. With the demands for regular troops for overseas 
service constant, greater reliance was placed on British fencibles to provide a reliable 
infantry force in Ireland. This was emphasized in a letter from Pitt to Cornwallis in 
December 1799 when he was attempting to raise an army to attack Brest for which 
fencible regiments in Ireland had volunteered; ‘This …force of fencibles I think 
amounts to about 15,000 or 16,000 men, and would make a most valuable and 
important  addition, but I doubt whether any large part of it could be spared from 
Ireland…as we could hardly trust the internal safety of that country to a small  body 
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of regular cavalry, with Irish militia and volunteers.’604 This ensured that contrary to 
the composition of the establishment of the 1790s, by the end of the Napoleonic war 
the Irish garrison was predominantly an infantry force. 
A main feature of the British response to the threat of French invasion in the 
post-rebellion era was the proliferation of barracks and military posts established 
throughout the kingdom. This came about due to the greater reliance on British 
fencible and militia regiments in the kingdom, ensuring a substantial increase in the 
number of military barracks needed to house these troops. The construction of new 
permanent barracks, and improvements made to existing military posts, had been 
occurring prior to 1798 but without urgency and not in great numbers.605 The 
experiences of that year heightened the fears of insurrection and invasion which 
resulted in a greater permanent military presence. An example was the use of 
fencibles and militia from 1800 to build a military road through the Wicklow 
Mountains, which from 1803 was to be supported by the erection of a series of 
fortified barracks. These strongholds were garrisoned by one hundred men and were 
to serve a local or regional need, as opposed to being part of a national system of 
defence.606 It was posts of this size and smaller that became a permanent feature of 
the Irish establishment. According to an Army Medical Board report, by 1804 there 
were 94 permanent military barracks established in the kingdom of various sizes and 
states of repair.607 However, a return submitted in 1811 reveals the extent to which 
Ireland was under military occupation: there were 106 permanent barracks that were 
occupied by 46,351 men; as well as 163 temporary barracks or other buildings that 
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were housing 24,073 men at the time.608 The greatest example of the military 
domination of Ireland can be seen by comparing this garrison of 70,424 to the Irish 
establishment of 1793, which had a paper strength of around 15,000 but an effective 
strength of much less.609 And although the Irish population were generally no longer 
burdened with the system of ‘free quartering’ from 1800 onwards, it was the spread of 
barrack building throughout the country that became the catalyst for the military 
occupation of the kingdom. 
                                                
This included the construction of artillery batteries at strategic points such as 
Bantry Bay, Lough Swilly, the Shannon estuary, as well as improvements to the forts 
guarding the harbours at Dublin, Cork and Waterford.610 Much of this work was 
undertaken in response to the military memorandum of the defence of Ireland 
submitted to the British government in 1808 by General Dumouriez, a French émigré 
who was well informed of the details of the French invasion plans of 1796 and 
1798.611  At the same time a system of signal towers, known as ‘telegraph’ stations 
was introduced to provide rapid news of coastal shipping movements to the naval and 
military authorities, especially any which indicated a French invasion force.612 The 
‘semaphore’ system of signalling with pivotal arms fixed to a vertical staff was also 
used to provide better communications between local forces and the high command in 
Dublin. These stations were prominent along the south and west coasts and were 
intended to be manned by ‘sea fencibles’ recruited from members of the local 
population who had some nautical experience.613 A series of Martello towers were 
also constructed at strategic coastal points from 1804, such as Dublin, Bantry Bay and 
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Rosslare in an effort to hinder any landing at those locations.614 Each tower generally 
mounted one 18 or 24 pounder cannon and with an extreme range of a mile was 
intended to provide mutual support to other towers or batteries in the vicinity.615 A 
small number of towers were also constructed in the interior along the River Shannon 
to protect strategic crossings. Although records indicate that 74 such towers were 
planned, less than 50 were built, with the greatest concentration protecting Dublin.616 
The greater reliance on British fencible and militia regiments in the kingdom led to a 
substantial increase in the number of military barracks being built to house these 
troops.  
The massive augmentation of the military forces, coupled with the   
establishment of 269 permanent and temporary barracks in Ireland post-1798 provide 
convincing evidence of the military occupation by Britain of the kingdom. Such 
moves would have ensured that the Irish population would be left in no doubt as to the 
control Britain had over the country, with the posting of troops into garrisons 
throughout Ireland, no matter how small, serving as a permanent reminder of that. 
This strategy was obviously aimed at discouraging any further armed dissent from the 
rebellious and disaffected elements within Irish society, and to this end it proved 
successful. However, such moves were also instigated to counter the growth of the 
yeomanry whose self-interested policing policies against the Catholic majority had the 
potential to inflame further rebellion.  Clearly, from 1798 the British government was 
of the opinion that the neither the external or internal defence of Ireland could be 
entrusted to the Irish, whether Protestant or Catholic, and that it could only be 
maintained through British domination.    
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By examining data relating to policies, strategies, tactics, actions and 
experiences of the various participating organisations and individuals who were 
important to the military structure of Ireland during the era 1793-1815 in a broader 
context, this thesis has substantiated some traditional views while challenging a 
number of aspects of the historiography of the period. Clearly, a close study of the 
Irish militia proves that its traditional poor reputation is unjustified and that it was an 
essential organisation in the defence of Britain. This work also introduces the concept 
of British military occupation of Ireland from 1798 that has largely been ignored by 
British historians. And although the conflicting dual roles imposed on the Irish 
establishment proved detrimental to training and discipline, the military forces in 
Ireland succeeded in quickly extinguishing the rebellion. It is clear that in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries political expediency and the maintenance of 
professional military reputations have over-ridden the need for a more accurate 
account of the military history of Ireland during the turbulent and uncertain times. 
Until the late twentieth-century British historians have tended to accept and repeat the 
official versions of events promoted by the Ascendancy and British government at the 
time. However, the historiography surrounding the atrocities committed by all of the 
belligerent factions and the role of the Irish yeomanry in promoting the interests of the 
Ascendancy remains sound. The new Irish identity that has evolved through the 
creation of the Irish Republic in the 1940s has led to the emergence of a number of 
Irish revisionist historians whose works, concentrated on specific organisations, have 
exposed inconsistencies with some traditional views, particularly regarding the Irish 
militia and British fencibles. The conclusions of this study are a result of critical 
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analysis and synthesis of the traditional history and revisionist historians. What has 
become obvious is that the traditional account of the period had been formulated by 
those in power. More in-depth study of the experiences and motivation of the 
common Irishman to either rebel or enlist in the armed forces is required to achieve an 
even greater understanding of the period, but is beyond the scope of this work. What 
this argument does expose are some inaccuracies within the traditional historical 
views of Ireland and the motivations behind them.  
The period 1793 to 1815 proved to be a defining period in Irish history. The 
relaxation of the Penal Laws towards the end of the eighteenth century saw Irish 
Catholic gentry reclaiming wealth and influence that was seen as a threat by the 
Protestant minority.617 War with France amplified these fears with the arming of the 
Catholic peasantry through the creation of the Irish militia. The rise of the republican 
United Irish movement, coupled with the traditional agrarian protests of the Catholic 
peasantry, led to an increase in violent activity throughout the midlands and the 
border counties of Ulster and Leinster from 1795.618 This in turn prompted the 
formation of the yeomanry in an effort to provide local defence, especially in areas 
not garrisoned by the army.619 The ruthless methods promoted by some senior army 
officers and the government in the disaffected areas subsequently fostered an increase 
in support amongst the peasantry for open rebellion. The turning point proved to be in 
1798 when popular insurrection and the French invasion divided the nation. 
Sectarianism then halted the civil advances of the Catholic majority, while the 
Protestant Ascendancy was able to protect their interests in the kingdom, albeit, 
through political union with Britain. From this time British dominance of Ireland was 
asserted through military occupation, characterised by the augmentation of the 
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garrison with loyal British fencible and militia regiments, coupled with the removal of 
a significant portion of the Irish militia through the interchange system from 1811.620 
The continual construction of barracks, coast defences and smaller army posts, 
especially after 1798, became a permanent expression of British military occupation. 
With the rebellion and the reverses suffered by government forces being blamed on 
the Catholic peasantry and militia, the Protestant oligarchy cemented the yeomanry as 
the defending military arm of the ruling minority, while welcoming the increased 
presence of British forces to minimise the perceived internal and external threats. The 
religious bias that was resurrected during this time was to become a permanent feature 
of Irish society and ultimately influenced events in Ireland up to the present time. 
Clearly, Ireland was too important to the defence of Britain for it to be left in 
the hands of the Irish Ascendancy. The disorder within the kingdom proved an open 
invitation to the French who saw an opportunity to invade in an effort to de-stabilize 
Britain’s defences. The French saw Ireland as the British did, as a weak link in 
Britain’s chain of defence.621 The rebellion and repeated invasion attempts provided 
Pitt, Dundas, Cornwallis and Castlereagh with sufficient evidence to promote British 
control of the kingdom through the Act of Union which had previously been 
universally rejected by all parties.622 Once this had been achieved Britain could 
determine the defence strategies of Ireland that were considered insufficient while 
under control of the Irish parliament. It was necessary for Britain to secure control of 
the turbulent country to ensure that British troops were not unnecessarily drawn away 
from campaigns elsewhere to deal with insurgents, and that the French could not 
establish it as a base for expeditions to Britain. And although Pitt eventually gained 
sufficient support for the union from the Protestant oligarchy that was reliant on 
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increasing British military presence to maintain its interests in Ireland, the move 
would ensure that Britain could weaken the political strength of the uncompromising 
and self-interested Ascendancy that was becoming problematic to Britain’s defence 
strategies, which included taking advantage of the manpower resource provided by 
the Catholic population. 
Prior to 1798 the Ascendancy had strengthened its position through political 
intrigue. This first came about through an outpouring of protest from influential 
Protestant peers and politicians regarding the liberal policies of Fitzwilliam, who as 
lord lieutenant, was keen to incorporate the Catholic peerage and gentry into the Irish 
political system.623 Such protest led to his recall in 1795 and his replacement with the 
earl of Camden. Camden proved to be weak, indecisive and easily manipulated, 
ensuring internal government directives were heavily influenced by his council of 
Protestant Irish peers, led by Lords Clare and Carhampton.624 Such men successfully 
argued for the formation of the yeomanry to protect their own interests, with their 
intention to maintain Protestant control throughout the country. Constant calls for 
protection from the gentry put further pressure on the beleaguered viceroy, with 
Ascendancy-minded and connected generals such as Carhampton, Lake and Knox 
eager to employ counter-terror operations against the disaffected population. Further 
pressure from the Ascendancy and within the army, ensured Camden failed to back 
the humane tactics encouraged by Abercromby, even though they proved more 
successful in recovering the arms of insurgents, while reducing civil unrest.625 
Ironically, the resumption of terror tactics directed by Lake, and widely supported 
within the Irish parliament when he replaced Abercromby in April 1798, proved the 
catalyst for insurrection. Ultimately, this proved to the crown that the oppressive 
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policies of the Ascendancy were only promoting instability at a time when the 
security of the country was essential to the defence of Britain. 
It was through the Act of Union that the Ascendancy maintained its 
dominance in Ireland. Although, politically the kingdom had been reduced to a 
collection of parliamentary constituencies within the Westminster parliament, the 
Protestant minority benefited from inclusion in the Union. The British government 
had chosen to appease the Ascendancy by taking into consideration its concerns 
regarding Catholics. The promised emancipation failed to eventuate through lack of 
support prior to the union and a later change to a conservative government that was 
more sympathetic to the Ascendancy.626 In effect Britain had chosen to ally itself with 
the Ascendancy. This is understandable when considering the longstanding social, 
political and religious ties that bound them. The Ascendancy was considered by many 
simply as Englishmen who lived and held lands in Ireland, and that their zealous 
loyalty would ensure Britain’s best interests would be maintained there.627 
Furthermore, the strength of the yeomanry could not be ignored and was needed to 
provide internal security. Britain would most certainly have been in the impossible 
position of having to forcibly contain this sizable corps had the British government 
sided with the Catholic majority once union was complete. Such considerations 
ensured that, apart from the loss of legislative power, the Ascendancy maintained 
local control within Ireland. Any political support for the Catholics was limited due to 
the continued questions regarding their loyalty to the Protestant crown, especially 
after the rebellion.628 However, the question of the Catholics remained an enigma in 
that Britain needed to encourage their loyalty to provide internal stability and utilize 
their military potential. 
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The fears held by the Ascendancy against Catholics in the 1790s were 
unfounded. Throughout the period the bishops of the Catholic Church in Ireland had 
actively discouraged any rebellious activity against the government as it was not 
under any threat from the Ascendancy.629 The Catholic peerage and gentry were 
determined to maintain and improve their circumstances, while proving their loyalty 
to the crown through military service either in the regular army, militia or yeomanry. 
The predominantly Catholic militia had proven itself to be loyal to the crown 
throughout the period and instrumental in dealing with the uprisings. In general, the 
Catholic population failed to give active support to the rebellion, essentially due to 
limited influence of the United Irish in many counties, and that the concept of a 
republic was foreign to the uneducated peasantry.630 This ensured that the uprisings 
were nothing more than isolated revolts, stimulated by local circumstances rather than 
a religiously motivated insurrection. The rebellion in Wexford, which although being 
the only county in which any significant popular support was evident, and where 
several Catholic priests were amongst its leaders, was mainly motivated by local 
issues regarding the experiences of their flock rather than religious fervour.631 
Localised economic stress and United Irish propaganda had ensured that the rebellion 
in the county was initially led by aggrieved members of the Protestant gentry, such as 
Bagenal Harvey, with support from the Catholic peasantry mainly motivated by the 
recent counter-terror activities of the yeomanry and militia.632 One aspect of the rising 
in Ulster was that the rebellion there erupted without the support of the Catholic 
‘Defenders’ which the United Irish leadership had been counting on to provide the 
majority of their forces. It appears that those Catholics that did rise up throughout the 
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kingdom, did so either in protest to the government-instigated ‘terror’ or were forced 
to by pressure from United Irishmen within their community or neighbours.633 The 
most obvious evidence of the allegiance of Irish Catholics remains the thousands who 
enlisted in the British army before the rebellion, and increasingly after it, with the 
Irish accounting for more than one third of Britain’s Napoleonic and Victorian 
armies.634  
There appears to have been very little conflict between the ‘Hibernianization’ 
of the armed forces of the British crown and continued British rule in Ireland. The 
thousands of Catholic soldiers who enlisted in the militia and regular regiments during 
22 years of war with France provides proof of that. The British army had been 
recruiting Irish Catholics, albeit illegally, since the 1750s and the removal of the 
Penal laws in 1793 had only legalised a practice that was already in place. Although 
the reasons for enlisting were many and varied, some Irish militiamen chose to enlist 
in line battalions as they had become accustomed to military life. The army provided 
the peasantry with security through regular pay, pensions, education and 
accommodation in an era of fluctuating economic uncertainty. Ireland proved a 
lucrative recruiting ground for British regiments who struggled to find sufficient 
replacements in England, with Irishmen equating to more than one third of the total of 
the duke of Wellington’s army in the Peninsular, including forty percent of the rank 
and file.635 Religious bias may have hindered promotion of Catholics in the ranks, but 
this may have been due more to the lack of education than bigotry.636 Military service 
was seen by the Catholic peerage and gentry as an opportunity to prove loyalty to the 
crown once their traditional connection with Catholic Europe ended as a result of the 
                                                 
633 Hewitt, pp. 104-108  
634 Mike Chappell, Wellington’s Peninsula Regiments: The Irish (Oxford, 2003), p. 5 
635Ibid. 
636 Duke of Portland to Lord Windham (British Museum, Add. MSS 37845, ff. 77), quoted in J.R. 
Western, ‘Roman Catholics Holding Military Commissions in 1798,’ pp. 428-432  
 217
French Revolution; a loyalty they hoped would be repaid through emancipation that 
would have been unlikely under the Ascendancy. Continued British rule in the 
kingdom during this period was considered essential for the political improvement of 
the Catholic population, and thus received their support. 
The Irish yeomanry remained an enigma for Britain during the war years. The 
para-military force was tolerated as a necessary evil due to the pressures placed on the 
relatively small British army.  The government was dependent on the corps to provide 
localised internal security at a time of civil unrest, ensuring that the bulk of the army 
could concentrate on external defence measures.637 Yet the British government was 
fearful of the potential political power of the organisation, ensuring that it never 
allowed the corps to have the independence characterised in the old volunteer 
movement. Dublin Castle maintained a tight rein over the organisation through the 
authorisation of officers’ commissions, the supply of arms and the allocation of 
pay.638 Measures instigated by Cornwallis after the rebellion ensured control was 
maintained at a local level during times of crisis  through individual corps being 
brigaded together under the command of regular army generals allocated to each 
county.639 By doing so, the government was able to minimise the chance of further 
excesses which a number of the yeomanry corps had demonstrated in putting down 
the United Irish rising. The most compelling evidence of government lack of trust in 
yeomanry was the creation of the Royal Irish Constabulary shortly after the end of the 
Napoleonic Wars, which took over the policing roles throughout Ireland, thus 
marginalising the yeomanry and leading to its eventual dissolution in 1834.640     
                                                 
637 Morton, ‘The Rise of the Yeomanry,’ pp. 60-61 
638 Blackstock, An Ascendancy Army, p. 101-103  
639 Ibid. 
640 Ibid., p. 299 
 218
There is no doubt that the military forces in Ireland served the purposes of the 
British government. The militia proved essential in the suppression of the rebellion, 
where it provided the bulk of the forces that defeated the United Irish armies before 
reinforcements arrived from Britain.641 Although generally lacking the discipline of 
regular units, as a whole, the militia proved to be a determined and loyal force that 
unjustifiably gained a poor reputation through magnified isolated incidents and post-
rebellion Ascendancy propaganda. The historiography that has emerged regarding the 
corps has failed to emphasize the significance of the militia in recruitment of Irishmen 
into the regular army. The institution proved an essential part of Britain’s defence 
forces in that it provided the crown with thousands of partially trained soldiers at a 
time when the country needed to rapidly augment its professional army. Likewise, the 
yeomanry proved essential as auxiliaries in providing local defence against 
insurgency and unrest that was endemic in Ireland during this time. Due to lack of 
training, militarily, the yeomanry was limited to providing a supporting role to the 
army by securing strategic points and conducting garrison duty to allow the release of 
permanent troops for offensive operations.642 However, its importance to the 
government increased after 1798 as it proved significant in the policing of the 
kingdom. The ability to carry out civil and military functions made the corps 
indispensable to a government that desperately needed its regular forces elsewhere. 
Primarily, from 1798 the yeomanry provided the stability necessary to govern the 
disaffected island, and its zealous loyalism ensured Britain’s continued control of the 
country, albeit under the supervision of the British army. The experiences of 
rebellion, and the attitudes reinforced by it, ensured that the Irish Protestant oligarchy 
and the British government were both uncomfortable that the protection of the country 
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was reliant on the perceived ‘Catholic’ militia, which invariably led to the ‘Protestant’ 
yeomanry becoming the preferred armed institution of the kingdom from 1798. 
Likewise, the numerous fencible and militia regiments sent from Britain proved 
essential in providing a substantial military force in the defence of the kingdom. The 
quality of these troops varied, with the Scottish fencibles proving to be the most 
physically suitable for the counter-insurgent duties required of them.   
In contrast to the early 1790s, the Irish military establishment became 
‘Protestantised’ in the post-1798 period. There is no doubt that the deployment of the 
Irish militia to Britain from 1811 led to an increase in the number of British regiments 
in Ireland until 1815. However, prior to 1798 there appears to be no pattern of 
deployment within Ireland that would indicate any official religious bias towards 
‘Catholic’ regiments by the authorities at Dublin Castle.643 Initially, regiments were 
not to garrison the county from which it recruited and were regularly transferred to 
various locations to prevent the troops from developing sympathies with the local 
populace.644 The Ascendancy was certainly fearful of having formations of armed 
Catholics spread throughout the kingdom. However, the dispersal of the troops into 
small detachments in isolated locations, coupled with the massive reduction in the 
number of line battalions in Ireland, generally made it impossible for the militia to be 
placed under the supervision of regular troops. The rotation system continued after the 
event of 1798, but resulted in the militia being retained as garrison troops and formed 
reserves, increasingly relinquishing the policing role to the yeomanry. What is evident 
is that after 1798 any regiment involved in any unsavoury incident with the local 
population was usually transferred to prevent further confrontations. 
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Clearly, the poor reputation of the Irish militia, fostered by the Ascendancy 
and repeated by military historians such as Fortescue, was encouraged to cover the 
inadequacies of the high command and government polices. The dispersal of 
regiments in policing roles proved counter-productive in ensuring adequate training 
for the newly formed units, while the tolerated absence of regimental officers to 
pursue personal interests ensured a lack of leadership and further hindered any unit 
élan.645  The training that the militiamen received was generally limited to musket 
drill and marching, with no provisions made for specific training for counter-insurgent 
duties.646 The dispersal policies and insufficient training played a part in the few 
reverses that the militia suffered in the initial stages of the rebellion, such as Ourlart 
Hill and Enniscorthy, where small company-sized garrisons were isolated and 
overwhelmed by the superior numbers of rebels. The ignominious defeat of the 
government forces at Castlebar by the French later in the year was squarely blamed on 
the lack of discipline of the ‘Catholic’ militia when facing the enemy, with such views 
being reinforced by official criticism from Cornwallis.647 However, a close analysis of 
available evidence indicates that such condemnation was unjustified and politically 
motivated. Contemporary statements from eye-witnesses, including French officers, 
indicate that the militia behaved admirably until the order to retreat was given by 
General Hutchinson which prompted a rout of the government troops at a time when 
the French were considering withdrawing from the field due to the stout defence of 
their foe.648 Hutchinson had panicked and he and General Lake officially criticised 
the militia to deflect the blame from themselves. In fact, part of the defeat at Castlebar 
was due to confusion of command caused by Hutchinson’s superior, General Lake, 
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also being present.649 It proved politically expedient for Cornwallis to divert the 
blame onto the militia rather than causing further embarrassment by having the 
competency of his experienced senior officers questioned. Thus, the reputation of the 
militia remained tarnished. 
Ultimately, the British successfully dealt with the situation in Ireland in 1798. 
Dublin Castle had made great use of the intelligence networks that had penetrated the 
United Irish movement. This resulted in the removal of the senior rebel leadership in 
Leinster, ensuring that the rebellion became a leaderless, disorganised and 
spontaneous revolt which was quickly defeated.650 The isolated rebel forces were 
easily contained by the government army, which was reinforced from Britain by the 
secure sea link of the Irish Sea. The rebel organisation had been seriously weakened 
prior to the rebellion due to the counter-terror operations, especially in Ulster, which 
limited the chance of success.  The concentration of government forces, especially in 
and around Dublin, proved significant in preventing the capture of the capital which 
had been the main gaol of the insurgents. The United Irish attempt to engage the 
government forces in open battle proved a fatal flaw in their strategy, with any hope 
of success relying on a general popular uprising throughout the kingdom combined 
with a sizable French invasion. If this had been accomplished the British would had 
been forced to fight on two fronts, seriously stretching their military resources.       
The operations of the British army from 1795 up to 1798 left the Irish with 
historical memories of brutal repression. The ruthless counter-insurgent campaigns 
carried out by Carhampton and Lake prior to the rising resulted in a scale of death and 
destruction not seen in Ireland since Cromwell’s invasion in 1649. This government-
sponsored oppression only encouraged further disorder and was the catalyst for the 
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rebellion in 1798. The excesses of the army, prompted by the commander-in-chief and 
influenced by the Ascendancy, on the defeated rebels and unfortunate innocent 
population resulted in deaths far exceeding those sustained in open conflict and has 
remained a stain on the reputation of the British army.651 Although the post-rebellion 
years saw the demise of the Irish militia and the military occupation of the majority 
Catholic population by a zealous Protestant para-military force that was determined to 
maintain the Ascendancy, the increased presence of the British army in Ireland after 
1798 ensured the excesses of the yeomanry were kept in check. However, the political 
and military circumstances dictated that the British government chose to align itself 
with the Protestant minority to secure its own interests. The British army, including 
the Irish militia and yeomanry, was used as a means to secure peace in the kingdom 
during a time of war when national security remained the greatest priority. 
Unfortunately, the tactics used only led to further division and helped establish a 
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Appendix 1. - Return of Permanent Barracks in Ireland, August 1811: 
 including numbers of officers and men accommodated within 




  Cavalry- 
Officers & 
Men 












Ardglass       13 Carlisle Fort  238
Arklow     165 Camden Fort  211
Armagh     792 Haubolin 
battery 
 21
Athenry     109 Spoke Island  126
Athlone       1,486 Cove  128
Athy   64      86 Clogheen 76 
Aughavanagh       78 Dingle  84
Ballaghedenen       82 Donaghadee  21
Ballinrobe 119    157 Downpatrick  98
Ballyshannon     783 Drogheda  398
Banaghan     104 Drumgott  78
Bandon 116 1,035 Dungannon 
Fort 
 229
Belfast  1,186 Dundalk 249 739
Bellick battery       52 Dungarvan  102
Belturbet 161    324 Dunmore 74 
Boyle    289 Dunree Fort  32
Brey      67 Dunshaughlin  84
Cappoquin   38  Dublin City 827 4,031
Carlow 160   225 Enniskillen 111 549
Carrick-on-
Shannon 
   284 Fethard 117 
Carrick-on-
Suir 
 48   127 Fermoy 170 2,090
Cashel    333 Fork Hill  32
Castlebar  85   498 Foxford  83
Castlecomer    172 Galway  1,125
Castle Island      84 New Geneva  1,790
Cavan    594 Glencree  78
Chapelizod    385 Gort 120 
Charles Fort    576 Granard  245
Clare Castle    154 Jonesborough  42
Clonakilty      69 Kelogue  53
Clonmel 147 1,223 Kilkenny 74 828
Cork City- old 
barracks 
   712 Killough  118
Cork City- 
new barracks 
304 3,126 Kinsale  1,429
      



















Laragh       78 Portumna 93  
Leitrim       78 Roscommon 84 389
Limerick 300 2,614 Roscrea 22 353
Longford 209    210 New Ross 40 
Loughrea   84    798 Ross Castle  87
Mallow   92      1,046 Rostrevan  51
Man of War   43  Rutland  103
Meelick     33 Shannon 
Bridge 
 103
Middleton    865 Sligo 78 375
Mill Street      66 Swords  53
Monaghan  55  Tallagh 76 
Naas    169 Tralee  120
Navan  55  Tullamore 131 1,048
Naddeen      42 Waterford  596
Newry       1,168 Westport  188
Oughterrande    137 Wexford  616
Phoenix Park  45   302 Whiddy 
Island 
 267
Phillipstown       132  Youghall  445
      




Barracks that could accommodate whole battalions (500 men) included: 
 
Athlone   Galway  
Belfast   New Geneva 
Charles Fort  Kinsale 
Cork   Limerick 
Dundalk  Middleton 
Dublin   Newry 
Enniskillen  Waterford 
Fermoy 
 











Appendix 2. - Return of Temporary Barracks in Ireland, August 1811: 
 including numbers of officers and men accommodated within 



















Abbeyfeale    72 Castlelacken   41
Adare    31 Celbridge  26
Aglish    31 Charleville  105
Antrim  252 Clerahan  23
Askeatow  159 Clononey  1,778
Aughnaclay  857 Coleraine  156
Ballyfernon    21 Croome  36
Balbriggan    62 Derry 98 830
Ballina  293 Drumcallaghan  31
Ballinamult    52 Dunboyne  62
Ballinasloe      350 830 Dundrum  31
Ballymena    60 Dungannon  52
Ballymore 
Eustace 
   51 Dublin-Old 
Custom House 
 622
Ballybunion    30 D- Mary St  350
Ballintobey    23 D- Abbey St  160
Ballypatrick    12 D- Henry & 
Sackville Sts 
 258
Ballinglass  100 D- Earl St  8




Berehaven    75 D- Kenny 
House 
327 
Bere Island  313 D- Leinster 
House 
420 
Black Rock    32 D- Baggot St 219 
Bruff  120 D- Mespit St 83 
Bunoranna    62 D- Cork St  304
Bullivant    52 D- Portland St  6
Bunisoleigh    40 D- Recruiting 
Depot 
 232




Callan      12  24 D- Cope St  8
Cappowhite   41 Eskey  44
Causeway   32 Ennnis  216
Carrickfergus 
 



















Ennistimond    52 Monkstown  309
Eyrecourt  538 Mt. Catherine             13 57
Elphin   58  Mullinahope  53
Fryarstown    27 Mocklesshill  52
Freshford    20 Michelstown  106
Garristown    31 Nenagh  638
Goldenbridge    69   New Castle, 
Co. Limerick 
 228
Gorey    94 New Castle, 
Co. Kildare 
 25
Green Castle    51 New Inn  21
Hospital, Co. 
Leitrim 
   50 Newtownbarry  190
Howth    38 New 
Birmingham 
 52
Hammondtown    21 Omagh  409
Keady    31 Palmerstown  43
Kells, Co. 
Tipperary 
   20 Parsonstown  1,040
Kenmere  _ Patrick’s Well  41
Kilbiggan 154 412 Rathesole  25
Kilcock   41   77 Rathkeale  306
Kilcullen  222 Rathmullen  40
Kildare    99 Rathangan  31
Killarney  200 Skepsceene  _
Kilmanagh    14 Shanagolden 12 32
Kilmagany    12 Strabane  626
Kilrush    30 Templemore  60
Knockalla Fort    70 Tarbert  120
Killala    52 Templeodigan  25
Kilmacthomas  100 Three Mile 
Bridge 
 30
Kellinaule    80 Thurles  153
Kilmannan    14 Tipperary  258
Littlekenny    80 Trim  83
Lifford  489 Tuam  822
Lisburne    90  Tubbercorry  24
Listowel        196 Thomastown  16
Littleton          50 Tulsk  21
Magharafelt         30  Timolin  20
Maynooth         36         78 White Rock  328
Moate        371 Wicklow  89
Monasterwan          80 Urlingford  30
Mullingar        570   
 
 227
Total: 163 Temporary barracks accommodating 24,073 officers and men 
 
Grand total:  241 barracks throughout Ireland accommodating 70,424 officers and 
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